PATTERNS OF POWER

British Northern Nigeria

The Complete Study — How an Empire That Had Bought Its Conscience at Forty Per Cent of a Year's Spending Conquered the Largest Slave State on Earth in the Name of Abolition, Kept the Slavery, Kept the Slaveholders, and Told the Truth About It in Print

Thomas J. Bryan

with Claude (Anthropic)

held as tested, not revealed

PATTERNS OF POWER · BRITISH NORTHERN NIGERIA

PREFACE

> *What the study is for, how it was built, and the discipline it holds*

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The spine

Words are just words. In themselves they do nothing.

England is remembered as the nation that ended slavery, and the arithmetic behind the memory is real: twenty million pounds in 1833, some forty per cent of a year's public expenditure, borrowed, and not finally paid off until 2015.

But the memory gets the causation wrong, and this study begins by saying so, because the corpus's own Jamaica volume already established the correct account. The twenty millions went not to the freed but to their owners — and to the mortgagees, trustees and London merchant houses standing behind them; nearly half of it stayed in Britain, and between five and ten per cent of the entire British elite appear somewhere in the compensation records. The public paid, largely through duties on the consumption of people who could not vote, and the enslaved paid the balance themselves in the unwaged years of the apprenticeship. And the decision was not carried by conviction: it was carried by Schedule A of the Reform Act of 1832, which abolished the fifty-six boroughs the West India interest sat in and left its lobby with eleven members of Parliament. The planters were not out-argued. Their seats were abolished. **The twenty millions did not measure British belief. They measured the price of a proprietor's consent** — because a Parliament of

proprietors would not expropriate a proprietor, even to end a thing it had just voted intolerable.

And yet the belief was real. It was real in the chapels and the petitions and the sugar boycott and the two hundred pledged candidates of December 1832. It simply never held the pen. It raised the price of the order; it did not make the decision; and the people who signed their names never knew the difference.

Which is where this study actually starts. Because two generations of schooling then turned a transaction into a national epic — every element of it arithmetically true and its causation false throughout — and the epic became entirely, sincerely real in the men who inherited it.

And a belief that is real in the men who hold it, whatever its origin, will buy a great deal.

England found that the character of *the nation that had abolished slavery* was a possession: transferable, redeemable, and worth an enormous amount at the moment a continent came up for division. It found that an anti-slavery treaty could itemise, in advance, every instrument of a colonial state — administration, courts, garrisons, railways, telegraphs, flying columns — and call each one a means of suppressing the slave trade. It found that it could conquer the largest slave-holding state on earth in the name of abolition, and then, having conquered it, keep the slavery, keep the slaveholders, keep their courts, keep their law — and say so out loud, in print, in London, to a public that had paid for the abolition and did not blink.

That gap — between what was said at the metropole and what was done in the emirates — is the subject of this study. The spine is Thomas J. Bryan's, held from the outset: that the robe was not a lie told after the fact but an asset acquired before it, at genuine cost, and then spent; and that ruling through the conquered elite was the mechanism that let a nation earn money from an institution it had staked its conscience on destroying, while continuing, without dishonesty, to describe itself as its destroyer.

The model's contribution has been to test that claim against the record, and to report where the record refused it. It refused it in one important place, and the refusal made the claim stronger. Nothing was hidden. The continuation of slavery in Northern Nigeria was not a secret kept from the British public: it was **published** — by the High Commissioner's wife, at five hundred pages, in 1905, and by the High Commissioner himself, in a Command Paper laid before both Houses of Parliament in December 1903, including the sentence about the fugitive slaves who ran through the fields beside his column and were turned back. Parliament bought the report for one and threepence and moved on to the next item.

So the asymmetry in this study is not an asymmetry of facts. It is an asymmetry of frame. And that is the harder thing, and the worse one, because a concealment can be exposed and a frame cannot.

How it was built

One module at a time, verification first, over the arc the Field Manual sets out: a landscape and twelve modules, each with a framework function, each contributing a revision or a refinement back to the framework rather than merely applying it.

Every load-bearing quotation, date, and figure was checked against a source reproducing the primary text before it was written down. Public-domain primary sources — laws, treaties, despatches, parliamentary debates, annual reports, memoirs — are quoted **exactly**, at the length the argument needs, because the precise wording of a legal fiction *is* the point. Modern copyrighted scholarship is paraphrased and credited, never quoted at length. Where wording or provenance could not be confirmed, the line was dropped rather than guessed. Contested figures — and in this study almost every casualty figure is contested — are given as ranges, and marked as the victors' arithmetic where that is what they are.

Where the study failed to obtain something it needed, it says so on the face of the module. The enacted text of the Slavery Proclamation of 1901 was never obtained, and Modules 2, 5 and 6 record that gap rather than papering over it.

The discipline

Legibility is not pardon.

To explain how an order held, and why it held so cheaply, is not to grant that it was just. To show that Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman meant what he said, that Flora Shaw believed every word she wrote, that Frederick Lugard was solving a real fiscal problem with real intelligence, and that the Sokoto Caliphate had itself been founded by conquest and raided its neighbours annually for human beings — all of this is set down because it is the mechanism, not because it is a defence. A study that cannot credit what an order actually did has stopped measuring anything; a study that swallows the order's account of itself has stopped being a study.

Both columns stand. Neither cancels the other. Carrying both at once is the whole of the method.

The arithmetic is laid out. The sum is left to the reader.

The arc

Landscape · Sufficient to Cover Any Trifling Sins. The two societies on the eve — an empire that bought itself a character at forty per cent of a year's spending, and a caliphate built a century earlier by a jihad against oppression that had become, by 1903, simply the way the world was.

1 · The Right to Depose Kings and to Create Kings. *The floor of force.* Two hours, four Maxims, and a conqueror who took his title not from Britain nor from abolition but from the conquest he had just destroyed.

2 · What the Taxpayer Would Not Buy Twice. *The settlement.* Who got what: the emirs kept everything, Britain got a

country for the price of a garrison, and the enslaved bought their own freedom — one hundred and two thousand of them, at prices their owners set.

3 · Generally Happy and Contented. *The robe.* The truth was not hidden from the British public. It was published for it, by the High Commissioner's wife, who explained that it was not in the administration's interest to hurry.

4 · At Their Father's Keenly Expressed Desire. *Formation.* Twelve government schools against twenty-five thousand Qur'anic ones — and the emir who wanted his sons taught English, and was refused.

5 · All Sokoto Went Out Yesterday. *The cost column.* The only people Britain had to police were the only people who had believed Britain. Satiru, March 1906.

6 · The Crop He Grew Anyway. *Extraction.* A tax designed to compensate the emirs for their lost slave-raiding income; a railway built for Lancashire that carried the farmers' groundnuts instead; and, where there was no emir to shelter behind, the other kind of extraction altogether.

7 · I Did Not Enquire Too Curiously What Became of Them. *Information and suppression.* Lugard hid his war from his own government, because his government might have stopped it. He did not hide the slaves from Parliament, because Parliament would not.

8 · The Natural Growth of Their Own Political Genius. *Elite coordination and the default.* One officer per hundred thousand in the North; one per seventy thousand in the South. The complexity variable as a line item — and a sixth answer to the open problem.

9 · We Shouted Sawaba Before the Court. *Plurality or foreclosure.* The hands that could check an emir fell from five to one, and the one was in London and cared about the tax receipts. Indirect rule did not preserve the emirate; it made it absolute.

10 · Something Like a Profit and Loss Account. *Change and collapse.* The floor never cracked. It was priced, and found not worth the money.

11 · We Killed Men and Women and Seventeen Children. *The grim accounting.* The only continuous record of slave-raiding under British rule was kept by the raider — a District Head whom Britain confirmed in office, asked politely to stop, and did not depose for another seven years.

12 · The Eighteenth. *Convergence and divergence.* Lugard counted seventeen conquests of Hausaland before his own. He knew exactly what he was. The strongest case against this study, stated in full, and answered.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

PATTERNS OF POWER · BRITISH NORTHERN NIGERIA — LANDSCAPE

SUFFICIENT TO COVER ANY TRIFLING SINS

> *Landscape · The two societies on the eve of conquest — an empire that acquired a character it had not quite paid for, discovered what the character permitted, and sent men who wholly believed in it, and a caliphate built a century earlier by a jihad against oppression that had become, by 1903, simply the way the world was*

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The sentence that opens the study

On the evening of 3 July 1899, the House of Commons went into Committee to authorise the purchase of a country. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, proposed that £865,000 be issued out of the Consolidated Fund to the Royal Niger Company in consideration of the transfer to the Crown of its administrative powers, its treaty rights, and its property — a territory he described, in the same speech, as an area of something like half a million square miles with an estimated population of thirty millions. Members complained, with justice, that they had been given not a scrap of paper: the figures had been read aloud and they were being asked to vote on notes hastily taken. John Dillon called it a most monstrous job. Henry Labouchère explained to the House exactly how the treaties on which the whole transaction rested had been obtained — a European, an interpreter, a chief, a bottle of gin, and a mark made on a paper — and observed that in all parts of Africa the black

man is robbed for the benefit of the white man. The Committee divided twice. The Government carried it, 223 to 101.

And in the middle of that debate the Leader of the Opposition rose. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, a Liberal, a critic of empire, a man who would within seven years be Prime Minister and who would denounce methods of barbarism in South Africa, said that the Company's policy had been distinguished by an evident desire all through to deal with the great evils of slave raiding, slave driving and slavery itself — and then added the sentence this study is written around:

> "*That in itself should be sufficient to cover any trifling sins that may be brought home to the company in the course of its administration.*"

He was not being cynical. That is the whole difficulty. He meant it, and his audience understood him, and nobody in the chamber found the formulation remarkable. A body that had set itself against slavery had, by that fact, acquired a covering — and the covering was understood, by the most honourable man in the room, to extend over sins not yet specified, committed in a place nobody present had seen, by men accountable to nobody present. He said it out loud, four years before the Maxim guns went up the ridge outside Sokoto, and the House moved on to the next item.

This is the Landscape, and its function is to set the two societies side by side on the eve: the empire that had bought itself a conscience and then found out what the conscience would purchase, and the caliphate that had been built, ninety-nine years earlier, by a jihad against oppression, and that had become in the meantime simply the world. Both had a robe. Both had paid for it. And what each robe covered is the subject of everything that follows.

What Britain bought, and who was actually paid

The framework's sharpest diagnostic is the revealed-preference test: force never pays for what it does not need, so where a power that already holds uncontested violence pays a real and avoidable cost for a belief, the expenditure itself is the evidence that the belief was load-bearing for some audience whose compliance mattered. It is a good test. It is also the easiest test in the manual to run badly — because it asks a question about *cost*, and a large enough number tempts you to stop before asking the two questions that actually matter: **who paid it, and into whose hands did it go.**

Run it carelessly on British abolition and you get the national epic. Run it properly and you get something colder, and far more useful.

The arithmetic first, because it is real and it is not in dispute. The Slavery Abolition Act of 1833 freed roughly eight hundred thousand people and compensated, not them, but their owners: some forty-six thousand claims, over forty thousand awards, twenty million pounds. HM Treasury, answering a freedom-of-information request in 2018, confirmed the figure in its own words — the Government used £20 million to fund the Slavery Abolition Act 1833, and in 1833 this was equivalent to approximately forty per cent of the Government's total annual expenditure. Fifteen millions of it were borrowed, through a syndicate led by Nathan Rothschild and his brother-in-law Moses Montefiore; the debt was rolled into an undated gilt; and the 4% Consolidated Loan was not redeemed until 1 February 2015.

Now ask the questions the test actually requires.

Who was paid? Not the freed — not a penny. The claimants were the owners, and, because the Commission paid whoever held the legal interest in the property, also the **mortgagees, trustees, legatees and merchant creditors standing behind them**. Nearly half the money stayed in Britain. Absentee proprietors took somewhere between fifty-one and fifty-five per cent of the total.

Between five and ten per cent of the entire British elite appear somewhere in the compensation records — as owners, mortgagees, legatees, trustees, executors. The largest single award, £106,769, for two thousand five hundred and eight human beings across nine plantations, went to Sir John Gladstone, whose son would be Prime Minister four times. The money did not evaporate into a moral gesture. It was recycled into railways, marine insurance and banking, and it helped capitalise Victorian Britain.

And who paid? The public purse — which in 1833 was filled overwhelmingly by customs and excise, which is to say by taxes on the consumption of people who could not vote. And then the enslaved paid the balance themselves, twice: once in the **apprenticeship**, the years of unwaged labour the Act bound them to as the unpaid remainder of the purchase price, and once as subjects of an Empire whose revenues serviced the loan for the next hundred and eighty-two years.

So the twenty millions were not a sacrifice. **They were a transfer** — from a public that did not decide, to a proprietary class that did, and to the London houses that held its paper.

And the decision itself was not made by belief either. It was made by a schedule in an electoral statute that does not mention slavery. The Representation of the People Act of 1832 carried a table: **Schedule A, fifty-six parliamentary boroughs to return no members at all.** The West India interest sat in those boroughs. By 1833 the Society of West India Planters and Merchants — the lobby that had defended the plantation since 1775 — had eleven members of Parliament left. They were not out-argued. They lost no vote on the merits. **Their seats were abolished**, by an Act concerning the representation of England and Wales, passed in a constitutional crisis they had no part in. The Jamaica study in this collection lays that sequence out in full, and it is the correct account of how British slavery ended.

Which is what the revealed-preference test, run honestly, actually finds here — and the finding is sharper than the epic it

replaces. **The twenty millions do not measure the depth of British anti-slavery conviction. They measure the price of a proprietor's consent.** A Parliament of proprietors would not expropriate a proprietor, even to end a thing it had just voted intolerable, because the precedent would have alarmed every man in the room who owned anything at all. Compensation was not paid because Parliament loved the planters. It was paid because **the sanctity of property was worth twenty million pounds to defend, and the property in this instance happened to be people.**

And yet the belief was real — which is the whole engine of what follows

It was simply never the thing that held the pen.

It was real in the chapels: the Nonconformists, admitted to public office only in 1828, were the shock troops of British abolitionism, and it was their congregations that raised the petitions and gave up sugar. It was real in Elizabeth Heyrick's *Immediate, not Gradual Abolition* of 1824, and in the women's anti-slavery associations that took her argument and forced a cautious leadership's hand. It was real in the Agency Committee, which went out before the first reformed election in December 1832, bound parliamentary candidates to pledges, and returned over two hundred pledged men. Hundreds of thousands of people who would never own an acre or hold an office signed their names against a crime committed three thousand miles from anywhere they would ever stand, and they meant it.

That conviction did real work — and the framework can say exactly what work. It **raised the price of holding the order**. The Jamaica study states the rule and it is the one to carry here: *a popular pressure's causal contribution is almost always to the cost column, not to the decision — it changes the price of the order, and whether that price is paid depends entirely on who is holding the ledger when the bill arrives.* In 1760 the bill for Tacky's Revolt

arrived at a Parliament of planters, and was paid without comment. In 1832 the bill for Sam Sharpe's rising arrived at a Parliament six months from being dissolved and replaced.

Fuel, and a lever. Never the pen. And the men and women who signed the petitions never knew the difference — which is precisely what happens next.

What formation did with it

Because then two generations of schooling went to work on the story.

What the British schoolboy of 1870 learned was not Schedule A. He learned that his country had looked upon a great crime, and paid an enormous sum out of its own pocket to end it, and asked nothing in return, and then kept a squadron on the Atlantic for sixty years at a cost in ships and men and no profit whatever. Every element of that account is arithmetically true. Its causation is false in every particular. And there was no way on earth for the boy to know it, because the men who wrote his schoolbooks were, in a very high proportion, the men who had been paid.

So the robe was not honestly bought and then spent. It was acquired in a transaction, laundered by formation into a genuine national faith, and then spent — and it was spendable precisely because, by 1899, the faith was entirely real in the men who held it. *That the origin was built does not make the belief a lie; it makes it a thing that was built and then became real.* Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, rising in that chamber on 3 July 1899, believed every word he said. So did Flora Shaw. So, on the evidence of a lifetime, did Frederick Lugard. **A sincere man carrying an inherited robe is the most effective instrument an empire has ever had. He is not a hypocrite, and telling him he is one will not reach him.**

This is why the study cannot be written as an exposure — though not for the reason the epic suggests. Not because the belief was honestly purchased; it was not. **Because a belief with**

a transactional origin, driven deep enough by formation, becomes indistinguishable from a true one in the men who carry the rifles — and it will therefore fund and man a conquest that no lie could ever have financed.

And an asset is exactly what it became. Britain did not merely *hold* an anti-slavery conviction after 1833; Britain **was** the nation that had abolished slavery, and that description was a possession — transferable, redeemable, and worth an enormous amount at the moment a continent came up for division. The Empire had acquired a character, at the taxpayer's expense and by an accident of electoral reform. What it did with the character is the subject of everything that follows.

The treaty that named its own floor

Ordinarily a robe is laid over a floor after the fact, to make an established violence cheap to hold. The Brussels Act of 1890 runs the sequence the other way: it specifies the floor *in advance*, and it does so in the language of emancipation, in a public instrument signed by seventeen powers.

The signatories, the English text records, were equally actuated by the firm intention of putting an end to the crimes and devastations engendered by the traffic in African slaves, of efficiently protecting the aboriginal population of Africa, and of securing for that vast continent the benefits of peace and civilization. That is the preamble, and it is sincere in exactly the way Campbell-Bannerman was sincere. Then comes Article I, which is not a preamble but a specification, and which deserves to be read slowly, because it is the operational manual of the Scramble written down as an anti-slavery measure:

> "*The powers declare that the most effective means of counteracting the slave-trade in the interior of Africa are the following:*
> *1. Progressive organization of the administrative, judicial, religious, and military services in the African territories placed under the sovereignty or protectorate of civilized nations.*
> *2. The gradual establishment in the interior… of strongly occupied stations…*
> *3. The construction of roads, and in particular of railways, connecting the advanced stations with the coast…*
> *5. Establishment of telegraphic lines, insuring the communication of the posts and stations with the coast and with the administrative centres.*
> *6. Organization of expeditions and flying columns, to keep up the communication of the stations… to support repressive action…*
> *7. Restriction of the importation of fire-arms…*"

Administration, courts, garrisons, railways, telegraphs, flying columns, and a monopoly of modern weapons: every instrument of a colonial state, itemised, and each one declared to be a *means of counteracting the slave-trade*. Article II adds that the stations so established shall, among their subsidiary duties, give aid and protection to commercial enterprises and prepare the way for the foundation of permanent centres of cultivation and of commercial settlements. Article IV provides that the powers may in all cases delegate to companies provided with charters all or a portion of the engagements which they assume. And Article VII — hold this one; it will be needed again, and it will be needed with force — provides:

> "*Any fugitive slave claiming, on the continent, the protection of the signatory powers, shall receive it, and shall be received in the camps and stations officially established by said powers.*"

Britain signed that in 1890. In Northern Nigeria, within a decade of the conquest, a slave who ran from his master could be dealt with as a vagrant. That is Module 5, and it will not need decorating.

The Act of Brussels is not a lie about the partition of Africa. It is a licence for it, drawn up by people who believed every word — and it arrives before the conquest rather than after, so that the conquest, when it comes, is pre-justified and its justification does not have to be improvised over the corpses.

The company that wore it

The instrument on the Niger was a chartered company. Sir George Goldie's Royal Niger Company received its charter in July 1886, and it did what a stationary bandit does: it made treaties, levied customs, kept order, and paid dividends. Hicks-Beach told the Commons that on its paid-up capital of half a million it had divided amongst its shareholders six per cent during each year since the charter was granted.

He also told them, in the same breath, what the Company had done for the cause. It put down slave-raiding and massacres over a great area. Some two or three years ago it abolished the legal status of slavery within its own jurisdiction. It had checked the trade in spirits. And — the detail that shows how well the metropole understood what lay upriver — the Company had further established very valuable relations with the great empires of Sokoto and Gando, empires which are, as compared with African tribes generally, really civilised countries.

There is the whole thing, in one Chancellor's speech: a firm that abolished the legal status of slavery, paid six per cent, and did business with a slave empire it acknowledged to be a civilised state. Nobody in the chamber thought these facts sat oddly together, because the robe had already reconciled them. The Company's slave-trade record, Campbell-Bannerman said, was sufficient to cover any trifling sins.

The £865,000 breaks down, in Hicks-Beach's own accounting, into £300,000 to redeem the territory's debt, £300,000 for unexhausted improvements, £150,000 for land and mineral rights and dislocation of trade, and £115,000 for plant — and the Company was to keep, for ninety-nine years, half the proceeds of any mineral royalty in a defined block of Northern Nigeria between the Niger on the west and a line drawn from Yola to Zinder on the east. On 1 January 1900 the charter lapsed, and at Lokoja a colonel of the West African Frontier Force named Frederick Lugard read a proclamation aloud, and the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria came into being: some two hundred and fifty-five to three hundred thousand square miles, perhaps ten million people, and a Treasury in London that would fund the difference by grant-in-aid and would want to know, every year, when the difference would stop.

The other robe, and the conquest that made it

Now cross the Niger, and refuse the two easy pictures — the exotic despotism of the conqueror's brochure, and the golden age of the apologist's. What Lugard was about to meet was a state: a state with a tax system, a judiciary, a scholarly class, a bureaucracy, a standing cavalry, an aristocracy, and a slave economy. Read it the way you would read eighteenth-century Prussia, because that is what it was.

And read it, above all, as a *former conquest that had reached the self-running pole* — the framework's recursion, and its cleanest documented instance. There is no aboriginal baseline anywhere in this study. What the British broke in 1903 was itself a floor laid in 1804.

Usman dan Fodio was a Fulani scholar and preacher in Gobir, northernmost and most militant of the Hausa kingdoms, and his indictment of the Hausa kings was not primarily an indictment of their unbelief. It was an indictment of their *government*: illegal taxation levied on the common people, arbitrary confiscation of

property, judges who took bribes, the sacred law bent to the interest of whoever was bending it — and the enslavement of people who had no business being enslaved. He preached against oppression, and the *talakawa*, the commoners, heard him. When Yunfa of Gobir moved against him, dan Fodio made a hijra to Gudu in February 1804, declared the jihad, and within four years his forces had taken Alkalawa and killed the king. Out of that came a caliphate of some thirty emirates, the largest polity in nineteenth-century Africa, ruled from Sokoto by his son Muhammad Bello under the title of Commander of the Faithful.

That was a conquest, and it was justified by a robe, and the robe said: *we have come to stop the oppression of the weak by the strong.*

By 1903 the robe had done its work so thoroughly that it was no longer visible as a robe at all. Islamic law, the emirate structure, the Fulani aristocracy, the Ramadan calendar, the Friday prayer, the Arabic learning of the *mallams* — these were not, to a Hausa farmer in Kano or Zaria, a policy adopted a century ago by an armed reformer. They were the furniture of reality. The order had reached the cheap pole. It ran on the conviction of the governed, and the conviction was genuine, and the men who died in the square outside Sokoto on 15 March 1903 were not dupes defending a fraud. They were men defending their world, and the origin of a world does not make it less a world. That the Caliphate was built does not make its belief a lie; it makes it a thing that was built and then became real, which is more durable than a lie and harder to break.

The thing at the centre of it

And that world was, on the evidence of its own records and of the people it raided, one of the largest slave societies in modern history. This must be stated flatly, without relish and without flinching, because the study is worthless if it flinches here.

The standard scholarship — Lovejoy and Hogendorn, whose *Slow Death for Slavery* is the base text and is paraphrased here, not quoted — holds that at the time of the colonial conquest the Caliphate's enslaved population was certainly in excess of one million and perhaps more than two and a half million people. Lovejoy elsewhere, citing Watts, puts the enslaved at somewhere between a quarter and a half of the total population; Salau estimates that even before 1850 the enslaved approached half of a population of about eight million. Take it as a range, because it is one: one to two and a half million people, in a state of perhaps ten million. That is a proportion that puts Sokoto second in the modern world only to the American South.

Enslavement was not a private vice. It was state policy. Most emirates embarked on annual slave raids, and many required conquered peoples to pay tribute in slaves; tribute in human beings flowed to Sokoto and Gwandu by the thousand each year, and the trans-Saharan export alone ran, on Lovejoy's figures, in the thousands annually across the middle of the century. Whole districts of what would later be called the Middle Belt were raided into emptiness. Villages built walls against it. Children were taken from it. Those are facts, they belong to the people it happened to, and no argument in the modules that follow cancels them.

The critic at the founding

Here is the detail that makes this Landscape worth writing rather than merely worth summarising — the thing the recursion pays out.

The Caliphate's robe was contested, on precisely the charge Britain would bring a century later, *at the moment of its founding, by a Muslim scholar, from inside the same tradition.* Muhammad al-Amin al-Kanemi of Bornu — whose polity had been Muslim for some eight hundred years and who was watching Fulani columns burn his towns in the name of purifying Islam — wrote to Sokoto and asked, in substance, by what right. He denied that venerating

a tree made a land a land of unbelief, and offered Damietta as his example: a great city of learning between Egypt and Syria where the common people do the same thing at a tree, and not one scholar rises to fight them or calls them pagans. And he accused the jihadists of the specific crime of enslaving free Muslims in a country that had been Muslim for centuries.

The charge landed. It is Bello himself, in the standard translations of the correspondence, who is reported to have written that nothing caused the leaders of the jihad so much anxiety as the letter from Alhaji Aminu — and they answered it at length, and the answering is much of the reason we know what the jihad thought it was doing.

Set that beside Campbell-Bannerman and the arithmetic does itself. Two conquests, a century apart, in the same territory, over the same peasantry. Each was launched by men who sincerely believed they were ending an oppression. Each was accused, by a serious critic, of committing the oppression it had come to end. Each carried on. The Hausa farmer was liberated twice and never once — and the second liberator arrived carrying, as his warrant, an indictment of the first liberator's institutions, which he would shortly be paying to keep.

The two floors

Militarily the eve is not a contest and both sides knew it. The Caliphate's floor was cavalry: horsemen in quilted armour, spears, bows, a scattering of old muskets, and the walled city — an instrument that had held Hausaland for a century and was, against any neighbour it had ever faced, entirely adequate. Britain's floor was a small column of African soldiers under British officers, with artillery and Maxim guns, and the Brussels Act's arms embargo to ensure that the Caliphate could not buy the same.

The numbers survive. When the column came up to Sokoto on 15 March 1903 it consisted, on the standard reconstructions, of

twenty-five officers, five non-commissioned officers, a handful of medical staff, sixty-eight gunners, some six hundred and fifty rank and file, four hundred carriers, four Maxim guns and four 75mm pieces. The Sokoto army that met it was perhaps two thousand cavalry and four thousand infantry. The fighting lasted around two hours. The Caliphate lost about a hundred dead; the British had two soldiers severely wounded and two carriers hurt.

That is not a battle. It is a demonstration of what happens when a floor meets a better floor — and it is worth saying plainly, because the modules that follow are about belief, and belief is not what decided this. Force decided this. Everything else in the study is about what was done afterward, and why what was done afterward cost so little.

Reading the eve against the framework

The framework does not ask us to guess what Lugard will do. It tells us where to look, and it names the variable that will decide.

The Menu's governing variable is administrative complexity, and it has already been set. The Field Manual's finding is blunt: one variable predicts, largely on its own, which item a rational apex draws from the menu of answers to the open problem — *how complex the administrative apparatus already is*. A conqueror inheriting a simple chiefdom loses little by clearing it out. A conqueror inheriting a satrapal fiscal system or an examination-trained bureaucracy would destroy not only the men but the accumulated information he now needs and cannot rebuild in a generation, and preservation becomes nearly the only rational item on the menu. It is why Persia and China, the two most administratively complex civilisations in the corpus, are the two whose templates survived conquest after conquest.

By that measure the Sokoto Caliphate is not a chiefdom and not a tribe. It is an assessed and collected tax system, a trained judiciary applying a written law, a scholarly class, an appointed provincial aristocracy, a treasury, and a formation apparatus with

tens of thousands of schools in it. **The variable is at the high end, and it points one way.** Britain has not yet fired a shot, and the Menu has already narrowed to a single rational item, and the item is preservation.

Which sets the study's actual question. Britain arrives holding a robe that is entirely real in the men who wear it, whatever the transaction that produced it — and the robe demands that this order be dismantled. The administrative facts on the ground demand that it be preserved. Those two demands cannot both be met, and the whole history that follows is the working-out of which one gave way. This study exists to watch that collision, and to record, without flattery in either direction, which held and which bent.

And the corpus supplies the control. The same empire, the same Colonial Office, in overlapping decades, met an acephalous order in the Kenyan highlands — no emirs, no alkalis, no treasury, no assessed tax, no aristocracy to inherit — and drew the other item: it *forged* an elite that had never existed, imported its own formation, and tried to make the belief take. The framework will let us read the two side by side, and it tells us in advance what to watch for. Where a conqueror's belief does not take, he must hold the cost column up by visible force and watching, and *surveillance is the tell of a belief that never took*. So the test is not what either administration said to London. The test is what it had to build to sleep at night.

Hold that test in your hand. It is the instrument this entire study runs on, and the two colonies will answer it very differently.

A note on sources.

On the abolition arithmetic, and a correction this collection has made to itself. An earlier draft of this Landscape ran the revealed-preference test on the twenty millions and concluded that the expenditure proved the depth of British anti-slavery conviction. That reading was wrong, and it was wrong in the

direction of the Whig national epic — the version in which belief overcame interest. The correction is owed to this collection's own Jamaica study (Module 10, *Fifty-Six Boroughs*), and the argument above now follows it. **The test was not run badly because the arithmetic was false; it was run badly because it stopped at the size of the number and never asked who paid it and who received it.** That is a general lesson about the diagnostic and it belongs in the Field Manual, not only here.

The figures on the destination of the compensation are from Nicholas Draper's *The Price of Emancipation* (Cambridge, 2010) and the University College London *Legacies of British Slave-ownership* project (Hall, Draper, McClelland, Donington and Lang), both in copyright and therefore **paraphrased and credited, not quoted**: some forty-six thousand claims and over forty thousand awards; nearly half the money remaining in Britain; absentee proprietors taking between fifty-one and fifty-five per cent of the total; between five and ten per cent of the British elite appearing in the compensation records as owners, mortgagees, legatees, trustees or executors; the £15 million borrowing underwritten by a syndicate led by Nathan Rothschild and Moses Montefiore; and Sir John Gladstone's award of £106,769 for 2,508 enslaved people across nine plantations, the largest single award made. The Treasury's own 2018 freedom-of-information answer supplies the £20 million and the forty-per-cent-of-annual-expenditure figure, and is quoted in substance. **Schedule A of the Representation of the People Act 1832 — fifty-six boroughs to return no members — is public-domain statute**; the collapse of the West India lobby to eleven members of Parliament by 1833, and the Agency Committee's two hundred–odd pledged candidates in December 1832, are as the Jamaica study establishes them.

The historiographical dispute should be named rather than hidden. Eric Williams's *Capitalism and Slavery* (1944) argued abolition followed the declining profitability of the West Indies; Seymour Drescher's *Econocide* (1977) replied with evidence that

the British slave economy was not in terminal decline and that abolition therefore ran against economic interest. **This study takes neither side of that argument**, because it does not need to: the account above is structural, not economic. It says that the planters were not out-argued and were not out-competed — **their seats were abolished** — and that the compensation which followed was the price of a proprietor's consent rather than the measure of a nation's conscience. Both Williams and Drescher are compatible with that.

All other primary quotation here is exact and from public-domain sources reproducing the primary text, and where a load-bearing line could not be verified it has been left out. Campbell-Bannerman's "sufficient to cover any trifling sins," Hicks-Beach's account of the Royal Niger Company (the six per cent dividend, the suppression of slave-raiding, the abolition of the legal status of slavery within the Company's jurisdiction, "really civilised countries," the £865,000 broken into its four heads, the Yola–Zinder mineral line, the half-million square miles and thirty millions), Labouchère's "the black man is robbed for the benefit of the white man" and his account of how the treaties were signed, and Dillon's objection are all from the Commons Committee debate of 3 July 1899 (HC Deb, vol. 73, cc. 1289–1331), quoted from the Hansard text. The Brussels Act of 2 July 1890 is quoted from the official English text as proclaimed in the *United States Statutes at Large* (vol. 27, pp. 886 ff.): the preamble, Article I in its enumerated heads, Article II, Article IV, and Article VII on the fugitive slave. The £20 million and the "approximately 40% of the Government's total annual expenditure" are HM Treasury's own words, from its FOI response of 31 January 2018 (ref. FOI2018/00186), which also gives the redemption of the 4% Consolidated Loan on 1 February 2015.

The enslaved population of the Caliphate is given as a range and as a dispute, not as a finding: Lovejoy and Hogendorn's *Slow Death for Slavery* (in copyright; paraphrased and credited, not quoted at length) puts it above one million and possibly above two

and a half million; Lovejoy, citing Watts, gives twenty-five to fifty per cent of the total population; Salau's *Plantation Slavery in the Sokoto Caliphate* puts the enslaved near half of some eight million before 1850. Whether the Caliphate's economy is best described as slave-based or as peasant-based with a large slave sector is itself contested in the literature and is not adjudicated here. The order of battle at Sokoto on 15 March 1903 and the casualty figures are as given in the standard military reconstructions (Adeleye, *Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria*; Dusgate, *The Conquest of Northern Nigeria*; Muffett, *Concerning Brave Captains*) and are reported as they stand, with the Caliphate's dead given as "about a hundred," a figure that comes from the victors and should be held loosely.

The al-Kanemi correspondence is quoted only in substance and in short fragment, because the underlying letters are public-domain but the working English translations are not; the Damietta argument and the charge of enslaving free Muslims are given as the standard translations render them, and Bello's remark that nothing caused the jihad's leaders such anxiety as the letter from Alhaji Aminu is reported as it appears in those translations rather than asserted as verified verbatim primary. Dan Fodio's indictment of the Hausa kings (illegal taxation, arbitrary confiscation, corrupt judges, the law bent to interest, the enslavement of the free) is summarised from *Kitab al-Farq* and *Ta'lim al-Ikhwan* as the scholarship reports them, and is not quoted. Modern scholarship — Lovejoy, Hogendorn, Salau, Last, Adeleye, Johnston, Perham, Falola, Siollun — is paraphrased and credited throughout, never quoted at length.

And legibility is not pardon. To show that Campbell-Bannerman was sincere, that the twenty millions were really spent (whoever actually received them), and that the Caliphate really did raid its neighbours for human beings every year, is to explain how a conquest came to be launched and believed — not to grant that it was just, and not to grant that the order it destroyed was justly destroyed. Both facts stand, and neither cancels the other, and

carrying both at once is the whole discipline of this collection. The arithmetic is laid out. The sum is left to the reader.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

PATTERNS OF POWER · BRITISH NORTHERN NIGERIA — MODULE 1

THE RIGHT TO DEPOSE KINGS AND TO CREATE KINGS

> *Module 1 · The Floor of Force — how a hundred years of Fulani rule were ended in two hours by four Maxim guns, and how the conqueror, standing in the taken capital, took his title not from Britain nor from civilisation nor from abolition, but from the conquest he had just destroyed*

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The document

Six days after the Sokoto army was dispersed outside its own walls, on 21 March 1903, Sir Frederick Lugard stood in the conquered capital and addressed the Sultan-elect, the Waziri, and the elders of Sokoto. The document survives, with its own bureaucratic header intact — *An Address by Sir F. Lugard, High Commissioner, to the Sultan, Waziri and Elders of Sokoto, regarding the Conditions of British Rule, Reasons for the War, &c.* — and it notes that it was translated to them by Kiari, the messenger whom Sokoto had once turned away, and checked word by word by Major Burdon, the incoming Resident and a Hausa scholar. Colonel Morland was present, and Captain Abadie, and the Waziri, and Maiturare, who had been shot in the shoulder six days earlier while urging his Sultan to leave the field.

It is the most important document in this study, because in it the conqueror describes the floor of force in his own words, to the people he has just put underneath it, and then — in the same

breath, in the same speech — announces the settlement that will make the floor cheap to hold. The Landscape ended by naming the variable that would decide the Menu: how complex the administrative apparatus already is. In this address you can watch the variable pay out in real time, in the mouth of the man it was working on.

The road to the war

The road was a treaty, and the treaty was a fiction, and the fiction was permitted to die on a schedule the conqueror set.

The Royal Niger Company had made an agreement with Sokoto and paid a subsidy for it. When the Company's charter lapsed on 1 January 1900, Lugard inherited the paper and, by his own account, tried to keep it alive: "*I at once sent my trusted messenger, Kiari, to take my salutations to the Sultan of Sokoto, and to say that I held to the promises made by the Company, and looked to the Sultan to fulfill his pledges. I brought money to pay the subsidy when it should fall due.*"

Caliph Abdurrahman, who had been Sarkin Musulmi since 1891, read Lugard's proclamation aloud to his councillors and sent the messenger away without an answer. Whether that is a refusal or an insult depends entirely on which of the two men you are; Lugard chose insult: "*No answer was sent to my letter, which was an insult to me and to my King.*"

Then, one by one, the emirates. Ilorin submitted. Bida and Kontagora were broken. Yola, Muri, Bauchi, Gombe and Zaria followed by the beginning of 1902. The Caliphate did not answer any of it as a body, because it was not that kind of body — it was a religious suzerainty over some twenty to thirty emirates, each with its own forces, its own quarrels, and its own calculation, and Lugard worked that fracture with skill. He made his advances look like assistance. He offered the Emir of Zaria military help against a fugitive emir, provided it, and then simply stayed, established a garrison, and appointed a Resident over the Emir's objection;

when the Emir refused to come to Zungeru, he was arrested and exiled. This is not a footnote. It is how the floor was actually laid: not in two battles but in three years of arriving as a friend and remaining as a garrison.

The letter, and the war it did and did not justify

In May 1902, after the fall of Bauchi, Abdurrahman wrote to Lugard. The letter has been quoted a great deal and misattributed almost as often — it belongs to **Abdurrahman**, who died that October, not to Attahiru I, who had not yet succeeded — and Adeleye's *Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria* is the source to trust. Its operative sentence, in the standard translation, is:

> "*Between us and you there are no dealings except as between Mussulmans and unbelievers — war, as God Almighty has enjoined on us. There is no power or strength save in God on high.*"

That is a man naming the floor exactly, refusing the vocabulary of treaty and subsidy and friendship, and stating that what stands between the two of them is force. He was not wrong. He was also, in the framework's own terms, a man whose position had drawn his field so that submission was not in it — his authority was *amir al-mu'minin*, and there is no version of that office that treats with unbelievers as a subject.

Lugard called it tantamount to a declaration of war, and later showed the original letter to the assembled elders at Sokoto for identification, so that they could not say the war had come from nowhere. But the honest detail — and it is the detail that shows the seam already working — is that Lugard did not act on it for ten months, because, on the scholarship's reading of his own position, he did not think a letter would be enough to justify an invasion to the Colonial Office. He needed a cause London would accept. In October 1902 the Magaji of Keffi murdered Captain Moloney, the British Resident there, and fled — to Kano, where

the Emir received him with honour, and then to Sokoto, where he was received with honour again. Lugard had his cause.

He gave it to the elders straight: "*the Magaji of Keffi murdered the Resident — a lame man without arms to defend himself — and he ran to Kano and the Emir Aliyu received him with honour. So we went to Kano and fought and drove out Aliyu, and the Magaji ran to Sokoto and was treated with honour.*"

The arithmetic

Kano fell in February 1903. The column then moved on Sokoto, and on 15 March 1903 it came up over a ridge outside the walls and saw the caliphal army drawn up to meet it in the open.

The British force, on the standard reconstructions, was twenty-five officers, five non-commissioned officers, three medical staff, sixty-eight gunners, some six hundred and fifty rank and file — overwhelmingly African soldiers of the West African Frontier Force — four hundred carriers, four Maxim guns and four 75mm pieces. Facing it were roughly two thousand cavalry and four thousand infantry with spears, bows, and old muskets.

The Majidadi, a slave official of the Waziri, asked the Caliph for the *goron yaki*, the kola-nut of war, which is the sign of a man who intends to die, and charged the square with his young squire beside him, and both were shot down by machine-gun fire. The cavalry came in on the flanks. Within about twenty minutes the Maxims had broken the assault; the survivors closed around the Sokoto flag and were killed around it. The fighting lasted about two hours. Sokoto lost, on the victors' count, about a hundred dead. The British had two soldiers severely wounded and two carriers hurt, and one man dead.

Attahiru I did not surrender. He left the field, declared a *hijra*, and walked east with a following that grew at every settlement — an answer to conquest that is neither submission nor battle, and that the British found more alarming than either, because it emptied towns. They pursued him for four months. At Burmi, on

27 July 1903, they caught him. He was killed there with several hundred of his people; the standard accounts put the Caliphate's dead at seven hundred or more against eighty-odd British casualties, and the figures should be held as a range and as the victors' arithmetic. The Fulani Empire of Sokoto, founded on 21 February 1804, ended in the ditches of a walled town in what is now Gombe State, ninety-nine years and five months later.

That is the floor. Everything in the eleven modules that follow is about what it cost to *hold* — and the answer, astonishingly, is almost nothing. But the taking was force, plain force, and the plainness matters, because the men who did it were about to spend twenty years explaining that they had come to liberate.

What was disarmed, and by what instrument

The framework asks who was disarmed and how, and here the answer has an unusual elegance, because the disarmament was performed by the robe.

Article VIII of the Brussels Act of 1890 — the anti-slavery treaty — prohibited the importation of firearms, and especially of rifles and improved weapons, as well as of powder, ball and cartridges, throughout the whole zone between the twentieth parallel north and the twenty-second south, on the express ground that the arms trade fed the slave trade and destroyed the African population whose existence it is the express wish of the powers to protect. Article IX added that only flint-lock muskets and common trade powder might be withdrawn from warehouses for sale, and that the regions in which the slave-trade is carried on shall always be excluded even from that.

So the Caliphate met the Maxim gun with cavalry not because it was primitive — it was a state with a treasury, a cavalry arm, and money enough to buy modern rifles from the Sahara or the coast — but because a humanitarian convention signed by seventeen European powers had made it illegal to sell them to it. And when Lugard stood in Sokoto six days after the battle and set out the

conditions of British rule, he wrote the same clause into the settlement: "*It is forbidden to import firearms (except flint-locks)*", with permits for bearing arms to be issued at the Resident's discretion to trustworthy men.

The Landscape argued that a robe bought at real cost becomes an asset that can be spent. Here is the first instalment of the spending, and it is not rhetorical but physical: the anti-slavery arms embargo did not merely excuse the conquest, it *produced the force differential that made the conquest a two-hour engagement rather than a war.* A robe, written into international law, can do work in the world — disarming the future enemy before the war, in the name of protecting him.

The address: the floor names itself

Now to the document, and to the reason it is worth the whole module.

Lugard begins the operative section by disposing of the treaty, and the way he disposes of it is the way legal fictions are always disposed of — by making the victim responsible for its death:

> "*The old treaties are dead, you have killed them. Now these are the words which I, the High Commissioner, have to say for the future.*"

And then, having cleared the paper away, he states the title. Not the King's title. Not England's. Not civilisation's, and — mark this, because it is the hinge of the entire study — **not abolition's**:

> "*The Fulani in old times under Dan Fodio conquered this country. They took the right to rule over it, to levy taxes, to depose kings and to create kings. They in turn have by defeat lost their rule which has come into the hands of the British. All these things which I have said the Fulani by conquest took the right to do now pass to the British. Every Sultan and Emir and the principal officers of State will be appointed by the High Commissioner throughout all this country.*"

There is the framework's central claim, spoken aloud, by the man performing it, to the people it was performed on. Conquest confers the right to rule, to tax, and to make and unmake kings; that right was taken by force in 1804 and lost by force in 1903; and the new holder claims it *as the old holder's successor*. Lugard does not argue that the Fulani conquest was illegitimate. He argues that it was legitimate — legitimate enough to have created a transferable title, which he has now won.

And elsewhere in the same address he says the other true thing, the one that makes any later talk of a mission of friendship impossible to sustain: "*I came with troops, for though the Sultan had made a treaty of friendship it was well known that a white man could not come as a friend alone to Sokoto.*"

The floor, named by the man standing on it.

What he promised to leave standing

Read on, and the settlement of Module 2 is already there, announced on day one, in adjacent sentences.

The emirs keep their thrones — "*The Emirs and Chiefs who are appointed will rule over the people as of old time*". They keep their taxes, subject to approval and to a share paid to Government. They keep their courts — "*The Alkalis and the Emirs will hold the law courts as of old*" — with bribes, mutilation and inhuman imprisonment forbidden and death sentences subject to the Resident. They keep their religion, and here Lugard is

emphatic and unqualified: "*Government will in no way interfere with the Mohammedan religion. All men are free to worship God as they please. Mosques and prayer places will be treated with respect by us.*"

Government takes the land rights "*which the Fulani took by conquest from the people*" — again, title through the previous conqueror — and all minerals, and the sole right to tax traders, and the currency.

And then, having promised the aristocracy of the largest slave-holding state on earth that their thrones, their courts, their revenues and their faith are safe, Lugard turns to the institution that the British public believed this entire war had been fought to destroy, and he says this:

> "*Buying and selling slaves and enslaving people are forbidden… Every person, including slaves, has the right to appeal to the Resident… If slaves are ill-treated they will be set free as your Koran orders, otherwise Government does not desire to interfere with existing domestic relations.*"

Otherwise Government does not desire to interfere with existing domestic relations.

One to two and a half million human beings, in that clause, on 21 March 1903, in the ruins of Sokoto, in front of the men who owned them. Trading in them is forbidden; enslaving new people is forbidden; the ill-treated may be freed *as your Koran orders*, which is to say by the standard of the slave-owners' own law, administered by the slave-owners' own courts, which Lugard has just promised to leave standing. And otherwise — otherwise the Government does not desire to interfere.

Nothing needs to be added to that sentence. It is the whole study, spoken by its author, on the first day, and it will take another thirty-three years to work itself out.

The reasons for the war, and who was told which

One last thing the document does, and it does it structurally rather than by any single line. The address is headed, in its own bureaucratic hand, *Reasons for the War*. Read the reasons Lugard actually gives to the conquered, in order: the subsidy offered and the messenger insulted; the letter unanswered; the treaty broken by the emirates that took up arms; the letter of May 1902 declaring war; the murder of a lame and unarmed Resident at Keffi and the honour shown to his murderer at Kano and at Sokoto.

Slavery is not among them.

To Sokoto, Lugard gives grievances — the ordinary casus belli of any state that has been insulted and whose officer has been killed. To London, and to Exeter Hall, and to the readers of *The Times*, the warrant of this conquest was that a slave empire had been ended. Both accounts are true, and neither is the other, and the two audiences were never in the same room.

Reading the floor against the framework

The Menu drew itself, and the address is the receipt. The Landscape set the variable — administrative complexity, at the high end — and predicted that preservation would be nearly the only rational item on the menu. Watch what Lugard actually does with a conquered capital and a broken army and no one to stop him: he keeps the emirs, keeps the alkalis, keeps the courts, keeps the taxes, keeps the law, keeps the religion, and keeps the households. He is not being merciful and he is not being cynical; he is being *rational in a position*, and the position is the one the Field Manual describes — a conqueror who has just taken possession of an assessed tax system, a trained judiciary, and a provincial aristocracy, and who knows he cannot rebuild any of it in a generation. The corpus should log Northern Nigeria as a straightforward confirmation of the complexity variable at its strongest, with the unusual advantage that the conqueror

announced the draw out loud, six days after the battle, in a document that survives.

And it points at what the study is actually for. The robe Britain carried demanded that this order be dismantled. The apparatus Britain captured demanded that it be preserved. Both demands were live on 21 March 1903, and you can hear them in the same speech: *buying and selling slaves is forbidden* — and — *otherwise Government does not desire to interfere with existing domestic relations*. The apparatus won that sentence. Everything from Module 2 to Module 10 is the working-out of how a nation that had genuinely paid for abolition lived with the fact.

Title by substitution. The framework names three provenances for the trusted-information leg — forge it, redirect it, or inherit it by destroying the previous occupant. Lugard's address supplies a case of *redirect* executed not at the level of a channel but of sovereign title itself, and it is worth naming as such. He did not have to teach Hausaland a new theory of legitimate authority; Hausaland had been formed for a century in a theory that already held conquest to confer the right to rule, tax, and depose, because that is exactly how the Fulani had acquired those rights in 1804. So the cheapest available move was not to argue for a British right but to step into the Fulani one — and he made it in his first sentence of substance. **The previous conqueror's naturalised robe becomes the new conqueror's deed of title**, and it fits, because it was cut for whoever holds the floor.

The comparison the corpus already contains. In the Kenyan highlands, in the same decades, the same empire met an order with no emirs, no alkalis, no assessed tax and no aristocracy — and had to *forge* chiefs who had never existed, because there was no title to step into and no apparatus to inherit. The complexity variable predicts both draws, and the two studies read as a matched pair. What that cost Kenya, and what its absence saved Northern Nigeria, is the accounting Module 5 will run.

A note on the seam, entered now and carried forward. The information asymmetry in this study is not, so far, a concealment. Lugard told Sokoto that he came with troops because a white man could not come as a friend alone, that the Fulani had conquered and he had conquered them, and that he would not interfere with existing domestic relations. He told London that a slave empire had been ended. Both statements are accurate. What separates them is not a lie but an audience — and a partition of true statements by audience cannot be exposed, only assembled, and nobody in 1903 was in a position to assemble it. Watch whether that holds. Module 3 will test it against the hardest possible case: a book, published in London, that says the quiet part in print.

A note on sources.

The Address at Sokoto of 21 March 1903 is a public-domain colonial document and is quoted here exactly, at the length the argument requires. It is reproduced in A. H. M. Kirk-Greene's documentary collection *The Principles of Native Administration in Nigeria: Selected Documents 1900–1947* (Oxford, 1965), from which the clause "*Government will in no way interfere with the Mohammedan religion*" is cited in the peer-reviewed literature at p. 44; the full text, with its original header naming Kiari as interpreter and Major Burdon as the checker of the translation, and signed *F. D. L.*, is transcribed online from the printed original, and the transcription's own scanning artefacts corroborate rather than undermine it. The passages quoted — "*The old treaties are dead, you have killed them*"; the Fulani conquest as the source of the right "*to depose kings and to create kings*"; "*a white man could not come as a friend alone to Sokoto*"; the retention of the emirs, the alkali courts, the taxes and the religion; and "*otherwise Government does not desire to interfere with existing domestic relations*" — are given as the document gives them. Where the transcription carries obvious typographic corruption the letters have been silently restored and nothing else altered.

Caliph **Abdurrahman's** letter of **May 1902** is quoted in the standard translation as reproduced in the scholarship (Adeleye, *Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria, 1804–1906*, pp. 258–9; Dusgate, *The Conquest of Northern Nigeria*, p. 168). The attribution matters and is frequently got wrong: Abdurrahman reigned from 25 March 1891 to 10 October 1902 and wrote the letter; Attahiru I, to whom it is often ascribed, did not succeed until 13 October 1902. Lugard's treatment of it as tantamount to a declaration of war, and his simultaneous judgement that it would not by itself justify an invasion to the Colonial Office, are as the scholarship reports them and are given as interpretation, not as verified verbatim primary.

The Brussels Act of 2 July 1890, Articles VIII and IX, is quoted from the official English text as proclaimed in the *United States Statutes at Large*, vol. 27.

The order of battle at Sokoto and the casualty figures are as given in Adeleye, Dusgate, and Muffett's *Concerning Brave Captains*; the Majidadi's charge and the kola-nut of war come from the account of a Sokoto participant as recorded by H. A. S. Johnston. All casualty figures on the Caliphate's side are the victors' arithmetic and should be held loosely: about a hundred dead at Sokoto, seven hundred or more at Burmi on 27 July 1903, against small British losses. Modern scholarship (Adeleye, Last, Johnston, Tukur, Perham, Tibenderana, Lovejoy, Hogendorn) is paraphrased and credited, not quoted at length.

And legibility is not pardon. To set out that Lugard's title was intelligent, that his address was candid, and that the Caliphate had itself been founded by conquest is to explain how the thing was done and why it held so cheaply — not to grant that it was rightly done, and not to grant that the men shot down around their flag on 15 March 1903 died in a bad cause. The arithmetic is laid out. The sum is left to the reader.

PATTERNS OF POWER · BRITISH NORTHERN NIGERIA — MODULE 2

WHAT THE TAXPAYER WOULD NOT BUY TWICE

> *Module 2 · The Settlement — who got what: the emirs kept their thrones, their courts, their revenues and their slaves; Britain got a country for the price of a garrison; and the emancipation the British public had already purchased once, at forty per cent of a year's budget, was purchased a second time by the enslaved, out of their own wages, one body at a time*

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The proclamation, and the thing it did not say

Module 1 ended with the draw announced: keep the emirs, keep the courts, keep the law, keep the faith, and do not interfere with existing domestic relations. This module is the settlement that draw produced — the terms, party by party, and the bill.

The Slavery Proclamation of 1901 is a short instrument and it does three things, each of them real.

It made enslavement and the slave trade criminal offences, triable in the colonial courts. It declared that every child born to slave parents after 31 March 1901 was born free. And it abolished the *legal status* of slavery — which is to say that a British court would no longer recognise, or enforce, a master's proprietary rights in a human being.

Every one of those is a genuine act, and men in London who had spent their lives on this cause read the text and were satisfied. Slave-raiding did stop, and it stopped because the Maxim guns of Module 1 stopped it, and the raiding had been the engine of the

whole system; whole districts of the Middle Belt that had been harvested annually for a century were not harvested again. That is not nothing. It is, in fact, a very great deal, and any account of this that does not say so is not an account, it is a prosecution.

But read the instrument for what it does *not* contain, because the absence is the settlement.

It does not emancipate a single living person. It does not prohibit slaveholding. It does not compensate anyone, either owner or owned. It creates no fund, appropriates no money, and imposes no timetable. As the historians of the subject put it flatly: the policy abolished the legal status of slavery without affecting the existing relations between masters and the enslaved population. Slaves were not emancipated; the courts simply would no longer uphold the owner's rights over them.

Which courts?

Whose law

This is where the settlement is actually made, and it is made not in a proclamation but in a promise.

Lugard had told Sokoto on 21 March 1903 that "*the Alkalis and the Emirs will hold the law courts as of old*" and that "*Government will in no way interfere with the Mohammedan religion.*" Those promises were kept, and they were kept precisely. Under British rule the *sharia* courts of the emirates continued to determine the personal status of Muslims — marriage, divorce, debt, land, inheritance — and, in the same jurisdiction and under the same judges, slave emancipation.

So the arithmetic of legal status abolition is this. British law would not enforce a master's rights in a slave. Islamic law would, and Islamic law remained in force, administered by alkalis appointed by the emirs whom Lugard had appointed, and paid out of treasuries the emirs controlled. An enslaved man in Kano in 1905 did not live under British law. He lived under Maliki law, in an emir's court, in front of a judge his owner's class had selected

— and it was to that court that he had to apply if he wanted to be free.

And the British did not merely permit this arrangement. They *serviced* it. Lugard's *Political Memoranda* of 1906 — the confidential instructions issued to every Resident and political officer — contained Memorandum No. 6, "Slavery Questions," and Memorandum No. 22, on the condition of slaves and the native law regarding slavery in Northern Nigeria, the latter compiled from Residents' reports and from the advice of local Muslim jurists on how Islamic law was to be interpreted in slavery cases. In 1916, by Lugard's own order, the administration published F. H. Ruxton's *Maliki Law* in London, so that British officers could administer it correctly.

Set that beside Campbell-Bannerman in the Commons and hold both at once. The empire whose anti-slavery record was sufficient to cover any trifling sins commissioned a legal handbook of the slave law of the emirates, printed it in London, and issued it to its officers so that they could apply it accurately.

This is the complexity variable running at the second of the two levels the Field Manual asks a study to test separately. A conqueror can keep the man and raze the library — retain the useful minister while destroying the institution that trained him. Lugard did neither thing by halves. **He kept the man and he kept the library, and then he reprinted the library at his own expense.**

What the emirs got

Everything they had, minus the right to make war and minus the raids.

They kept their thrones — subject to appointment and deposition by the High Commissioner, which is not a small subtraction, and Module 8 will take it seriously. They kept their courts. They kept their religion, and they kept it under a British guarantee stronger than any they had ever had, since no *sharia*

court in Kano had previously been backed by a Maxim gun. They kept their revenues, on a formula: taxes collected by native officials, of which first a quarter and later a half went to the colonial government, the remainder to a Native Treasury out of which the emir and his officials drew fixed salaries. Lugard's early act was to separate the emirate's general treasury from the emir's privy purse — an intrusion, and a real one, but an intrusion of the auditor, not the abolitionist. By 1911 there were some fifty Native Treasuries in the Northern Provinces with a combined revenue in the region of £441,000.

And they kept their slaves.

Not on paper. On the ground. The Emir of Kano in 1903, the Sultan of Sokoto in 1903, the Waziri, the alkalis, the great households — the men who owned a substantial share of between one and two and a half million enslaved people — were told by the conqueror, in his own words at the occupation of Kano, that "*it was not my intention to interfere with the existing domestic slaves.*"

That is what he paid them with. And it cost him nothing, because he was not giving them anything; he was promising not to take something away.

What Britain got

A country, and a way of holding it that fit inside a Treasury grant-in-aid.

Some two hundred and fifty-five to three hundred thousand square miles and perhaps ten million people, administered through the men who had administered it the day before, with a Resident at each emir's elbow and a handful of political officers in the provinces. The ratio is the thing to look at, and it will be Module 5's whole subject: by the mid-1920s there was on the order of one British administrative officer for every hundred thousand Nigerians. That is not colonial rule as Algeria

understood it. That is a supervisory tenancy over somebody else's machine.

And that was the point, and Lugard was entirely open about why. Direct rule was never on the table, because — as the scholarship on his own reasoning puts it — the British Treasury and the British taxpayer would not carry it. Indirect rule was a matter of expediency before it was ever a philosophy. The Northern Protectorate ran a deficit for its entire existence and lived on grants from London, and every year London asked when the grants could stop.

Here is the sentence that connects Module 2 to the Landscape, and it should be read twice.

The British public had already bought one emancipation, and it had cost forty per cent of a year's public expenditure, and the loan was still being serviced. In 1833 the Treasury paid twenty million pounds to forty thousand slave-owners so that eight hundred thousand people in the West Indies could be freed — the largest payout in British history, borrowed, rolled into an undated gilt, and not finally redeemed until 1 February 2015. That is the price of buying freedom for people at the owners' valuation, and Britain had paid it once, and knew exactly what it cost.

In 1901, facing a slave population one and a half to three times the size of the West Indian one, in a territory that could not pay for its own administration, Britain did not pay it again.

Who paid, then

The slaves paid.

The mechanism was already there, waiting, and it was an institution of the Caliphate itself — *murgu*, the arrangement by which a slave could work partly on his own account and pay his owner a monthly sum in cowries in lieu of labour, and, by accumulating beyond that, purchase his own freedom at a price the owner set. Richardson, travelling in the middle of the nineteenth century, described it as universal in the Fulani

districts: the slaves brought their hundreds of cowries, and on the accumulated monthly payments of the poor the great man subsisted and was rich and powerful in the country.

British policy did not abolish *murgu*. It built the emancipation on it. Rather than free the enslaved, the colonial state abolished the legal status of slavery and encouraged them to buy themselves — through the emir's courts, under Maliki law, at a price negotiated with their owners.

Lovejoy and Hogendorn's study of the archive counts, in an appendix, the people who did it. **One hundred and two thousand.**

One hundred and two thousand human beings, out of between one and two and a half million, assembled the purchase price of their own bodies and handed it to the men who owned them, and walked out free — a transfer of wealth from the enslaved to the slave-owning aristocracy, executed inside the legal system of the largest slave state in modern history, supervised by the empire that had abolished slavery, and recorded in its files.

Many could not do it. Plantation slaves, who had no capacity to work on their own account, mostly could not. Slavery in Northern Nigeria was not finally abolished until **1936**, thirty-five years after the Proclamation, and only then under pressure that will be Module 10's subject.

In 1833 the taxpayer paid the master. In 1901 the slave paid the master. The master, in both cases, was paid.

The doors that were closed

If the enslaved were to buy themselves rather than be freed, then they had to be prevented from simply leaving — because in 1900–03 that is exactly what many of them began to do.

The scholarship is unambiguous, and it is the most damning single fact in the study. When British anti-slavery rhetoric arrived with the conquering columns, the enslaved *heard it*, and they acted on it: there was a widespread spontaneous flight of slaves

from their masters. And Lugard's administration moved quickly to stop it.

The instruments were three, and none of them mentions slavery.

Vagrancy. A person without a master, without land, and without visible means was a vagrant, and vagrancy was an offence. The fugitive who had believed the robe found that the robe's own author had made his flight a crime.

Land. Proprietary rights in land were enforced, which meant that a slave who left his master's farm had nowhere to go and nothing to farm, in a society where land was the only livelihood.

Tax. The Native Revenue Proclamation of 1906 put the individual into a cash relation with an emir's tax collector, and a man with no master and no land could not meet it.

Set that beside the Brussels Act of 1890, which Britain had signed:

> "*Any fugitive slave claiming, on the continent, the protection of the signatory powers, shall receive it, and shall be received in the camps and stations officially established by said powers.*" — *Article VII*

Both documents are British. Both are public. Eleven years separate them. The Act promises the fugitive slave sanctuary in the stations of the signatory powers; the Protectorate makes his flight a punishable idleness and returns his case to a court administering his owner's law. Nobody had to lie. The two instruments simply never appeared on the same desk, in the same language, before the same audience.

And there was a fourth door, closed more slowly. Lugard's pledge that Government would in no way interfere with the Mohammedan religion was, in itself, a promise of toleration and nothing worse. But his successors used it as the ground for excluding Christian missions from the Muslim emirates, and that exclusion became a hallmark of Northern Nigerian administration. The consequence is Module 4's subject and needs only naming here: the north got almost no mission schools, almost no mission

clinics, and almost no literate class that owed anything to Britain — while the south, where missions were free to work, got all three. The emirs were promised that nothing would come in that might unsettle the order the British had rented. That promise was kept too.

The settlement, entire

Set out the four parties and what each carried away, and the module has done its work.

The emirs kept their thrones, their courts, their law, their faith, their aristocratic revenues on a fixed salary, and their households — and lost the right to raid, the right to make war, the right to appoint themselves, and their sons' unmediated future. It was a real subordination and a real bargain, and Module 8 will show what it cost them in the end.

Britain got a territory of a quarter-million square miles at a price the Treasury could just about absorb, an anti-slavery victory it could announce at home in one sentence, a functioning tax system it did not have to build, and a peasantry it never had to persuade of anything — because the people who had been persuading them for a century were still in post.

The peasantry, the *talakawa*, got the end of the raids, which was a very great deal, and the same emir, the same alkali, the same tax, and a new share of that tax going to a distant government they never saw. This is why the study cannot be a simple indictment: for a Hausa farmer outside the walls, the conquest looked less like an occupation than like a change of the name on the top of the ledger.

And the enslaved got a proclamation that freed their unborn children, a court run by their owners' class in which to petition for themselves, an institution of self-purchase they had to fund out of their own labour, a vagrancy law if they ran, and thirty-five more years.

Reading the settlement against the framework

Classify it and be done: this is Co-opt, drawn exactly as the complexity variable predicts, and executed at both levels. Bind the rival claimant class to the centre rather than destroying, exporting, preventing or rotating it. What distinguishes Northern Nigeria from the classic instances — Ottoman *damat*, steppe marriage alliance, Ghazan's conversion — is that the classic form of Co-opt *costs something*: land, office, revenue, a daughter, a creed. Lugard bought the emirate aristocracy with a **promise of non-interference**, and non-interference costs the buyer nothing at the moment of purchase. He paid in the one currency he did not have to mint. **The cheapest co-optation available to any conqueror is the one whose price is a promise not to act** — and the corpus should hold Northern Nigeria as its exemplary case, because the thing he promised not to touch was the exact thing his robe existed to abolish, which meant the price of the settlement never appeared in the metropole's accounts at all. A thing you decline to do leaves no line in a ledger.

The bill for the robe was re-issued to a different payer, and the payers were its named beneficiaries. The Landscape established that a robe bought at real cost becomes a spendable asset; Module 1 showed it spent as an arms embargo. Here it is spent again, and the mechanism is uglier. Abolition was purchased once, in the metropole, by the metropole's taxpayers, at a price they felt. When the same robe was spent on Northern Nigeria, the metropole declined to pay a second time — and the cost was transferred to the people the robe named as its beneficiaries, who discharged it in instalments, in cowries and grain and hired labour, to the men who had owned them. The framework already holds that extraction is sorted by caste. This case adds a rung to it: **the cost of the legitimating belief itself is sorted by caste.** In the metropole the robe is a public good funded by public money; in the colony it is a private debt owed by the persons it was supposed to liberate.

And the seam has now taken its permanent form: the bilingual law. Module 1 noted that the asymmetry here is a partition of true statements by audience rather than a concealment. Legal-status abolition is that partition compressed into a single instrument. In London the 1901 Proclamation says, truly: *there is no slavery under British law in Northern Nigeria; the courts will not enforce a man's ownership of another.* In Kano it says, equally truly: *your master's rights subsist, under a law we have promised to preserve, in a court we have promised to leave standing, and if you run you are a vagrant.* It is not false in either language. It is one instrument whose truth-conditions differ according to which legal system the reader is standing in — and therefore **the seam does not run between the metropole and the colony. It runs through the statute.** That is why it held for thirty-five years and why no exposure ever broke it. There was nothing to expose. Anyone could read the Proclamation; reading it in London and reading it in Kano were different acts.

Module 3 puts that claim under the hardest test available. If the seam is a partition rather than a wall, then the truth should be publishable — and it was, in London, in 1905, at five hundred pages, by the High Commissioner's wife.

A note on sources.

The Slavery Proclamation of 1901 is described here from the documentary scholarship rather than quoted, because a verified full text of the enacted instrument was not obtained; what is asserted about its content — criminalisation of enslavement and the slave trade, freedom for children born after 31 March 1901, abolition of the legal status of slavery without emancipation, no compensation, no prohibition of slaveholding — is the settled and unanimous finding of the literature, and the date is confirmed both by the Colonial Office's own later despatch referring to persons "born in or brought within" the Northern Provinces after the 31st March, 1901, and by Lady Lugard's contemporary

account, which gives the same rule as applying to children born after 1 April 1901. The Proclamation is a load-bearing document for this study and should be read in full before Module 6; it has not been, and this note says so.

Lugard's "*it was not my intention to interfere with the existing domestic slaves*", spoken on the occupation of Kano in 1903, is quoted from the documentary edition of the Northern Nigeria slavery papers published in *African Economic History* (vol. 40, 2012), where it is described as the only surviving public declaration of slavery policy from the period of the conquest. Memoranda Nos. 6 and 22 of Lugard's *Political Memoranda* (issued as *Instructions to Political and Other Officers*, London, HMSO, 1906) are described from the same edition and from Polly Hill's account; their texts have not been read directly and no words are put in Lugard's mouth from them. The Sokoto address of 21 March 1903 is quoted exactly, as in Module 1.

The figure of 102,000 self-purchases and the terminal date of 1936 are from Lovejoy and Hogendorn, *Slow Death for Slavery: The Course of Abolition in Northern Nigeria, 1897–1936* (Cambridge, 1993), which is in copyright and is paraphrased and credited throughout, never quoted at length; the appendix summarising the characteristics of the slaves who purchased their freedom is the source of the count. *Murgu* is described from Lovejoy's "Murgu: The Wages of Slavery in the Sokoto Caliphate" (*Slavery & Abolition*, 14:1, 1993) and, for the mid-century practice, from James Richardson's traveller's account of the 1850s, which is public domain and is paraphrased here rather than quoted at length. The suppression of slave flight, the use of vagrancy law, land-right enforcement and taxation to check it, the survival of Islamic law and the alkali courts' jurisdiction over emancipation, and the reclassification of enslaved women as dependent members of their former owners' households are all as the scholarship reports (Lovejoy, Hogendorn, Hill, Jumare, Tibenderana).

The revenue formula (a quarter, later a half, of native-collected tax to the colonial government), the separation of the emir's privy purse, the Native Treasuries and the c. £441,000 figure for c. 1911, and the missionary exclusion are given from the secondary literature and should be treated as approximations, not audited figures; Module 6 will do the accounting properly. The £20 million and the forty per cent are HM Treasury's own, as cited in the Landscape.

And legibility is not pardon. That the raids stopped, that the raids stopping saved a great many lives, and that Lugard was solving a real fiscal problem with real intelligence — all of this is true, and it is set down here because a study that cannot say it is not measuring anything. It does not touch the other column. The arithmetic is laid out. The sum is left to the reader.

PATTERNS OF POWER · BRITISH NORTHERN NIGERIA — MODULE 3

GENERALLY HAPPY AND CONTENTED

> *Module 3 · The Robe — the continuation of slavery in Northern Nigeria was not concealed from the British public. It was published for it, in five hundred pages, in London, in 1905, by the High Commissioner's wife — who had reported the Brussels Anti-Slavery Conference, who had given the country its name, and who explained to her readers that it was not in the administration's interest to hurry*

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The author

Modules 1 and 2 established that the seam of this study is a partition of true statements by audience rather than a wall between a truth and a lie. This module puts that claim under the hardest test the record allows, and the test is a book.

The framework says a robe is cut for the audience whose belief the order needs, and that the trusted-information leg — the channel through which the audience learns what is true — is the expensive part. It rarely gives us the tailor by name.

Here it does.

Flora Louisa Shaw was the first woman on the permanent staff of *The Times* and, from 1893, its Colonial Editor, at eight hundred pounds a year — more than any woman in British journalism. She had been sent by the *Manchester Guardian*, as the only woman reporter present, to cover the Anti-Slavery Conference at Brussels: the conference that produced the General Act of 1890, whose Article I declares that the most effective means of

counteracting the slave-trade are administration, garrisons, railways, telegraphs and flying columns, and whose Article VII promises the fugitive slave the protection of the signatory powers. She was a friend of Cecil Rhodes and of George Goldie of the Royal Niger Company. In *The Times* of 8 January 1897 she proposed a name for the Company's territories:

> "*The name Nigeria applying to no other part of Africa may without offence to any neighbours be accepted as co-extensive with the territories over which the Royal Niger Company has extended British influence…*"

In June 1902 she married Sir Frederick Lugard, High Commissioner of Northern Nigeria. In 1905 — two years after Sokoto, one year before her husband left the Protectorate — she published *A Tropical Dependency*, five hundred pages, London, James Nisbet & Co.

So: the woman who reported the anti-slavery treaty, named the country, married its conqueror, and then wrote its history for the British reading public. The trusted-information leg of this order was not a mechanism. It was a person, and she was in the room for every stage of it.

And here is the thing that matters, and that the whole module turns on: **she did not lie.**

Chapter One

The book opens with the reason for the enterprise, and it is worth reading with attention, because it is not a chapter about slavery and it is entirely a chapter about slavery.

She begins by correcting a British misapprehension — "*It has become the habit of the British mind to think of the British Empire as a white empire. But, as a matter of fact, we all know that ours is not a white empire*" — and moves at once to the governing conclusion:

> "*The administration of this quarter of the Empire cannot be conducted on the principle of self-government as that phrase is understood by white men. It must be more or less in the nature of an autocracy which leaves with the rulers full responsibility for the prosperity of the ruled.*"

Then the commercial engine, stated without a scrap of embarrassment, because in 1905 no embarrassment was required:

> "*The increase which might result to British trade by a mere opening of the markets that lie as yet unapproached within the Empire, is past calculation… At home the very prosperity of our trade creates a demand for expansion. And these potential markets are our own. We may do as we will within them.*"

And then, immediately, in the same breath, the problem:

> "*The question of labour is more serious. Tropical labour is coloured labour, and we have not yet faced the question of organising free coloured labour… The industrial development of ancient civilisations was largely based on slavery, and, from the earliest periods of which history has any record, countries lying within the tropics — always prolific of population — were raided to supply the slave-markets of the world.*"

There is the architecture of the whole thing, on the first three pages of the book. Autocracy is the necessary form. The markets are ours and we may do as we will within them. What we need from them is labour. Tropical labour has always been slave labour, and the task of the age is to organise it *free*.

Anti-slavery, in Chapter One, is not the mission that justifies the enterprise. It is a labour-supply problem *inside* the enterprise. Lugard would publish the same argument seventeen years later, in *The Dual Mandate*, and get a doctrine named after him for it. His wife wrote it first.

What she told them about the slaves

Now to page 462, and to the sentence that gives this module its title.

Shaw explains to her readers that the farm slaves of Northern Nigeria are inalienable from the land, cannot legally be sold, have rights in produce and housing and in the plots they work for themselves — that they are, in her word, less like slaves than like serfs, and she footnotes a comparison with the slaves of Saxon England out of Hume. They form the agricultural population; any sudden change that drove them off the land and into the towns would manifestly be disastrous. And then:

> "*The slaves of Northern Nigeria, by the universal testimony of the British Residents now stationed in every province, are generally happy and contented.*"

Hold that against Module 2. One to two and a half million people. A hundred and two thousand of them would eventually assemble the purchase price of their own bodies and hand it to their owners. A vagrancy law stood ready for any who simply walked. And the British public was told, over the signature of the woman who had named the country and reported Brussels, that on the universal testimony of the Residents they were happy.

She is not writing propaganda in the ordinary sense — she is reporting what the Residents told her, and they very likely did tell her that, and some of them believed it. That is the difficulty and that is the point. The sentence is not a lie in the mouth of a liar. It is a fact laundered through a frame, and the frame is doing all the work.

What she told them about the law

And now the passage the study has been building toward — because in it Lady Lugard explains to the British reading public, with complete accuracy and no evasion whatever, the constitutional device that makes the entire settlement lawful:

> "*It is the British tradition that slavery is not tolerated in any country which has been annexed to the Crown, and has become a colony under the British flag, but that in countries which are only in that partially dependent condition which is known by the name of a Protectorate, and are still governed by their own laws, it is not possible to forbid the institution of domestic slavery where it exists.*"

Read it again. **A colony may not tolerate slavery. A protectorate may.** Northern Nigeria was a Protectorate.

That is not a scandal she is exposing. It is a legal fact she is explaining, in a chapter meant to reassure, and she moves straight on to the remedy, which she also explains with total exactness:

> "*The abolition of the legal status of slavery has an effect in two ways. It is different from the abolition of slavery. It means only that the law as administered in British courts does not recognise the existence of slaves, and that property in persons as slaves is not admitted. It is not forbidden to a native to hold slaves so long as the master and slave are mutually satisfied, but the slave can at any time assert his freedom if he wishes to do so.*"

Every word of that is true, and Module 2's whole argument is contained in it, and it was printed in London in 1905 and reviewed and shelved in libraries and nothing happened.

It is different from the abolition of slavery. She says so. *It is not forbidden to a native to hold slaves.* She says so. The bilingual law is not a secret. It is a selling point.

The offer to the slave-owner

Then comes the passage that no summary can soften, in which the administration's inducement to the slave-owning aristocracy is set out for the British reader as a piece of enlightened policy.

Residents, she writes, are instructed to point out to the chiefs the practical advantages of free labour. And here is the advantage:

> "*…since, if an employer's slaves choose to desert him, the British courts cannot force them to return, while, if he employs free labour, he has the full assistance of the administration in enforcing his contract.*"

The pitch to the slave-owner is that **free labour is more enforceable than slavery**, because the Empire will help him hold a free man and will not help him hold a slave. That is the argument. It is printed. It was meant to be persuasive, and to the audience it was addressed to — Residents, chiefs, and the readers of a five-hundred-page book on tropical administration — it was.

"*Without abolition, and without compensation*"

And then, the summary of the policy in the author's own words, offered with satisfaction:

> "*Thus, by pressure of circumstance, without abolition, and without compensation, the slave-owner will gradually cease to exist. Having set the machinery of freedom in motion towards an inevitable end, it is not to the interest of the administration to hasten its operation. On the contrary, it is evidently to be desired in the interests of the country that it should work slowly.*"

Both absences named, and named as virtues. *Without abolition* — no emancipation of any living person. *Without compensation* — the twenty millions of 1833 will not be paid a second time, and Module 2 has shown who paid instead. And then, in the plainest English available: *it is not to the interest of the administration to hasten its operation.*

Slavery in Northern Nigeria was not finally abolished until 1936. She had said, in 1905, that it should work slowly. It worked slowly for thirty-one more years.

Which robe, and cut for whom

The framework asks the questions in order. What did the belief claim; whose recognition did it require; is the apex running more than one robe, cut to more than one audience; and how was the trusted-information leg acquired — forged, redirected, or inherited?

Toward the conquered, Britain ran no robe of its own at all. It did not need one. Module 1 showed Lugard stepping into the title the Fulani conquest had already installed, and Module 2 showed him keeping the courts, the law and the faith that maintained it. The belief that held the Hausa peasant in place in 1905 was the belief that had held him in place in 1895, and it belonged to somebody else. This is the *redirect* provenance in its purest documented form: get behind a channel the people already trust, and point that earned trust at yourself. It is cheap precisely because someone else did the work of earning it — and the someone else, here, was dan Fodio, a century dead.

Toward the metropole, Britain ran the anti-slavery robe — and *A Tropical Dependency* is that robe's principal garment, cut by a true believer with a printing press. Note the sequence, because it is the reason this module sits where it does. The Menu draw was made first, forced by the administrative facts of Module 1. The robe was fitted around it afterward. Lady Lugard is not explaining a policy that flowed from the anti-slavery cause; she is explaining, to the anti-slavery public, a policy that flowed from the complexity of the apparatus Britain had captured — and she is doing it so well that the public reads the outcome as the cause's own achievement.

Two robes, then, but not two lies: one belonging to a dead conqueror and rented, one acquired in a transaction at Westminster, made real by two generations of formation, and spent. And they never contradict each other in public, because the audiences never meet.

The dissenters, and why they lost

They existed, and they must be credited. The Anti-Slavery and Aborigines' Protection Society and its allies opposed legal-status abolition, understood exactly what it did and did not do, and pressed the point for years. They were not fooled. They lost — and the shape of their defeat is the shape of the robe.

They lost because they were arguing against a policy that had already been publicly justified in the vocabulary they themselves had built. *Gradualism* was an abolitionist word. *Not dislocating the machinery of labour* was the argument used in 1833 to justify the apprenticeship system in the West Indies, which was slavery under another name for six more years, and which the same movement had swallowed. *The slave can at any time assert his freedom* is a sentence that means, to a reader in Bristol, that the slave is free. Every plank of the platform was cut from the abolitionists' own timber, and Lugard's administration, which was not stupid, said so.

Later they returned to it, and in 1936 they won, and that is Module 10.

Reading the robe against the framework

The test set in Module 1 has been run, and the partition holds. The information-asymmetry method sets the public words of the metropole beside the private words of the colony and lets the gap speak — and it assumes concealment: that what was done in Kano was hidden from London, and that the order's core task was keeping the two ends of the seam from meeting. In Northern Nigeria the two ends met, in public, in a book, and nothing happened. The continuation of domestic slavery was not hidden; it was *explained*. Its legal basis was set out accurately, its deliberate slowness was defended, and the absence of emancipation and of compensation were stated as advantages. And the British public — the same public that had paid forty per cent of a year's

expenditure to end slavery, and was still servicing the loan — read this, or read the reviews of it, and did not rise.

So the asymmetry in this study is not an asymmetry of facts. It is an asymmetry of *frame*. And that is a harder thing than concealment, and a worse one, because a concealment can be exposed and a frame cannot. There was nothing to leak. The document was on the shelf.

Which gives the framework's own diagnostic a second edge, and this is the module's contribution. The rule stands: *surveillance is the tell of a belief that never took* — an order that must watch its subjects is an order whose robe failed. Northern Nigeria supplies the mirror. Where a robe has fully taken, an order does not need to suppress the facts, because the audience metabolises them: **publication is the tell of a belief that took completely.** Lady Lugard could tell the British public the whole truth about the slavery policy — its mechanism, its slowness, its refusal to compensate — because seventy years and twenty million pounds had formed that public to hear those facts *as progress*. The frame did the work concealment would otherwise have had to do, and it did it better, because a frame leaves nothing to expose. **Where a robe is weak, the order hides the facts. Where a robe is strong, the order can afford to print them.**

Hold that alongside its opposite in the corpus. In the Kenyan highlands the same empire ruled a population it had failed to form, and the tell arrived exactly where the framework says it should: the *kipande* at the throat, two million issued by 1931, a biometric register of a whole subject people — the physical infrastructure of distrust. Northern Nigeria built nothing of the kind, and did not need to. Two colonies, one empire, and the framework's instrument reads them both correctly and in opposite directions.

And the sincerity is the mechanism, not the mitigation. Flora Shaw was not a paid apologist. She had covered Brussels; she thought slavery an evil; she thought the Empire the

instrument of its ending; she said all of that, and she also said the slaves were happy and the policy should work slowly, and she believed both. Apply the framework's revealed-preference test in the direction it points: no one was compelling her. A robe held by someone who believes it is not a weaker robe — it is the only kind that holds. The most effective advocate for the continuation of slavery in Northern Nigeria was a woman who had gone to Brussels to report its abolition, who would have been appalled to hear herself described that way, and who was right about her own motives and wrong about nothing except what the words on her page would do.

A note on sources.

A Tropical Dependency: An Outline of the Ancient History of the Western Soudan with an Account of the Modern Settlement of Northern Nigeria, by Flora L. Shaw (Lady Lugard), London, James Nisbet & Co., 1905, is out of copyright, and every passage quoted here is quoted exactly, from the full scanned text of the first edition (Internet Archive, from the University of California copy). The passages on tropical administration, autocracy, markets and coloured labour are from Chapter I, pp. 1–3; the passages on domestic slavery, the happiness of the slaves, the Colony/Protectorate distinction, the meaning of legal-status abolition, the inducement of enforceable free-labour contracts, and "without abolition, and without compensation… it is not to the interest of the administration to hasten its operation" are from the chapter on British policy, pp. 462–4. Her account of the Slavery Proclamation — that it forbade enslavement and, "without directly touching the institution of domestic slavery," reaffirmed the abolition of the legal status of slavery, with all children born after 1 April 1901 declared free — is from p. 428 of the same text, and it resolves the date question raised in Module 2: children born after 31 March and children born from 1 April are the same children.

The *Times* article of 8 January 1897 coining "Nigeria" is quoted as it is reproduced in the standard biographical accounts; the original has not been read directly and the sentence is given as those accounts give it. Shaw's biography — first woman on the permanent staff of *The Times*, Colonial Editor from 1893, £800 a year, the only woman reporter sent to cover the Brussels Anti-Slavery Conference, her friendships with Rhodes and Goldie, her marriage to Lugard in June 1902 — is from the *Dictionary of Irish Biography* and the standard reference literature, paraphrased and credited. Sources differ on whether the marriage was 10 or 11 June 1902; nothing turns on it.

The opposition of the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines' Protection Society to legal-status abolition, and its eventual success in 1936, is as the scholarship reports (Lovejoy and Hogendorn, Miers, Jumare) and is paraphrased, not quoted; no words are put in the abolitionists' mouths here, and Module 10 will quote them directly. The Brussels Act is quoted from the official English text as in the Landscape. The *kipande* figures are from the British Kenya study in this collection. Lugard's *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* (1922) is referred to but not quoted in this module.

And legibility is not pardon. Flora Shaw's sincerity is established here because it is the mechanism, not because it is a defence. That she believed what she wrote is precisely why what she wrote worked, and precisely why the people she was writing about stayed where they were. The arithmetic is laid out. The sum is left to the reader.

PATTERNS OF POWER · BRITISH NORTHERN NIGERIA — MODULE 4

AT THEIR FATHER'S KEENLY EXPRESSED DESIRE

> *Module 4 · Formation — Britain built almost nothing in the North, and did not need to. The apparatus that produced obedient subjects had been built by the previous conqueror a century earlier, it still worked, and the British protected it with their own arms. The emirs did not demand that the missionaries be kept out. Britain kept them out*

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The two school systems

In 1914 the Northern Provinces of Nigeria contained approximately **twenty-five thousand Qur'anic schools**, with something on the order of **two hundred and eighteen thousand pupils** in them.

In the same year the British administration operated a handful of provincial schools. By 1915 there were twelve, with an average annual enrolment of about **seven hundred and thirty-three**.

Set the two numbers beside each other and the module is finished before it starts. In the largest territory Britain acquired in the Scramble, in a population of perhaps ten million, with a Colonial Office, a Director of Education, and thirteen years of undisputed control, the British formation apparatus reached roughly one child in three hundred of the children already sitting on the floor of a *makarantar allo* with a wooden board on his knee, chanting the Qur'an.

The Field Manual asks a study to test the complexity variable at two levels separately, and warns that they can come apart: it predicts whether a conqueror keeps the individual carriers of competence — the retained minister, the spared astronomer — far more reliably than whether he keeps *the institution that trained them*. A conqueror can keep the man and raze the library. Module 2 showed Lugard keeping the man. This module is the second level, and the answer is that he kept the library too, and paid its rent, and reprinted its books.

What was already standing

The Sokoto Caliphate did not need Britain to educate its subjects, because it had spent a century doing it, and it had been very good at it.

Usman dan Fodio was a teacher before he was a conqueror. The order he founded ran on the *mallam* — the Qur'anic teacher — and on the *alkali*, the judge trained in Maliki law, and on a network of schools so dense that a British survey a century later still counted twenty-five thousand of them. Boys learned the Qur'an by rote from a board; the promising went on to the higher sciences, to *fiqh* and *hadith* and Arabic grammar; and Katsina and Kano and Sokoto were, by any honest measure, university towns. Lugard's own party noticed. Lady Lugard records that when the High Commissioner reached Katsina on 28 March 1903 and made his explanation of British policy, he added something he had not said at Sokoto, because "*Katsena had a special reputation as a centre of learning*" — assurances "*of the willingness of the British Government to give such assistance as it could to education.*"

That is the previous conquest's robe, and it had fully taken. A Hausa farmer's son learning his letters from a mallam in 1903 was not being indoctrinated into a régime; he was learning to read, in the only way anyone in his world had ever learned to read, in a system so completely naturalised that its founding a hundred years earlier by an armed reformer had become invisible. It was

the furniture of reality. And it produced, reliably, generation after generation, exactly the population the Caliphate needed: literate enough to be taxed and judged, formed to accept the emir and the alkali as the shape of the world, and requiring no surveillance whatever.

That is a cheap-pole formation, and Britain inherited it intact.

The excuse, and why it fails

The standard defence of British educational policy in Northern Nigeria — offered then and repeated since — is that the emirs would not have it. Muslim rulers, it is said, resisted Christian schools; Lugard had pledged not to interfere with Islam; his hands were tied; the exclusion of the missions was a concession to the conquered.

The record does not support it, and the sentence that breaks it is in Lady Lugard's own book.

Writing of the installation of the new Emir of Nupe at Bida in February 1901 — the first emirate to be settled on the new terms — she reports, as an illustration of how well the system was working:

> "*Nupe has prospered exceedingly under the new system, and the emir's sons are now being educated at a school established in Bida by the Church Missionary Society, where they are learning, at their father's keenly expressed desire, to speak English.*"

A Muslim emir, installed by Lugard, sending his sons to a **Church Missionary Society school**, at his own keenly expressed desire, to learn English. And the Emir of Katsina, two years later, asking the High Commissioner for assistance with education, and being promised it.

The scholarship confirms what the sentence implies: the emirs did not, as a class, exclude the missionaries, and Lugard did not initially discourage missionary contact. The exclusion came from

the British side, and it hardened after him, as his successors took his pledge of religious non-interference — "*Government will in no way interfere with the Mohammedan religion*" — and read into it a ban on Christian mission work in the Muslim emirates. That reading was convenient, and it became doctrine, and it became one of the defining features of Northern Nigerian administration for half a century.

So the fathers wanted English for their sons, and Britain declined to let the people who taught English come north.

What Britain built instead

Not nothing — and the study must be exact, because the little that was built was built with care.

In 1909 a Swiss-born former Church Missionary Society man named Hanns Vischer, who had left the mission for the political service and would earn the Hausa title *Dan Hausa*, opened a school at Nassarawa outside Kano. It began with thirty pupils. By 1913 it had two hundred and nine, drawn from the eleven Northern provinces. Each chief paid five pounds a year for each boy. By 1911 the establishment had grown into an elementary school, a training school for mallams, a school for the sons of emirs, and a technical school; by 1913 there were provincial schools at Katsina and Sokoto; by 1915, twelve in all.

And look at the design, because the design is the argument. There were no lessons on Sunday or Friday. There was no Sunday school and no Christian morning prayer. The boys lived in compounds with the retinues they had brought from home, each compound headed by a *mallam*. The stated object of the schools was not to promote European culture but to preserve the culture and social life of Northern Nigeria and to train pupils for the Native Administration and for craft work. Vischer's principle, as his admirers record it, was to make the boys' life as natural to them as possible, so as to avoid the problem of re-entry when the course was over.

Read that as an educationist and it is enlightened, humane, and far ahead of its time. Read it as a formation engineer and it is something else: a school designed to return its graduates to exactly the position they came from, changed in no particular except a useful competence in English and clerical work. It was a school for the sons of emirs, funded by the emirs' treasuries, teaching the sons of emirs to administer emirates. It formed the Native Administration. It formed nobody else, and it was not meant to.

The double exclusion

And then the second mechanism, quieter than the mission ban and, in its way, more complete.

The colonial state funded schooling by grant-in-aid, paid to missions and voluntary agencies that met the standard. In the South, where the missions were free to work, this built a school system. In the North, the missions were kept out of the Muslim emirates — and the Qur'anic schools, the only schools the North actually had, were excluded from the grants, on the ground that their curriculum was unsuitable.

So the twenty-five thousand schools and two hundred and eighteen thousand pupils were, for the purposes of the British educational budget, invisible. They were not competitors to be suppressed and not partners to be funded. They were simply outside the accounting — which is precisely what the Protectorate's constitutional form had already done to the slaves. The same device, twice: a thing that plainly exists, placed where the metropole's ledger cannot see it.

The North was therefore excluded twice over: the institutions that would have brought British formation were forbidden to come, and the institutions that were actually forming Northern children were declared ineligible for the money. What was left in the middle was twelve schools and seven hundred and thirty-three boys, most of them the sons of the men Lugard had installed.

Why: formation is admission

The framework's rule is that to form a population is to admit it — to give it the vocabulary in which it can make claims, the literacy in which it can petition, the credential by which it can demand a post.

Apply the revealed-preference test in its harshest form. This administration found the money for four Maxim guns, a war, eight hundred and sixty-five thousand pounds to the Royal Niger Company, a Resident in every province, a railway to Kano, and a permanent garrison. It did not find the money for schools, and it forbade the people who were willing to pay for schools out of their own subscriptions to come and build them. Where a power spends is what it wants; where it refuses to spend is what it refuses to have.

And what it refused to have was a class of literate Northerners with a claim. Because the moment there is a boy in Kano who reads English, writes a petition, cites the Brussels Act, and asks why Article VII promises the fugitive slave protection while the Protectorate's law calls him a vagrant — that boy is a problem, and there is no answer to him. Better that he should learn the Qur'an from a mallam, in Arabic, under an alkali appointed by an emir appointed by the High Commissioner, and never encounter the question at all.

What held the field

And this is the point at which the whole cheap hold becomes visible, and where the study's two colonies pull apart.

Withholding formation does not leave a vacuum if a prior formation is already in place and still working. In Northern Nigeria the field was not empty. It was occupied — densely, deeply, for a century — by the formation apparatus of the *previous* conquest, which produced precisely the deference the British required, at no cost to the British, and which the British therefore had every reason to protect.

And protect it they did. That is the sentence to underline. The mallam's school, the alkali's court, the Friday prayer, the Maliki law — these did not merely survive the conquest. They were *guaranteed* by it, in Lugard's own words at Sokoto, and enforced by British arms, and funded out of Native Treasuries the British had organised, and administered according to a handbook of Islamic law that the British printed in London.

The framework's category of the "native counter-formation" — the clergy, the schools, the calendar, the holy places that outlast the colonizer because they are a former conquest's robe that fully took — turns out to hold two different structural objects, and this study is where they separate. In Algeria, and in Kenya, the native religious and educational apparatus stood *against* the colonizer, and the colonizer knew it and watched it. In Northern Nigeria the Qur'anic school stood *underneath* the colonizer, and he funded it. It was not counter to anything. It was load-bearing. Britain did not tolerate the mallam; Britain depended on him.

The bill

Formation gaps do not close when the flag comes down. They compound.

At mid-century, literacy in the Northern Region ran somewhere below five per cent against roughly twenty in the South, on the estimates available — figures that should be held as approximations, but whose direction and magnitude are not in dispute. When Ahmadu Bello, himself a product of Sokoto Provincial School and Katsina Training College, took the leadership of the North, he found fewer than ten Northerners in the senior ranks of his own region's civil service; by 1958, after a decade of deliberate effort, the number in higher posts had reached three hundred and eleven. In a region containing more than half the population of Nigeria.

The clerks, the engineers, the teachers, the doctors and the administrators of an independent Nigeria came, overwhelmingly,

from the South — because that is where the missions had been allowed to build schools. And they came north to fill the posts, and they were resented, and the resentment had a religion attached to it, because the line Britain had drawn between where missions might work and where they might not had become a line between Christian and Muslim, drawn across the middle of a country.

That line is still there. It is the deepest thing the British left in Northern Nigeria, and it was not built by malice. It was built by a pledge of religious non-interference, which was the price of ruling through the emirs, which was the mechanism the administrative facts had already chosen, and which the anti-slavery warrant then had to be fitted around. Follow the chain link by link and it begins at Exeter Hall.

Reading formation against the framework

The complexity variable holds at both levels, and the study should say so plainly, because the Field Manual expects it to come apart. A conqueror can keep the man and raze the library. Lugard kept the emir *and* the alkali court *and* the Maliki law *and* the mallam's school, funded the last three out of Native Treasuries, and printed the law book in London for his own officers to use. This is preservation running to the bottom of the apparatus, and Northern Nigeria should stand in the corpus as the case where the variable holds at both levels at once — alongside Persia and China, and for the same reason: what Britain captured was too complex, too deep, and too well-tuned to be worth rebuilding, so almost nothing was rebuilt.

The mission ban is a consequence of the draw, not a concession to the conquered. The Emir of Nupe wanted his sons in a Church Missionary Society school and said so; the Emir of Katsina asked for help with education. The exclusion was the colonizer's, and it followed from the settlement with the force of arithmetic: the entire cheap hold depended on the emirate order remaining intact, and a mission school is a formation apparatus

with a different owner, and two owners cannot run one field. **Lugard had rented a machine. You do not let a stranger into the engine room of a machine you are renting, however keenly the machine's former owner asks you to.**

And the corpus's diagnostic needs one clarification, which this case is uniquely placed to supply. *Surveillance is the tell of a belief that never took.* Kenya proves the rule from the failing side: an acephalous order, no elite to inherit, chiefs forged from nothing, formation imposed and refused — and then the *kipande* at every throat, two million issued by 1931, a biometric register of a whole people, the physical infrastructure of distrust. Northern Nigeria proves it from the succeeding side: no pass law, no register, no Emergency, one administrative officer per hundred thousand people, and sixty quiet years.

But it was not *Britain's* belief that took. It was dan Fodio's. Britain built no conviction in Northern Nigeria and asked for none; it stood on a conviction a century old and let it go on carrying the weight. So the diagnostic is exactly right and must be read exactly: **the absence of surveillance measures the presence of a belief, not the identity of the thing believed.** A conqueror who inherits a self-running order inherits its silence with it — and can mistake that silence, or report it to the metropole, as consent to himself. Lugard's cheap hold was rented, and the rent was paid in a currency no British ledger recorded: the continued authority of the men who had conquered the country before him.

A note on sources.

Lady Lugard's *A Tropical Dependency* (London, 1905) is out of copyright and is quoted exactly: the CMS school at Bida and the emir's sons learning English "at their father's keenly expressed desire," from her account of the Nupe settlement; and the assurances at Katsina "of the willingness of the British Government to give such assistance as it could to education," from

her account of the 1903 tour (p. 455). Lugard's pledge at Sokoto — "*Government will in no way interfere with the Mohammedan religion*" — is quoted as in Module 1, from the Address of 21 March 1903.

The educational statistics are given from the secondary literature and should be treated as orders of magnitude, not audited counts: approximately 25,000 Qur'anic schools with 218,618 pupils in the Northern Provinces in 1914, against twelve provincial government schools by 1915 enrolling on average 733 pupils annually; Nassarawa School, Kano, opened 1909 with 30 pupils, 209 by 1913, at £5 per boy per year paid by the chiefs. A figure circulating in the economics literature — 37,500 primary schools in the South against 1,100 in the North in 1914 — is not used here, because a count of 37,500 primary schools in Southern Nigeria in 1914 is implausible on its face and is more likely a count of pupils; the discrepancy has not been resolved and the figure is therefore set aside rather than deployed. Literacy of under five per cent in the North against roughly twenty per cent in the South around 1950, and "fewer than ten" Northerners in the senior Northern civil service at the start of the 1950s rising to 311 in higher posts by 1958, are from the secondary literature and are given as approximations whose direction is not disputed but whose precision should not be relied on.

Hanns Vischer's biography and the design of the Nassarawa schools (no lessons on Friday or Sunday, no Christian prayer, compounds under mallams, the object of preserving rather than replacing Northern social life, training for the Native Administration) are from the specialist literature on his career, paraphrased and credited. The exclusion of Qur'anic schools from grants-in-aid on grounds of curriculum is as reported in the Nigerian educational-policy literature (Imam, Ogunsola, Fafunwa), paraphrased. That the emirs did not as a class exclude missionaries and that the exclusion hardened under Lugard's successors is as the scholarship reports (Ayandele, and the literature on missionary activity and schooling in Nigeria); it is

stated here on the strength of that scholarship and of Lady Lugard's own contemporary sentence, and any reader who can produce an emir's own words demanding the exclusion should bring them, because I could not find them. The *kipande* figures are from the British Kenya study in this collection.

And legibility is not pardon. Hanns Vischer was a serious and humane man who did not want to strip Hausa boys of their world, and his schools were better than the alternative a cruder administration would have built. That is true and it is set down. It does not touch the fact that there were twelve of them.

The arithmetic is laid out. The sum is left to the reader.

PATTERNS OF POWER · BRITISH NORTHERN NIGERIA — MODULE 5

ALL SOKOTO WENT OUT YESTERDAY

> *Module 5 · The Cost Column — why the ordinary subject did not revolt, and why the one population that did was the one population Britain had told the truth to. The floor of this order was not built. It was rented. And at Satiru in March 1906 it was manned by the Sultan's own cavalry, riding beside the Maxim guns, against a village of fugitive slaves*

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

Two ledgers in one village

The framework asks a single question in this module: for the ordinary subject, why does the ledger come out against revolt? Is the cost column full — a credible enforcer who can reach him, and he knows it — or is it empty, and he complies because he believes? And it warns that the answer will differ between core and periphery.

In Northern Nigeria the answer differs *inside a single compound*, between two men standing three feet apart, and the fault line is not geography. It is caste.

Take the *talakawa*, the free Hausa peasant, and his ledger comes out against revolt almost without a cost column at all. The emir is the emir; the alkali is the alkali; the Friday prayer is Friday prayer; the tax is the tax his father paid. This is a century-old order that reached the self-running pole long before any Englishman saw the Niger, and it holds him up from the inside. Add to it the one enormous thing the conquest actually delivered — the raids stopped, and the walls his village had built against the

horsemen were no longer needed — and the benefit column carries real weight. He is not watched, because nothing about him requires watching. In sixty years of British rule the Northern Provinces produced no pass law, no identity register, no fingerprint archive, and no political police worth the name.

Now take the man in the next hut, who is owned.

The crack the robe opened

His ledger had been stable too, for a century, in the way that a slave's ledger is stable: the cost of running was high, the chance of success was low, and no power on earth had ever suggested to him that the arrangement was anything other than the arrangement. He was inside the same self-running order as his master, and it ran on him rather than for him, and it had never needed to watch him either.

And then, in 1900, an army came up the river announcing that it had come to end slavery.

The enslaved *heard it.* This is the fact the whole module turns on, and it is not in dispute in the scholarship: when British anti-slavery rhetoric arrived with the conquering columns, there was a widespread, spontaneous flight of slaves from their masters. They believed the Empire. They took the robe at its word, walked off the farms, and went looking for the protection they had been told was theirs.

They were the only people in Northern Nigeria who ever did.

The *talakawa* did not need Britain's robe and did not receive one. The emirs did not believe it and were not asked to. Lady Lugard's readers in London believed it and were seven thousand miles away. The enslaved were the sole population inside the Protectorate whose ledger the British robe actually moved — and it moved them toward the door.

So the administration closed the door. That is what the cost column in Northern Nigeria *is*: not a general apparatus of domination, which the order did not need, but a specific

machinery of flight-prevention, built for one caste, by the empire that had announced their liberation.

The doors, and the law that was supposed to be open

The instruments were three, and none of them mentions slavery.

Vagrancy. A man without a master, without land, and without visible means was a vagrant, and vagrancy was an offence. The fugitive who had believed the robe discovered that the robe's own author had made his flight a crime.

Land. Proprietary rights in land were enforced, so that a slave who left his master's farm had nowhere to go and nothing to farm, in a society where land was the only livelihood.

Tax. The Native Revenue Proclamation of 1906 put every man into a cash relation with an emir's tax collector, and a man with no master and no land could not meet it.

And behind all three stood the courts of Module 2 — the alkali's court, applying Maliki law, under a judge appointed by an emir appointed by the High Commissioner — which was the only forum in which an enslaved man could sue for his freedom, and the same forum that would hear the case against him if he simply took it.

Now set beside that the treaty Britain had signed in 1890, whose text the Landscape gave in full:

> *"Any fugitive slave claiming, on the continent, the protection of the signatory powers, shall receive it, and shall be received in the camps and stations officially established by said powers." — Brussels Act, Article VII*

Read it as a man in Kano in 1905 would have had to read it. The Act promises him sanctuary in the camps and stations of the signatory powers. By 1903 the signatory power's camps and stations were *everywhere*. The whole Caliphate was a British Protectorate; there was no border to cross; the flag he was meant to run to was already flying over the farm he was running from.

The sanctuary had become the cage. That is the specific fact — legal, not geographic — that made this order a trap rather than a contract for the one caste it trapped. A fugitive slave in Northern Nigeria could not reach British protection, because he was standing in it, and British protection was the thing enforcing his master's law.

What the floor was actually made of

Here is where the cheapness becomes visible, and where the study's central argument arrives at the coercive apparatus itself.

Britain did not build a coercive apparatus in Northern Nigeria. It **rented** one.

There was a Resident at each emir's elbow and a scattering of political officers in the provinces — on the order of one British administrative officer for every hundred thousand people by the middle 1920s. There was the West African Frontier Force, a small regiment of African soldiers under British officers, garrisoned at a handful of stations. And beneath and around that, doing the actual work of pricing defection every day in every town, was **the emir's own machinery**: his *dogarai*, his district heads, his tax collectors, his alkali, his gaol. The men who would arrest a runaway slave in Kano in 1908 were the same men who would have arrested him in 1898, wearing the same clothes, taking their orders from the same palace, under a law the British had promised to preserve and had printed a handbook to explain.

That is why the ratio is what it is. A colonial state with one officer per hundred thousand is not an efficient state; it is a *tenant*. The framework says the cost column must be held high by visible force and surveillance where the belief is thin. In Northern Nigeria the belief was thick — it just wasn't Britain's — and so the force could be almost invisible, because it was somebody else's force, and it had been standing there for a hundred years.

Until it was tested.

Satiru

In February 1904 the village head of Satiru, a settlement a dozen miles from Sokoto, proclaimed himself the Mahdi and his son Isa the returning prophet. Sultan Attahiru II — installed by Lugard on 21 March 1903, the man to whom the Address of Module 1 was delivered — arrested him. He died in detention. The British let the Sultan handle it, and it worked.

Two years later they did not.

The scholarship on who rose at Satiru is exact, and it is the most important sentence in this module. The Mahdist supporters of the revolt of 1905–6 were **disgruntled peasants, fugitive slaves and radical clerics**, hostile both to the indigenous authorities and to the colonial regime. There was **no known support among aristocrats, wealthy merchants or the *ulama***. The rising drew Hausa, Zamfarawa, Gobirawa, Kabawa, Azbinawa — and **no Fulani**. The battle lines mapped onto class so precisely that ethnicity followed them.

The people at the bottom of the Caliphate rose against the Caliphate and the Empire at once, because by 1906 there was no way to distinguish them.

On 14 February 1906 the Acting Resident, H. R. P. Hillary, took about seventy mounted infantry under Lieutenant Francis Blackwood, with his assistant A. G. M. Scott and a single Maxim gun, and rode out to deal with it himself. The column was destroyed. Hillary was killed, Scott was killed, Blackwood was killed, and with them between twenty-five and twenty-nine African soldiers and carriers — the figures differ between Goldsmith's Sokoto Province report and Lugard's own despatch to Onslow of 28 February, and both are given here rather than one chosen. Malam Isa was mortally wounded and died two days later, on the morning he was to have unfurled the green flag.

For about three weeks, in one small corner of the largest territory in British West Africa, a village of peasants and runaway slaves had beaten the British Empire in the field.

On 10 March the Empire came back. Major Goodwin brought some five hundred and seventy rifles, seventy armed police, a 2.95-inch gun and Maxims — and, riding with them, **the fighting men of Sokoto**. The Satirawa had dug trenches and did not stay in them. They charged, in massed formation, repeatedly, against machine guns. It was over by half past two in the afternoon.

The dead are given, on the contemporary estimates, as **upwards of two thousand men**, with some three thousand women and children taken. Those are the victors' figures and should be held loosely; what is not in doubt is that the village was annihilated. It was burnt. The site was razed. And the Sultan of Sokoto, Attahiru II — great-grandson of Usman dan Fodio, Commander of the Faithful, appointed by Frederick Lugard — pronounced a curse on any man who would rebuild or farm the ground. It has never been rebuilt.

Dan Makafo and five surviving leaders were tried and executed. **Not in a British court.** They were convicted for rebellion and murder in the Sultan's own Native Court, under the law Lugard had promised at Sokoto to leave standing.

And the Resident, Major Burdon — the same Burdon who had checked Lugard's Address word by word in March 1903 — telegraphed the High Commissioner:

> "*All Sokoto went out yesterday to inspect the battlefield and raze Satiru to the ground.*"

All Sokoto went out. Not a British column. Not the Frontier Force. Sokoto — the aristocracy, the palace, the cavalry, the Caliphate itself — went out to level the village of the fugitive slaves who had risen in the name of God against the men who owned them. The floor of the British order in Northern Nigeria, at the one moment in sixty years when it was seriously tested, was manned by the conquered elite, at its own initiative, with its own men, and it did the work thoroughly.

That is what a rented floor looks like when the rent is being earned.

What the repression was a message about

Lugard's own account, in his annual report for 1906, does not hide what it was for: the situation, he wrote, demanded "*a signal and overwhelming victory for the restoration of our prestige and the prevention of any such rising in future*", and the policy was one of "*a terrible retribution*" intended to "*render any further appeal to arms unnecessary in the Sokoto Province for very many years.*"

But the historians of the slavery question read the message at Satiru as addressed to a more specific audience, and their reading is the one this study must carry. The brutality of the repression, Lovejoy and Hogendorn conclude, was **a message to slave owners and slaves alike that the colonial regime was committed to the continuation of slavery and opposed to any sudden emancipation of the slave population.**

Set that against Campbell-Bannerman, in the Commons, in 1899.

And hear, finally, from inside the cost column itself. A Sokoto citizen, in the year of the rising, as recorded in the same scholarship:

> "*We have been conquered. We have been asked to pay poll tax and cattle tax. We have been made to do various things, and now they want us to fight their wars for them.*"

That is not a manifesto. It is a ledger, read aloud by a man who has finished adding it up — and it is the closest thing in this study to a voice from beneath the floor.

Reading the cost column against the framework

The floor was rented, and Satiru is the receipt. Modules 1 to 4 traced a conqueror who inherited a title, a judiciary, a tax system, a law and a school network, and declined to replace any of them. This module completes the inventory: he inherited the *coercive apparatus* too. The men who priced defection for the

ordinary subject of Northern Nigeria were the emir's men, and when the order was tested in the field it was the Sultan's own fighters who went out with the Maxims and razed the village and cursed the ground and hanged the survivors in his own court. The corpus should record this as the furthest extent to which the complexity variable can run: **where the captured apparatus is complete enough, the conqueror need not even man his own floor.** That is what makes it the cheapest hold in the collection, and it is why the officer-to-population ratio reads like an error.

The thick/thin gradient runs by caste, in the same village, in the same year. The Field Manual says to expect a different answer for core and periphery — and it is right, but Northern Nigeria shows the split can be vertical as well as horizontal. For the *talakawa*, the belief is thick, the cost column is nearly empty, and force is invisible for sixty years. For the enslaved, in the identical square mile, the belief was never installed at all — they were the *object* of the order, not its subject — and the cost column is held up by a vagrancy law, a land law, a tax, a court owned by their masters, and, when they moved, by machine guns. One territory, two gradients, three feet apart.

And here is what this case gives back to the collection's sharpest instrument. *Surveillance is the tell of a belief that never took.* Northern Nigeria has almost no surveillance — no *kipande*, no register, no fingerprint archive, nothing of what Kenya built in the same decades. But it is not *nothing*. There is a vagrancy law, a land law, a tax designed to catch the masterless man, and a body of policy whose explicit purpose was to check the flight of slaves. And that residue of coercion has a single, exact target.

The only people in Northern Nigeria whom the British had to police were the only people who had believed the British.

Everyone else was held by a conviction Britain did not author and did not need to enforce. The enslaved alone had been told something new by the Empire — *we have come to end slavery* —

and they alone acted on it, and the entire coercive machinery the British built in the North across sixty years was built to un-tell them. The robe opened the one crack in the cheap hold, and the floor had to be re-laid to close it, and at Satiru it was re-laid with the conquered aristocracy's own cavalry.

That is not an incidental irony. It is the mechanism by which an order that could have been almost bloodless came to slaughter two thousand people twelve miles from Sokoto in the spring of 1906 — and the reason the killing was done, very largely, by the people the abolitionists had come to disarm.

A note on sources.

The composition of the Satiru rising — peasants, fugitive slaves and radical clerics; no aristocrats, no wealthy merchants, no *ulama*; Hausa, Zamfarawa, Gobirawa, Kabawa and Azbinawa but no Fulani; the class lines onto which ethnicity mapped — is from Lovejoy and Hogendorn, "Revolutionary Mahdism and Resistance to Colonial Rule in the Sokoto Caliphate, 1905–6," *Journal of African History* 31:2 (1990), which is in copyright and is **paraphrased and credited throughout, not quoted at length**. Their conclusion that the repression served as a message to owners and slaves alike that the colonial regime was committed to the continuation of slavery and opposed to sudden emancipation is their finding, given as theirs, and it is load-bearing for this module.

The events of 14 February and 10 March 1906 are reconstructed from Adeleye ("Mahdist Triumph and British Revenge in Northern Nigeria: Satiru 1906," *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, 1972), from Lovejoy and Hogendorn, and from the contemporary accounts they cite. **The British dead of 14 February are given as a range because the sources disagree**: Goldsmith's Sokoto Province Annual Report for 1906 gives three white officers and twenty-seven African soldiers and carriers; Lugard's own despatch to Onslow of 28 February 1906

gives three white officers and twenty-five African soldiers. The relieving force of 10 March is given as approximately 573 rifles, 70 armed police, a 2.95-inch gun and Maxims, under Major R. H. Goodwin. **The Satiru dead — upward of two thousand men killed and some three thousand women and children taken — are the victors' estimates and are reported as such and held loosely; no independent count exists and none is likely to.**

Burdon's telegram — "*All Sokoto went out yesterday to inspect the battlefield and raze Satiru to the ground*" — is quoted as it is reproduced in the modern accounts drawing on the Northern Nigeria records; the original telegram has not been read directly, and it is given as those accounts give it. Lugard's phrases from the Annual Report for 1905–6 — "*a signal and overwhelming victory for the restoration of our prestige and the prevention of any such rising in future,*" "*a terrible retribution,*" and the intention to "*render any further appeal to arms unnecessary in the Sokoto Province for very many years*" — are quoted as they are reproduced in the secondary literature from the published report, which is a public-domain colonial document; the report itself has not been read directly. The complaint of the Sokoto citizen ("*We have been conquered…*") is quoted as it appears in Lovejoy and Hogendorn's account, and is a translation whose original wording cannot be checked here.

The Brussels Act, Article VII, is quoted from the official English text as in the Landscape. The vagrancy, land and taxation instruments used to check slave flight are described from the scholarship (Lovejoy, Hogendorn, Hill, Jumare) and **not quoted, because their enacted texts have not been obtained**; that gap was flagged in Module 2 and remains open. The Sultan's curse on the site and the fact that Satiru has never been rebuilt are as the modern accounts report. The officer-to-population ratio is an approximation from the secondary literature.

And legibility is not pardon. To show that the Sultan of Sokoto had every reason of position to ride against Satiru — that a rising

of slaves and peasants threatened his house as directly as it threatened the Residency, and that he was a man whose field had been drawn to make the choice look like duty — is to explain why the floor held so cheaply. It is not to excuse what was done on that ground on the tenth of March, and it is not to forget who was buried in it.

The arithmetic is laid out. The sum is left to the reader.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

PATTERNS OF POWER · BRITISH NORTHERN NIGERIA — MODULE 6

THE CROP HE GREW ANYWAY

> *Module 6 · Extraction — what was taken, from whom, and at what rate: a tax expressly designed to compensate the emirs for the income they had lost from slave-raiding; a railway built to carry cotton to Lancashire that carried groundnuts to the margarine works instead; and, on the Jos Plateau, among a people who had no emir to shelter behind, the other kind of extraction altogether*

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The fork

The framework's extraction question comes with a fork in it, borrowed from Wolfe: does the conquest take a *flow* — a surplus skimmed off a population left in place — or a *stock*, the land itself, in which case the native is not a labour supply but an obstacle, and the logic turns from exploitation toward elimination? Invasion is a structure, not an event.

Northern Nigeria answers the question twice, in the same protectorate, under the same Governor, in the same decade — and the line between the two answers falls exactly where the line of administrative complexity falls. Inside the emirates, where Britain had rented a working machine, the extraction is flow, and the peasant keeps his farm, and on one memorable occasion he uses it to defeat Lancashire. Up on the Jos Plateau, among the Berom and the other stateless peoples who had no emir and no alkali and no aristocracy to shelter behind, the extraction is stock: the land is

taken, the indigenous industry is banned, and the labour is coerced.

Same flag. Same year. Two extractions. And the variable that predicted the Menu draw in Module 1 predicts this too.

The tax, and what Lugard said it was for

Begin with the flow, because it is the ordinary case and it is where the money came from.

Lugard consolidated the Caliphate's existing multiplicity of levies into two: the *haraji*, the general tax on agriculturalists, artisans and traders, and the *jangali*, the cattle tax on the pastoral Fulani. The Land Revenue Proclamation of 1904 and the Native Revenue Proclamation of 1906 gave the system its colonial shape — assessed by native officials, collected by the emir's men, and split, first a quarter and later a half to the colonial government, the remainder to the Native Treasury out of which the emir and his officers drew fixed salaries.

None of this was new to the *talakawa*. The Caliphate had taxed him; the British taxed him. What changed was where the money went and, crucially, what it was *for*.

And Lugard, in the Memorandum on taxation issued to his political officers, was explicit about that. Revenue from the tax, he explained, would **compensate the chiefs for the income they had lost** — the income they had lost from levies on their subjects, and the income they had lost from "*slave-raiding and slave-trading.*"

Read that again with Module 2 open beside it.

In 1833, Britain compensated slave-owners for the loss of their property, and it did so out of the British taxpayer's pocket, at twenty million pounds and forty per cent of a year's public expenditure. In Northern Nigeria, Britain compensated the slave-*raiders* for the loss of their raiding — and it did so out of the pockets of the Hausa peasantry, through a tax collected by the raiders' own officials and paid to the raiders as salary.

Module 2 showed the enslaved buying their own emancipation, one body at a time, at prices their owners set. Module 6 shows their free neighbours paying the raiders' pension. **The bill for the robe was re-issued twice, and both times to Africans.**

And there is no hypocrisy to catch Lugard in, which is precisely the difficulty. He was not concealing a scandal; he was solving an administrative problem, in writing, for his officers, in the plainest terms he could manage. The emirs had lost a revenue stream. The order depended on them. Something had to replace it. He wrote down what.

What Lancashire expected

Now the second half of the flow, and the one place in sixty years where the metropole was beaten.

Britain did not conquer Northern Nigeria for cotton, but within two years of the conquest cotton was what it wanted. The Lancashire industry, dependent on American supply and frightened of it, had founded the British Cotton Growing Association in 1902; the Association made an agreement with the Nigerian Government in 1904 to establish model farms and a research station, build ginneries, and supply seed and experts. Northern Nigeria was to be the salvation of the mills — the "new Mecca," as one Lancashire advocate had it. The cotton enthusiast J. A. Todd was still writing in 1915 that "*the possible cotton crop of Nigeria is about 6,000,000 bales of 400 pounds.*"

And the railway was the instrument. Lugard drove the line north because cotton is heavy and the Niger is not enough, and in 1912 the Baro–Kano railway reached Kano.

It was the largest single capital investment the British made in the North. It was built for Lancashire.

The crop he grew anyway

The farmers of Kano used it to sell groundnuts.

The reasons are entirely unromantic and that is what makes them devastating. Groundnuts were more remunerative than cotton. They required less labour. They could be eaten if the price fell. And cotton clashed with the millet on which the household actually depended. Worse still, from the Association's point of view, Kano had a **flourishing indigenous textile industry** of its own, and the Kano weavers paid the farmer as much for his cotton as the BCGA did, or more — so that the Association found itself outbid, in its own target market, by the people who had been weaving there for centuries.

The Association's research station closed in 1910. And when the railway arrived in 1912, it was the Kano traders — village headmen, agent-buyers, middlemen, farmers — who mobilised the countryside to take advantage of it, and what came down the line was groundnuts. The boom ran through 1912 and 1913–14 and never stopped. The margarine works of Europe got their oil. Lancashire got its six million bales in a pamphlet.

The historian who worked the archive on this, Jan Hogendorn, gave the episode its proper title: the cotton campaign in Northern Nigeria was **an early example of a public/private planning failure in agriculture.** The Empire built a railway to carry one crop and the peasantry filled it with another, and the peasantry was right about the prices.

Why he could

This is not a story about African cunning versus British stupidity, and it must not be told that way. It is a structural fact, and the structure is the one this study has been building since Module 1.

The Hausa farmer defeated the British Cotton Growing Association because he still had his farm.

He had his land, because nobody had taken it. He had his labour, because nobody had conscripted it. He had a choice of crop, because no law told him what to plant. He had a rival buyer, because the Kano weaving industry had not been destroyed. And

he had all of that for one reason: the Co-opt draw of Module 2 required leaving the emirate order intact, and the emirate order rested on a peasantry sitting on its own farms, paying its own tax, under its own emir. **You cannot rent a machine and smash the thing it runs on.** The Empire needed the *talakawa* exactly where he was, and the price of keeping him there was that he could tell Lancashire no.

Now hold that against the corpus. In the Kenyan highlands, the same empire in the same decades took the land on nine-hundred-and-ninety-nine-year leases, penned the Kikuyu in reserves, drove him out to work with a hut tax and a pass, and then — this is the part that matters — **forbade him by law to grow the profitable crop**, because an African growing coffee would compete with a settler growing coffee. Kenya's Module 6 is called *The Crop He Was Not Allowed to Grow*. This one is called what it is called.

The difference is not British attitudes to Africans, which were the same. The difference is that Kenya had no apparatus worth renting and Northern Nigeria had one — so Kenya got a settler colony and Northern Nigeria got a tenancy, and a tenant does not tear up the floorboards.

Where the stock extraction happened

Except in one place, where there was nothing to rent.

The Jos Plateau was not emirate country. Its peoples — the Berom above all — were stateless, non-Muslim, outside the Caliphate's writ, and had for centuries been on the receiving end of its raids. They were, in the Protectorate's own vocabulary, "pagan tribes." And they were sitting on tin.

Alluvial tin had been dug and smelted on the Plateau for a very long time by Hausa miners and smiths. From about 1902 the British moved in. The Royal Niger Company — which, by the terms of the 1899 buyout recorded in the Landscape, retained **half of all mineral royalties for ninety-nine years** in a defined block between the Niger and a line from Yola to Zinder — took

exclusive prospecting rights and led the way; by 1910 the mining companies were arriving in numbers. Output went from something like fifty tons in 1901 to around six hundred by 1910, and at its height the Northern Nigerian field supplied close to a tenth of the world's tin.

What was done to get it belongs in this module without softening.

The land was taken. Licensed area on the Plateau expanded by hundreds of square miles, and local people lost their farms to it.

The indigenous industry was destroyed by administrative fiat. Colonel H. W. Laws set up a European smelter in 1906 and found the Hausa smelters at Ririwai competing with him — so he applied to F. B. Gall, the Resident of Bauchi Province, and had the traditional smelters **banned**, over the protests of the local ruler. The competition was not outbid. It was prohibited.

And the labour was coerced. The railway that carried the groundnuts was built, between 1907 and 1912, on forced labour. The tin fields drew their men through cash taxation, the pressure of the market, the weakening of slavery, and the state's use of forced labour, until a migrant workforce assembled itself out of the poorest districts of the North and the neighbouring French territories.

The Middle Belt got the Kenyan treatment, and it got it inside Nigeria, from the same administration that was protecting the Kano farmer's right to plant what he liked.

The mine-owners who wanted Kenya and were refused

And now the detail that proves the mechanism rather than merely illustrating it.

In the second decade of the century the mine-owners pressed hard for the colonial regime to institute **Rhodesian-style labour recruitment** — the full apparatus of compulsion that produced the labour supply in Southern Africa and in Kenya. They wanted the state to deliver them men.

They were refused. And the reasons the administration gave were: the cost of doing it; the desire to encourage cash-crop growth; and **the overarching aim of social stability.**

There is the whole thing in a phrase. *Social stability* means: do not shake the machine we are renting. The mining lobby lost in Northern Nigeria exactly where the settler lobby won in Kenya, and it lost for the same structural reason that the slaves lost — because the Co-opt draw outranked every other interest in the colony, including the interests of British capital. The peasant on his farm under his emir was the load-bearing wall of the entire cheap hold, and the administration would not let the mines knock it out.

So the tin was got from the people who had no emir instead.

Reading extraction against the framework

The extraction fork is not an independent axis. It is downstream of the Menu draw. The Field Manual carries Wolfe's flow/stock distinction as its own variable. Northern Nigeria shows the two are coupled: where a conqueror inherits an apparatus complex enough to be worth renting, he *cannot* take the stock, because the apparatus runs on the population sitting where it is — so the extraction must be flow, and the native must be left with his land, his labour and his choice. Where he inherits nothing worth renting, there is no machine to protect, and the stock is on the table. **One protectorate, one governor, two extractions, and the boundary between them is the boundary of administrative complexity.** The corpus should log this as the case that ties the two variables together, because it runs both experiments at once under controlled conditions.

The peasant's victory over Lancashire is a product of the settlement, not an exception to it. He beat the British Cotton Growing Association because he had a farm, a choice, and a rival buyer — all of which he owed to the same structure that left the enslaved man in his master's house and the emir on his throne.

The order that kept a million people in slavery is the identical order that gave the free Hausa farmer the leverage to tell the Empire what he would plant. Both facts are the Co-opt draw. Neither cancels the other, and any account that reports one without the other is not measuring this colony.

And the robe's bill has now been presented to Africans twice. In the metropole, abolition was a public good bought with public money. In the colony it was a private debt — discharged by the enslaved, in *murgu*, at prices their owners set; and discharged again by the free peasantry, in *haraji*, to fund the salaries that Lugard's own memorandum says were meant to replace what the emirs had lost from slave-raiding and slave-trading. The framework holds that extraction is sorted by caste. This study can now state the sharper form: **in a colony, the cost of the metropole's conscience is itself an item of extraction, and it is levied on the people the conscience was about.**

A note on sources.

That Lugard's Memorandum on taxation justified the tax partly as compensation to chiefs for income lost from "*slave-raiding and slave-trading*" as well as from levies on their subjects is taken from the peer-reviewed scholarship on West African colonial taxation, which quotes the Memorandum directly with a page reference; **the Memorandum itself has not been read here, and only the quoted phrase is given as Lugard's words.** The consolidation of levies into *haraji* and *jangali*, the Land Revenue Proclamation of 1904 and the Native Revenue Proclamation of 1906, and the division of revenue between the colonial government and the Native Treasuries are from the secondary literature (Adebayo, "Jangali: Fulani Pastoralists and Colonial Taxation in Northern Nigeria," *IJAHS* 28:1, 1995; and the Nigerian fiscal-history literature), paraphrased and credited. The enacted texts of these Proclamations have not been obtained, and the

reader should treat their provisions as reported rather than as quoted — the same gap flagged in Modules 2 and 5.

The cotton campaign is from Jan Hogendorn, "The Cotton Campaign in Northern Nigeria, 1902–1914: An Early Example of a Public/Private Planning Failure in Agriculture" (in Isaacman and Roberts, eds., *Cotton, Colonialism, and Social History*), and from the British Cotton Growing Association's own record: the 1902 founding, the 1904 agreement with the Nigerian Government for model farms, ginneries, seed and experts, the closure of the research station in 1910, and the Association's disappointment at Kano, where the local textile industry paid the farmer as much or more than it did. Todd's "*the possible cotton crop of Nigeria is about 6,000,000 bales of 400 pounds*" is quoted as it is reproduced in the economic-history literature from Todd (1915), p. 170. The Baro–Kano railway reached Kano in 1912; some sources give 1911 for the first through traffic, and the year is given here as the literature gives it. The groundnut boom of 1912 and 1913–14, and the mobilisation of the countryside by Kano traders, headmen and agent-buyers, are from Hogendorn's *Nigerian Groundnut Exports* and from the scholarship built on it, paraphrased and credited.

The Jos Plateau tin economy is from the specialist literature (Freund, *Capital and Labour in the Jos Tin Mines*; the *Journal of African History* study of labour migration to the Northern Nigerian tin mines, 1903–1945; Mason, "Working on the Railway: Forced Labour in Northern Nigeria 1907–12"), paraphrased and credited. **Production figures — roughly 50 tons in 1901 rising to around 600 tons by 1910, and a peak share approaching a tenth of world output — are given as reported and should be treated as orders of magnitude.** The banning of the Hausa smelters at Ririwai in 1906, at the instance of Colonel H. W. Laws and through F. B. Gall, Resident of Bauchi, over local protest, is as the Plateau mining scholarship reports it. That the mine-owners pressed for Rhodesian-style labour recruitment and were refused on grounds of cost, the desire to

encourage cash-crop growth, and the overarching aim of social stability, is the finding of the *Journal of African History* study cited above, given as that study's finding and load-bearing for this module's argument. The Royal Niger Company's retention of half of all mineral royalties for ninety-nine years is from the Hansard record of 3 July 1899, as quoted in the Landscape.

And legibility is not pardon. That the Kano farmer won his argument with Lancashire is a real fact and a pleasing one, and it is set down here at full weight. It does not lighten by one ounce what was done on the Plateau to people who had no emir, and the study would be dishonest if the good news and the bad news were not in the same module. The arithmetic is laid out. The sum is left to the reader.

PATTERNS OF POWER · BRITISH NORTHERN NIGERIA — MODULE 7

I DID NOT ENQUIRE TOO CURIOUSLY WHAT BECAME OF THEM

> *Module 7 · Information and Suppression — Lugard hid his war from his own government, because his government might have stopped it. He did not hide the slaves from Parliament, because Parliament would not. Both facts are in the same Command Paper, laid before both Houses in December 1903, and nobody moved*

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The document, and the question it answers

Colonial Reports — Annual, No. 409. *Northern Nigeria: Report for 1902.* Sir F. Lugard to Mr Chamberlain, 2 September 1903. Received in the Colonial Office on 22 October. Presented to both Houses of Parliament by command of His Majesty, December 1903. Printed for His Majesty's Stationery Office. Price one shilling and threepence.

Everything this module needs is in it, and it settles a question the study has been circling since the Landscape: if the seam in Northern Nigeria is a partition of true statements by audience rather than a wall between a truth and a lie, then what, exactly, did anyone bother to suppress?

The answer is precise, and it is not the one the colonial-bend model predicts. **The suppression ran upward, from the man on the spot to his own government — and almost nothing ran outward, because nothing needed to.**

What Lugard did not tell London

He had a telegraph. From Zungeru he could put a message, plain or coded, into the Colonial Office within a day or two. Across the whole of the run-up to the Kano–Sokoto campaign, he made no use of it.

The historians who have gone through the despatches conclude that this cannot have been inadvertence in a man of Lugard's competence: doubting his ability to persuade the British Government that the expedition was necessary, he decided to force its hand by carrying the thing past the point of no return before anyone in London knew there was a point. His despatch of 7 October 1902 reached the Colonial Office and excited no notice. And then, on 5 December, the London press published a Reuter's report describing the military preparations being made at Zaria for an attack on Kano — and the Colonial Office discovered from a newspaper that its High Commissioner was about to start a war.

Chamberlain was in Natal. The Earl of Onslow was acting in his place. And on 19 January 1903 the Colonial Office approved the expedition — **two days after it had begun.**

There is more, and it is worse, and it is the detail on which Module 1 turns. The entire legal justification for the war was the letter of May 1902 in which the Sultan of Sokoto declared that between Muslims and unbelievers there could be nothing but war. That letter was written by **Abdurrahman**, and Abdurrahman died on 10 October 1902. His successor, Attahiru I, had written nothing of the kind. Lugard said nothing to the Colonial Office about the Sultan's death until his confidential despatch of 19 December — where he mentioned it **parenthetically**.

So the war was declared on the strength of a dead man's letter, against a successor who had not written it, by a High Commissioner who did not tell his own government that the author had died, who did not use the telegraph, and whose ministry learned of the campaign from Reuters and blessed it retrospectively because — as the Colonial Office's own Olivier put

it in 1906 — if the millions of people in Nigeria who did not want the British there once got the notion that Englishmen could be killed with impunity, they would not be slow to try it.

That is the suppression in this study, and its target was Whitehall.

What he told Parliament

And now set beside it what Lugard was perfectly willing to print.

In the same Annual Report, at paragraph 61, describing his departure from the conquered capital of Sokoto in March 1903, the High Commissioner of Northern Nigeria wrote this — for the Secretary of State, for both Houses of Parliament, for anyone who cared to buy it from Eyre and Spottiswoode for one and threepence:

> *"On leaving Sokoto I had a very disagreeable task to perform. Hundreds of slaves had secretly crowded into our camp, hundreds more clambered over the walls to follow us, and no prohibition would stop them. Turned out of the line of march, they ran parallel to us through the fields, or ran on ahead. I had promised not to interfere with existing domestic slaves; I had no food for these crowds, and in front of us was a desert untraversed and unmapped, in which the infrequent wells were far apart, and could only supply a very limited amount of water. Moreover, this exodus of slaves would leave Sokoto ruined, and its social fabric a chaos. There was nothing to be done but to send these poor wretches back, and instruct the Resident to enquire into all deserving cases. We did so, and presently found that the King of Gober, who was following me with an army of 300 or 400 wild horsemen of the desert, had appropriated all he could catch. We made him disgorge them, and set them at liberty to return. Doubtless very many bolted to neighbouring towns, but I considered my obligations of honour and of necessity were satisfied when I turned them out of my own following, and I did not enquire too curiously what became of them."*

Take it slowly, because it is the centre of this study and there will not be a better piece of evidence.

They came. Hundreds of them, in secret, into the camp of the army that had announced it was ending slavery. Hundreds more went over the walls of Sokoto to follow it. When they were turned out of the column they ran alongside it through the fields, and some of them ran ahead. Module 5 argued, from the scholarship, that the enslaved were the only people in Northern Nigeria who believed the British robe. Here is the High Commissioner confirming it, in a Command Paper, in his own hand, with the physical detail of people running through a field to keep up with a column that did not want them.

He sent them back. And he gives his reason without evasion, and the reason is not logistics, though he mentions the wells: *this exodus of slaves would leave Sokoto ruined, and its social fabric a chaos.* The social fabric of Sokoto was slavery. He is saying so. Preserving it was the settlement of Module 2, and here is what preserving it cost, on the road out of the city, in March 1903.

And then the King of Gober. Three or four hundred horsemen riding with the British column, who took as many of the runaways as they could catch. Lugard made him give them up and "*set them at liberty to return*" — to return, that is, to the masters they had just fled.

And then the sentence. *I did not enquire too curiously what became of them.*

Nothing in the collection is more complete. It is an admission, a confession, and an administrative return, and it is the same document. It was printed at public expense, tabled in Parliament, and shelved.

Nobody moved.

The other things in the same report

Once you know what this document is, the rest of it reads differently, and four passages should be set down because they say, in the conqueror's published words, what this study has spent six modules assembling from the archive.

On why the hold is cheap, and what holds it — the cost column of Module 5, named by the man who built it:

> "*prestige is another word for self-preservation in a country where millions are ruled by a few score.*"

On the title, and the conquest it came from — Module 1's argument, in Lugard's summary, four words long:

> "*What they had won by conquest they had lost by defeat.*"

He goes further in the same paragraph than any module of mine has: the Fulani, he writes, "*held their suzerainty by right of recent conquest*", and he can "*see no injustice in the transfer of the suzerainty thus acquired to the British Government by the same right of conquest*" — a suzerainty that carries "*the ultimate title to all land, the right to appoint Emirs and all officers of state, the right of legislation and of taxation*." And he notes, in passing, that the Habe dynasty which the Fulani overthrew was itself "*said to be the seventeenth which had overrun and conquered Hausaland*." **The recursion, counted, by the eighteenth conqueror.**

And on the vagrants — the flight-prevention machinery of Modules 2 and 5, announced to the chiefs of Kano and reported to Parliament:

> "*I emphatically forbade all slave raiding and all transactions in slaves, while saying that it was not my intention to interfere with the existing domestic slaves… We recognised, I said, no less than they did that labouring classes must exist, and I had no desire to convert the existing farm and other labourers into vagrants, idlers, and thieves, but I hoped that they would by and by see the advantage of paid free labour, which we considered more profitable and better than slave labour.*"

Vagrants, idlers, and thieves. The vagrancy law that would criminalise the fugitive slave is not a later administrative accretion, and it did not creep in behind the Empire's back. It is in the conqueror's speech to the slave-owners of Kano in February 1903 and in his report to Parliament in December, and the word for a slave who walks away from his master is chosen before the man has walked.

Where the seam actually runs

Lay the two halves of this module side by side and the framework's colonial-bend prediction has to be restated for this case.

The model expects the seam to run between the metropole and the colony: that what is hidden from London is what the conquered live, and that the order's core task is keeping the two ends from meeting. In Northern Nigeria the two ends met, in print, at one and threepence, and the meeting produced nothing.

What was actually concealed was a **war from a ministry** — and it was concealed for six weeks by a man who wanted a campaign his own government might not authorise. That is not an imperial seam. That is an ordinary bureaucratic one, of the kind that exists in every large organisation where a distant agent wants a free hand. It ran upward and it ran briefly, and it worked.

Which yields the sharpest instrument this study has produced, and the corpus should take it:

What a regime bothers to hide is a map of what its audience would actually punish.

Lugard concealed the Kano expedition from the Colonial Office because the Colonial Office had the power to stop a war and might have used it. He did not conceal paragraph 61 from Parliament, because Parliament had the power to stop him and *would not use it* — and he knew that, and he was right, and the proof is that he printed it and nothing happened. **The suppression map of an empire is not a map of its crimes. It is a map of its constituencies' thresholds** — and in December 1903 the British state's threshold ran somewhere between *an unauthorised war* and *a thousand slaves handed back to their owners on the road out of Sokoto*.

That is the finding. It is not that the British public was deceived. It is that the British public, having paid forty per cent of a year's national expenditure to end slavery, was told what had been done

with its purchase, in a Command Paper, and did not consider it worth a question in the House.

A correction to Modules 1 and the Landscape

Honesty about sources requires a correction, and it belongs here, in the module about information.

The Landscape and Module 1 gave the order of battle at Sokoto on 15 March 1903 from the standard modern reconstructions: four Maxims and four 75mm guns, and about a hundred of the Caliphate's dead. Lugard's own published report gives the column as **656 rank and file, 25 officers, 1,100 carriers, two guns and four Maxims**, facing an estimated **1,500 horse and 3,000 foot**, with Sokoto's losses "*estimated at 70 killed and 200 wounded*" and British losses of one carrier killed and one wounded. At Kano the report gives 24 officers, 12 British NCOs, 722 rank and file, four guns and four Maxims, and British casualties of **fourteen wounded and none killed**. At Burmi on 27 July it gives "*about 700 of the enemy*" killed including the ex-Sultan, against Major Marsh and ten men killed and seventy-two wounded.

Where the conqueror's own figures and the later reconstructions differ, **both are now given, and neither is adopted.** The count of the enemy's dead in a colonial despatch is an estimate made by the people who did the killing, and it is offered here as that and nothing more.

Reading information against the framework

The seam ran upward, not outward, and it ran because of where the power to stop things lay. The framework's colonial model expects the metropole to be kept ignorant of the colony. Here the metropole was *told*, in a public document, and the thing that had to be kept quiet was a military expedition, and the party it was kept from was the Secretary of State. The reason is structural and it generalises: **a distant agent conceals from**

whoever can actually restrain him. Lugard's public was not a restraint. His ministry was. So he managed the ministry and published to the public.

Publication is the tell of a belief that took completely — and paragraph 61 is the proof at full strength. Module 3 argued this from Lady Lugard's book, where a private author explained the slavery policy to a private readership. Module 7 puts it beyond argument, because now it is the *government's own* document, tabled by command of the King. The worst sentence in this study was not leaked, not uncovered, not prised out of an archive by a historian. It was **laid before Parliament and offered for sale.** Where a robe is weak, an order hides the facts. Where a robe is strong, the facts are a routine administrative return — and the strength of the British anti-slavery robe was such that its own agent could describe returning fugitive slaves to their owners, and decline to ask what became of them, and file the report, and be made a Baron.

And the corpus gains a diagnostic to sit beside the surveillance rule. *Surveillance is the tell of a belief that never took.* Add: **concealment is the tell of a constituency that would act.** Read an empire's secrets and you learn what its people would not stand for. Read what it prints, and you learn what they would.

The British Empire hid its unauthorised wars. It published its slaves.

A note on sources.

Every passage attributed to Lugard in this module is quoted **exactly** from *Colonial Reports — Annual, No. 409: Northern Nigeria, Report for 1902* (London, HMSO, December 1903), a public-domain Command Paper presented to both Houses of Parliament, read here in the full scanned text of the printed original. Paragraph 61 (the slaves at Sokoto, the King of Gober, and "*I did not enquire too curiously what became of them*") is

quoted in full and without elision. The passages on prestige and "*millions are ruled by a few score*", on "*what they had won by conquest they had lost by defeat*" and the right of conquest transferred, on the Habe as the seventeenth conquest of Hausaland, and on "*vagrants, idlers, and thieves*" are quoted from the same report. Where the scanned text carries obvious typographic corruption from the original printing, letters have been silently restored and nothing else altered. Lugard's own rendering of the Sultan's letter — that "*between the Mussulmans and Government there could be nothing but war*" — is from paragraph 34 of the same document, and differs slightly in wording from Major Burdon's translation quoted in Module 1; **both are given rather than one preferred, and the difference is itself a small lesson in how a casus belli travels.**

That Lugard made no use of the telegraph, that the Colonial Office learned of the Kano preparations from a Reuter's report in the London press on 5 December 1902, that the expedition was approved on 19 January 1903 two days after it had begun, and that Lugard mentioned the death of Sultan Abdurrahman only parenthetically in his confidential despatch of 19 December 1902, are as established in the documentary scholarship on the Kano–Sokoto expedition (drawing on Muffett, *Concerning Brave Captains*, and on the confidential despatches in CO 446); **the CO files have not been read directly here, and these points are given as the scholarship establishes them.** Olivier's remark of 1906 is quoted as it is reproduced in the secondary literature. The scholarship's judgement that Lugard's failure to use the telegraph was deliberate is given as a judgement, not a fact, and is attributed as such.

Lugard's report states as a "*well-authenticated report*" that Emir Aliyu of Kano had marched out to attack the garrison at Zaria and turned back only on hearing of the Sultan's death. **Some later accounts hold that Aliyu had in fact marched to salute the new Sultan at Sokoto and was not moving against Zaria at all.** The point is contested; it is flagged here and not

adjudicated, and the reader should note that the module's argument does not rest on it.

And legibility is not pardon. Paragraph 61 is set out in full because it is evidence, not because it is a spectacle. Lugard called the task disagreeable and it plainly was; he was not a man who enjoyed it, and the passage carries the discomfort of a person doing something he would rather not have to describe. That is the point. He did it, he described it, he was believed, he was promoted, and the people who ran through the fields beside his column went back to Sokoto. The arithmetic is laid out. The sum is left to the reader.

PATTERNS OF POWER · BRITISH NORTHERN NIGERIA — MODULE 8

THE NATURAL GROWTH OF THEIR OWN POLITICAL GENIUS

> *Module 8 · Elite Coordination and the Default — Lugard did not invent an answer to the open problem. He captured one. The Caliph had held the power to appoint and depose the emirs; Lugard took the chair and used the same power from it — and inherited, with the chair, a warrant he could not honour*

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

Two elites, two problems, one payroll

The open problem is that a centre needs capable men and the capacity that makes a man useful is what would let him replace the centre. It has no single answer; it has a menu; and which item an order draws is where the interesting variance lives.

Northern Nigeria has to answer the question twice, because there are two elites in the field.

There is the **conquered aristocracy** — the Sultan of Sokoto, the emirs of Kano and Zaria and Katsina and Gwandu, the *waziris*, the *alkalis*, the district heads. These men had administered the country the day before the British arrived and would administer it the day after. They were the apparatus. They were also, self-evidently, the only people in Northern Nigeria capable of replacing the British, and the British had just killed a great many of them.

And there is the **conqueror's own surplus** — the Residents, the Assistant Residents, the political officers: younger sons of

clergymen and half-pay officers and the professional classes, men formed to expect authority in a country that had no chairs for them.

The remarkable thing about the settlement Lugard built is that it answers both problems with one institution, and the answers come from opposite ends of the Menu.

The draw for the conquered: Co-opt, on a leash

Take the government's own description first, because it is better than any paraphrase. Here is the Annual Report for 1925, laid before Parliament, describing the Northern Provinces:

> "*Everywhere throughout these states are to be found a peaceful, diligent, prosperous and thriving peasantry, tilling their fields in complete confidence and security, governed by their own hereditary rulers, and living under forms of government which are the natural growth of their own political genius.*"

And then, in the very next sentence:

> "*For the most part these hereditary rulers fully justify the confidence placed in them, but there are, of course, cases in which they do not fulfil expectations. In those cases, steps are taken to provide the people with rulers who can be trusted.*"

Read those two sentences together and the entire architecture of indirect rule is visible in about sixty words. The *natural growth of their own political genius* — and *steps are taken to provide the people with rulers who can be trusted*. The robe and the leash, in adjacent clauses, in a Command Paper, without a flicker of embarrassment, because the men who wrote it did not experience the two as being in tension.

The leash was real, and it was statutory. The same report notes, among the year's legislation, the **Deposed Chiefs Removal**

(Amendment) Ordinance, 1925 — which "*authorises the Governor to order that any deposed chief shall within a specified time leave the area over which he exercised jurisdiction or influence… Disobedience to such an order may entail a term of imprisonment and the deportation of the chief to such part of Nigeria as the Governor may direct.*"

An *amendment*, note. The original Ordinance was already on the books. Deposed chiefs were a standing administrative category with their own statute and their own removal procedure, twenty-two years after Sokoto — and the Governor could exile a man from the country he had ruled, and gaol him if he came back.

And they used it, from the beginning. The Emir of Bauchi, deposed 1902. The Emir of Zaria, arrested, exiled to Wushishi, and deposed in 1903. The Emir of Kano, Aliyu, fled and was captured and pensioned off. After Satiru in 1906, the Emir of Gwandu and the Sarkin Jega were deposed, and the alkali of Jega dismissed for refusing to try a man on a charge arising from the rising. Tibenderana's study of Sokoto province alone traces the British hand in emirate appointments across three decades and finds it everywhere: in who was recognised as *dangaladima* and therefore heir, in whose candidacy was quietly refused, in who was deposed and why.

So: **Co-opt.** Bind the rival class to the centre — pay it, confirm it, guarantee its faith and its courts and its households — and hold over it the power to unmake any individual member. On the Menu, this is the family that binds a potentially rival class through patron-client ties rather than exporting, preventing, or rotating it.

But look harder at *how*, because this is where the case has something the Menu does not yet contain.

The instrument he did not have to invent

The Menu's Co-opt family binds the rival class *through marriage, fictive kinship, patron-client ties, or shared doctrine*. Ottoman grand viziers married into the imperial family. Steppe khans made

güregen of their sons-in-law. Ghazan and Öz Beg each converted to the creed of the faction whose backing they needed.

Lugard could do none of this. He could not marry into the Fulani aristocracy; he shared no creed with it — indeed his unbelief was the whole of the Caliph's stated objection to him; and he had no kinship, fictive or otherwise, to offer. He arrived as an infidel general with a Maxim gun and no ties whatever.

What he had instead was **the chair**.

Because the Sokoto Caliphate had already solved its own open problem, a century earlier, and had solved it *positionally*. The Caliph appointed the emirs. The Caliph deposed the emirs. In the western half of the Caliphate the Emir of Gwandu exercised that right of appointment and discipline **on the Caliph's behalf**, and the emirs of that sector paid their tribute through him. The power to make and unmake the provincial aristocracy was not a bloodline and not a creed and not a marriage — it was an **office**, and it had been sitting in Sokoto since 1804, and everybody in Hausaland had been formed for four generations to regard its exercise as the ordinary shape of the world.

Lugard sat down in it.

"*Every Sultan and Emir and the principal officers of State will be appointed by the High Commissioner throughout all this country.*" That is the Address of 21 March 1903, and Module 1 read it as a claim of title. Read it now as what it also is: **a claim to an existing administrative instrument.** He is not announcing a new British power. He is announcing that the Caliph's power has changed hands. And he then dismantled the intermediary — Gwandu's right to discipline the western emirs was ended, and Gwandu was reduced to its own emirate — so that the instrument ran directly from the Residency to each emir with nothing in between.

This is not Co-opt as the Menu describes it, and it is not Rotate, and it is not Prevent. It is a sixth thing, and the Field Manual explicitly invites the naming of one:

Assume the chair. *Where the conquered order has already solved its own open problem, and has solved it through an office rather than a bloodline, a creed, or a kin-network, the conqueror need not devise an answer at all. He occupies the seat from which the answer was already being administered, and operates the incumbent mechanism unchanged. The elite experiences the same instrument from a new hand.*

It is the cheapest item on the Menu by a very long way, because it requires no invention, no doctrine, no marriage, no bureaucracy and no time. And it is available only under a narrow condition, which is exactly the condition the complexity variable measures: **a complex apparatus is one that has offices rather than persons — and an office, by its nature, can be entered by a stranger.** That is why the variable predicts preservation. It is not merely that the machine is too valuable to break. It is that the machine has a *seat in it*, and the seat fits anyone.

What the chair could not carry

And here is the liability, and it is the reason this module matters more than it first appears.

A chair comes with a warrant, and the warrant may be one the new occupant cannot honour.

The Caliph's power to depose an emir was not a bare administrative fact. It rested on a duty: the Caliph was *amir al-mu'minin*, and his right to unmake an emir flowed from his responsibility to ensure that the emir upheld the *sharia* and carried the frontiers of Islam forward — that he waged jihad. An emir who failed in that would be deposed by the Caliph. That was the warrant, and the emirs' own obedience ran on it.

Lugard took the power. He could not take the warrant. He was an unbeliever; he had forbidden the emirs to make war; he had forbidden the raids; and he had guaranteed the religion precisely so that he would never have to have an opinion about it.

So the office he occupied began, quietly, from the day he sat down in it, to be voided of the thing that had made it obeyable. And the people who noticed were not the British and not the emirs.

Nigerian scholars of Muslim orientation have put the point with complete precision, and it is worth stating as they state it: since the pre-colonial emirs' legitimacy depended on their readiness and ability to further the frontiers of Islam, the emirs of the colonial period, who could no longer perform those functions, cannot be regarded as legitimate emirs at all — and during the Caliphal era, any emir who failed to perform them **would have been deposed by the Caliph.** The colonial emir is, on the Caliphate's own terms, exactly the kind of emir the Caliphate existed to remove.

Now go back to Module 5 and look again at who rose at Satiru in 1906. Peasants. Fugitive slaves. **Radical clerics.** No aristocrats, no wealthy merchants, no established *ulama*. The class lines were exact, and so were the theological ones. The men who rose were the men who had worked out that the emir was now a functionary of an infidel — and they rose against both, in the same movement, because by 1906 there was no longer a meaningful difference.

And it was the Sultan's own cavalry that rode out with the Maxims and razed the village, and the Sultan's own court that hanged the survivors.

The cheapest draw on the Menu carries the highest hidden liability: you inherit the discipline but not the warrant, and the elite you are disciplining is slowly hollowed out beneath you — and it is hollowed out precisely in the eyes of the people it is supposed to be keeping quiet.

The draw for the conqueror's own surplus: Export

Now turn the telescope around.

The Field Manual names, among the outlets through which an order can discharge its surplus claimants outward rather than let the pressure turn inward, *a frontier, a holy war,* ***a colonial service***. Northern Nigeria is that outlet, and the numbers show what a small, efficient valve it was.

From the Annual Report for 1925 — Nigeria's total European population, in a country of eighteen and a half million, was **about four thousand**, and the report adds, in a phrase that decides everything: "*The country is not suited for European settlement.*" No settlers. No white highlands. No 999-year leases. The Englishmen in Northern Nigeria were **employees**, and they went home.

And of those, the political officers — the men who actually ran the country — were counted thus:

> "*The Northern Provinces... are divided into twelve provinces, each under the immediate control of a resident and the whole under the general administrative control of a Lieutenant-Governor. The proportion of the number of political officers on duty to the number of the native population is about one to one hundred thousand.*"

The Northern Provinces held 10,297,509 people. **One political officer to a hundred thousand.** Call it a hundred men, give or take, administering a territory of 276,000 square miles.

That is the Export valve doing its work with extraordinary economy: an entire country converted into positions for perhaps a hundred surplus Englishmen at a time — and note what kind of positions. Lugard chose the title himself, before he ever took office, and the choice is the fiction in a word: "*the chief civil officers of the provinces are to be called Residents, which implies one who carries on diplomatic relations rather than Commissioners or Administrators.*" A Resident conducts *relations* with a sovereign. That sovereign had been conquered, and could be deposed by the man conducting relations with him, and the word was chosen anyway.

And the position was **non-heritable, non-alienable, and revocable**. A Resident in Kano had no land, no local kin, no revenue of his own, and no troops he commanded; the Frontier Force answered elsewhere. He could not pass Kano to his son. He could not turn Kano into a fief. His entire standing was derivative and it evaporated the day the Colonial Office recalled him.

Which is the point, and the corpus should mark it: **the colonial service is Export fused with Prevent.** It sends the surplus outward, *and* it denies the exported man the ability to convert his position into a heritable base — the same anti-hereditary function the Ottomans achieved by recruiting outsiders and confiscating their estates, achieved here by the opposite means, on insiders, at a distance.

So where does the exported man's ambition finally get paid? **At home, in a currency the landed class does not have to give up any land to mint.** Frederick Lugard was a chaplain's son, an army officer with no fortune, a man with no prospects in England whatever. He went out, and he came back, and in 1928 he was created **Baron Lugard of Abinger**. The colony converts a surplus claimant's ambition into a metropolitan honour — and a title costs the men who hold the estates precisely nothing.

The arithmetic of the tenancy

And now the single most economical confirmation of this study's spine, and it is in the British government's own staffing table.

Northern Provinces: one political officer per hundred thousand. Southern Provinces: one political officer per seventy thousand.

The North is bigger, emptier, further from the sea, more recently conquered, and overwhelmingly Muslim — and it needed *fewer* Englishmen per head than the South. The report explains why in its own words, and in doing so states the complexity variable as government policy:

> *"In the Northern Provinces and the western portions of the Southern Provinces, where there are chiefs of sufficient influence and ability, native administrations are recognised and supported by Government, the details of administration being left largely in the hands of the paramount chief and his officials, under the guidance and supervision of the Resident and his staff. In other parts, however, where there is no strong native authority capable of governing, the rule of the political officers is a more direct one."*

Where there is an apparatus, indirect rule. Where there is not, direct rule. **Britain wrote the Field Manual's finding into its own annual report and priced it to the nearest thirty thousand souls.** The Igbo east, acephalous and without emirs, got warrant chiefs and more Englishmen. The Kenyan highlands, acephalous and without emirs, got the *kipande* and the camps. Sokoto got a hundred men with horses.

The variable is not a theory here. It is a line item.

The default

Every order has a default: what happens if the apex does nothing, and who is standing there when it stops.

Lugard built one deliberately, and he said so — the emirs "*will rule over the people as of old time*" — and for sixty years everything the British did in the North made the emirate more solidly the answer to the question *who governs here if the white men go?* The Native Authorities collected the tax, ran the courts, held the treasuries. By 1925 those treasuries carried balances of £1,179,066, of which some £440,000 sat in securities — **invested, the report notes, through the Crown Agents in London.** The emirate aristocracy of the Sokoto Caliphate held a portfolio in the City.

And when the British went, in 1960, the default fired exactly as designed.

The Premier of the Northern Region — the region containing more than half of Nigeria — was **Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto**, a direct descendant of Usman dan Fodio, educated at Sokoto Provincial School and Katsina Training College, leading the Northern People's Congress, a party built on and through the Native Authorities the British had spent sixty years perfecting. He was, by common consent, the most powerful man in the Federation.

The rented order was handed back to its owners, with the rent paid up and the improvements thrown in. What Britain left in Northern Nigeria was not a British institution at all. It was the Sokoto Caliphate, minus the jihad, plus a Crown Agents portfolio and a railway — and the question of whether an emirate hollowed of its warrant could hold a modern country is the question of Module 10, and the answer arrives on the morning of 15 January 1966.

Reading the open problem against the framework

Classification. Northern Nigeria runs **Co-opt** toward the conquered elite and **Export** toward the metropolitan surplus, and it discharges both through one office and one payroll. That is worth stating as a general fact about empires: **a colony is simultaneously an answer to the metropole's open problem and an answer to the colony's, and the same man — the Resident — is both the discharged claimant and the disciplining hand.** England's landless younger sons are converted into Sokoto's kingmakers. One institution, two open problems, and neither constituency ever meets the other.

The Menu gains a sixth item, and the Field Manual asked for it. *Assume the chair.* Where a conquered order has already solved the open problem, and solved it through an **office** rather than a bloodline, a creed, or a marriage-network, the conqueror need not draw from the Menu at all — he occupies the incumbent's seat and runs the incumbent's mechanism

unchanged. Lugard did not co-opt the emirs by kinship or doctrine, having neither to offer. He took the Caliph's power to appoint and depose, abolished the intermediary at Gwandu, and exercised it himself for six decades. It is the cheapest answer available to any conqueror in this collection, and its precondition is precisely what the complexity variable measures: **an apparatus complex enough to be worth keeping is an apparatus organised into offices — and an office can be entered by a stranger.** That is the mechanism *underneath* the variable, and it is why Persia and China kept being reoccupied rather than rebuilt.

And the sixth item carries a liability the other five do not. *You inherit the discipline but not the warrant.* The Caliph's right to unmake an emir flowed from his duty to make him wage jihad and uphold the law; Lugard took the right, could not take the duty, and thereby began voiding the office from the moment he entered it. The co-opted elite is disciplined and paid and preserved — and quietly stripped, in the eyes of the ruled, of the only reason it was ever owed obedience. **The instrument keeps working long after the warrant has gone, which is exactly what makes the draw look so cheap for so long — and exactly why the bill, when it comes, is presented not by the elite but by the people underneath it.** Satiru is the first instalment: peasants, fugitive slaves, and radical clerics, rising against an emir who could no longer explain himself in his own tradition — and cut down by that emir's cavalry, riding beside British Maxims.

Watch the drift, because the framework says to. The classification does not hold static. Co-opt in 1903 is a bargain with a defeated sovereign; Co-opt in 1925 is a Deposed Chiefs Removal Ordinance and a Durbar for the Prince of Wales; Co-opt in 1960 is a political party. The chair was occupied, warmed for sixty years, and then vacated — and the men who sat back down in it were the great-grandsons of the man who built it.

A note on sources.

All quotations from the Annual Report are **exact**, from *Colonial Reports — Annual, No. 1315: Nigeria, Report for 1925* (London, HMSO, 1926), a public-domain Command Paper, read here in the full scanned text of the printed original: "*the natural growth of their own political genius*" and "*steps are taken to provide the people with rulers who can be trusted*" (para. 16); the ratio of "*about one to one hundred thousand*" in the Northern Provinces (para. 17) and "*roughly one political officer to every 70,000*" in the Southern (para. 34); the policy statement on where native administrations are recognised and where "*the rule of the political officers is a more direct one*" (para. 16); the Deposed Chiefs Removal (Amendment) Ordinance, 1925 (para. 89); the Northern Provinces population of 10,297,509 and the roughly 4,000 Europeans, and "*The country is not suited for European settlement*" (paras. 2–3); the native treasury balances of £1,179,066 including some £440,000 in securities, invested through the Crown Agents (paras. 24, 58); and the normal 50 per cent revenue share (para. 58). Lugard's Address of 21 March 1903 is quoted as in Module 1. His description of the Residents as "*one who carries on diplomatic relations rather than Commissioners or Administrators*" is quoted as it is reproduced in the standard accounts of his pre-1900 memorandum; the original has not been read directly.

The Caliphate's own mechanism — the Caliph's power to appoint and depose emirs, exercised in the western half of the Caliphate by the Emir of Gwandu on the Caliph's behalf, and ended by the British, who reduced Gwandu to its own emirate — is from P. K. Tibenderana, "The Role of the British Administration in the Appointment of the Emirs of Northern Nigeria, 1901–1931: The Case of Sokoto Province" (*Journal of African History*), which is in copyright and is **paraphrased and credited, not quoted at length.** The argument that colonial-period emirs cannot be regarded as legitimate on the Caliphate's own terms — because

their legitimacy had depended on furthering the frontiers of Islam, and an emir who failed in that would have been deposed by the Caliph — is reported by Tibenderana as the position of Nigerian scholars of Muslim orientation, and is given here as **their** argument, not as this study's finding. It is load-bearing for the module and the reader should weigh it as a contested position held by serious people, which is what it is.

The composition of the Satiru rising is from Lovejoy and Hogendorn as cited in Module 5. The depositions of 1906 (Gwandu, the Sarkin Jega, the alkali of Jega) are from the same literature. Lugard's peerage — Baron Lugard of Abinger, 1928 — and his parentage are from the standard biographical record. Ahmadu Bello's position as Sardauna of Sokoto, Premier of the Northern Region from 1954, and his descent from Usman dan Fodio are as the standard sources give them; **the precise degree of descent is stated variously and is therefore not specified here.**

And legibility is not pardon. The men who wrote paragraph 16 of the 1925 report believed that they were preserving something and that the peasantry was thriving, and in the narrow sense that no army had burned a Hausa village for twenty years they were not wrong. That the same paragraph provides for removing rulers who "*do not fulfil expectations*", and that the Ordinance to exile them was on the statute book, is not a contradiction they noticed. It is not a contradiction this study is required to resolve for them either. The arithmetic is laid out. The sum is left to the reader.

PATTERNS OF POWER · BRITISH NORTHERN NIGERIA — MODULE 9

WE SHOUTED SAWABA BEFORE THE COURT

> *Module 9 · Plurality or Foreclosure — the variable on which liberty turns. The Caliphate could depose a bad emir. The British could too, but only for failing the British. So the number of hands that could check an emir fell from many to one, and the one was in London and cared about the tax receipts. Indirect rule did not preserve the emirate. It made it absolute*

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The question, stated exactly

Liberty, in this framework, is not a gift and not a value. It is a **structural residue**: what is left over when violence, wealth, and trusted information are held in several hands that can check one another, rather than in one hand that owns all three. Crowded is the whole of the available liberty. Captured is foreclosure.

So the question this module asks of Northern Nigeria is not *were the British kind*. It is: **who could check the emir, and how many of them were there, and did the number go up or down after 1903?**

The answer is that it went down, and that this is the single most counter-intuitive finding in the study.

The three monopolies, and who held them

Take the inventory the framework demands, and take it honestly.

Violence. Held by one coalition. The West African Frontier Force at the top; beneath it, in every town, the emir's *dogarai*, his

district heads, his gaol. Lugard had disbanded the emirs' armies and required the surrender of firearms — but he left, and indeed depended on, the emirate's own coercive staff. At Satiru in 1906 the two arms of that coalition rode out together, and the Sultan's cavalry razed the village. There was no third force in Northern Nigeria and there was never going to be.

Wealth. Held by the same coalition. The *haraji* and the *jangali*, assessed by the emir's officials, collected by the emir's men, split — normally fifty-fifty by the 1920s — between the colonial government and the Native Treasury. By 1925 the native administrations' balances stood at £1,179,066, some £440,000 of it invested in securities **through the Crown Agents in London**. The emirate aristocracy and the imperial government were not two purses. They were one purse with two spouts.

Trusted information. Held by the same coalition — and here is where the module turns, because this is the leg that Britain did not merely fail to crowd. Britain *guaranteed the monopoly*, and did it in the language of liberty.

The pledge that was a monopoly grant

Lugard, at Sokoto, 21 March 1903:

> "*Government will in no way interfere with the Mohammedan religion. All men are free to worship God as they please. Mosques and prayer places will be treated with respect by us.*"

Read as a sentence about conscience, this is one of the more decent things any conqueror has ever said to a conquered people, and it was received — Lugard reports it himself — with "*a quite remarkable expression of joy and relief.*"

Now read it as a sentence about **structure**.

Government will in no way interfere meant, in the hands of Lugard's successors, that no Christian mission might enter the Muslim emirates. Module 4 established that this was Britain's

choice and not the emirs' demand — the Emir of Nupe had his sons at a Church Missionary Society school in Bida at his own keenly expressed desire, and the Emir of Katsina asked the High Commissioner for help with education. Britain declined.

And Module 4 established the second exclusion: the Qur'anic schools, the only schools the North had, were held ineligible for grants-in-aid because their curriculum was unsuitable. So the state neither funded the incumbent channel nor admitted a competitor to it.

The result, stated in the framework's own terms: **the trusted-information seam of Northern Nigeria, which had been *crowded* before 1903, was *captured* after it — and the instrument of capture was a promise of religious freedom.**

That the seam had been crowded before is not a romantic claim; it is a matter of record. Nineteenth-century Hausaland contained competing Sufi orders — Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya — in real and sometimes bitter rivalry. It contained Mahdist currents that could and did raise men. It contained rival scholarly lineages, and *ulama* who could denounce an emir from a pulpit, and a Caliph in Sokoto who could depose him for it. And it contained, at the very founding, al-Kanemi of Bornu writing to Muhammad Bello to tell him his jihad was illegitimate and his enslavements unlawful — an argument the jihad's own leaders admitted caused them more anxiety than anything else.

That is what a crowded seam looks like: several hands claiming the right to say what God requires, checking one another because none can silence the rest.

After 1903, one hand — the emir's *alkali*, the emir's *mallam*, appointed and paid within a Native Authority whose treasury the British audited — and a British guarantee that no rival hand would be permitted to reach for it. **The colonizer did not capture the seam by destroying the incumbent. He captured it by preserving the incumbent and locking the door behind him.**

The Field Manual observes that a conqueror who *inherits* the seam by destroying its previous occupant tends to hand himself a monopoly, because razing the old channel razes the rivals that used to crowd it — which is why a revolution against an interpreter class so often produces a more captured seam than the one it overthrew. Northern Nigeria supplies the exact mirror, and the corpus should hold both:

Preservation captures a seam as effectively as destruction, and by the opposite mechanism. Destruction razes the rivals along with the incumbent. Preservation freezes the incumbent and forbids the rivals. Either way, one hand.

What the emir lost, and what he gained

Now the counter-intuitive core, and it must be argued carefully because it cuts against every instinct.

Under the Caliphate, an emir could be checked. He could be **deposed by the Caliph** — that was the Caliph's office and his duty, and Module 8 showed Lugard taking it over. He could be denounced by the *ulama* for failing the *sharia*. He could face a rival claimant from within his own dynasty with a following and a horse. He could be overthrown by a Mahdist rising, and Mahdist risings were a chronic feature of the century. He could be attacked by a neighbouring emirate. He was, in short, a man with several enemies capable of removing him, and every one of those enemies was a check.

Under the British, an emir could be checked by **one** party: the High Commissioner. The Caliph's power to depose had passed to a man in Zungeru — and Module 8 named the statute, the Deposed Chiefs Removal Ordinance, that carried out the removals. The rival claimant could raise no army; Lugard had taken the firearms and disbanded the *dogarai*'s military function. The Mahdist rising was answered at Satiru with Maxim guns and a curse on the ground. The neighbouring emirate could not make war. And the

ulama could denounce him all they liked, because the man who would have acted on the denunciation — the Caliph — was now a British appointee himself.

So count the hands. Before: the Caliph, the *ulama*, the dynastic rival, the Mahdi, the neighbour. After: the Resident.

And ask what the Resident would depose an emir *for*. Not for oppressing his peasants; the record shows very few depositions on that ground. He would depose him for failing to keep order, for failing to remit the tax, for intriguing, for embarrassing the administration. **The one check that remained was calibrated to the interests of the colonial government, not to the interests of the governed** — and that is a precise description of foreclosure.

Indirect rule did not preserve the emirate. It made the emirate absolute — by removing every competitor for the office's power while guaranteeing the office itself with an artillery piece. The emirs of the twentieth century were more secure, more solvent, and less accountable than any emir Usman dan Fodio ever appointed.

Two constitutions in one colony

And now the constitutional fact, stated in Britain's own Command Paper, which settles the *plural where and foreclosed where* question with unusual clarity.

In 1922 Nigeria received a new Legislative Council: twenty-six official members, fifteen nominated unofficials, and — for the first time anywhere in British Africa — **elected African members**, three for Lagos and one for Calabar. The first elections were held on 20 September 1923 and, the Annual Report records, "*aroused the keenest interest.*"

And then, in the next breath:

> *"This Council legislates only for the Colony and the Southern Provinces of the Protectorate, and the Governor continues to legislate for the Northern Provinces of the Protectorate. The power of taxation in the Northern Provinces is left with the Governor."*

One country. Two constitutions. In the South: elections, a Legislative Council, a press, Herbert Macaulay's Nigerian National Democratic Party from 1923, lawyers, newspapers, trade unions — a genuinely, if narrowly, plural politics, built on the mission schools Module 4 counted. In the North: **rule by the Governor's decree, and taxation by the Governor's word, over more than half the population of Nigeria.**

The framework says an order can be plural at its core and foreclosed at its periphery. Northern Nigeria inverts the geometry: **the foreclosed zone was the majority, and the plural zone was the minority** — and one may reasonably suspect that the plurality of Lagos was affordable precisely because it could not reach Kano. The counterweights the Empire tolerated in the South were tolerable because the North was sealed against them.

The counterweight that formed anyway

It formed anyway. It took fifty years, and it came from inside.

On **8 August 1950**, in a building on Yoruba Road, Kano, a group of radicals — many of them defectors from the emirate establishment's own Northern People's Congress — founded the **Northern Elements Progressive Union**, *Jam'iyyar Neman Sawaba*, the party of the seekers of freedom. It was the first political party in Northern Nigeria. Its manifesto, the **Sawaba Declaration**, is the document this module exists to place on the record, because it is the excluded turning the order's own language back on it, and it is devastatingly accurate about what the order was:

> "*That the shocking state of social order as at present existing in Northern Nigeria is due to nothing but the family compact rule of the so-called Native Administration in their present autocratic form. That owing to this unscrupulous and vicious system of administration by the Family Compact rulers and which has been established and fully supported by the British Imperialist Government, there is today in our society an antagonism of interest manifesting itself as a class struggle, between the members of the vicious circle of Native Administration on the one hand and the ordinary Talakawa on the other.*"

The family compact rule of the so-called Native Administration. They named it exactly — and they named its author, and got that right too: *established and fully supported by the British Imperialist Government.*

And the Declaration ends:

> "*…that POVERTY may give place to COMFORT, PRIVILEGE TO EQUALITY, and political, economic, and social SLAVERY to FREEDOM.*"

The last word of the talakawa's manifesto, in Kano, in 1950, is **freedom**, and the word it is set against is **slavery** — forty-nine years after the Slavery Proclamation, fourteen years after slavery in Northern Nigeria was finally abolished, and one generation after the last people bought themselves out of it with their own wages.

Its leader, from 1953, was **Mallam Aminu Kano**: a teacher, a poet, the son of a Chief Alkali of the Kano Emirate — a man of the judicial aristocracy who turned on it — who founded the Northern Teachers' Association in 1948, the first trade union the region had ever seen. And he argued in the emirate's own idiom, not against it. Summoned before the Emir of Kano's council on charges that his politics were un-Islamic, he pointed out that the Prophet had made a defensive alliance with the Jews of Medina; that the Emir

had lately employed Christian Igbo engineers on the Great Mosque of Kano; and he asked whether it was un-Islamic when emirs wore the medals of a British order of chivalry. He and his advisers, before that meeting, performed the ablutions of men expecting to die.

What the order did to it

The apparatus Britain had preserved, guaranteed, funded and armed was turned on the counterweight, and it worked.

Not by the British, mostly. **By the Native Authority.**

The courts. Illa Ringim, remembering 1951: "*when myself and my brother Hussaini were passing by the Ringim Alkali Court, we were summoned by the court president. To our great surprise, the Alkali instructed one of his boys to beat us up. The reason for this punishment, as we learnt later, was that we shouted SAWABA before the court.*"

Read that against Lugard at Sokoto in 1903: "*The Alkalis and the Emirs will hold the law courts as of old.*" He kept the promise. Forty-eight years later the courts he preserved were beating men in the street for shouting *freedom*.

The tax. In Katsina and elsewhere the Native Authorities used assessment as a weapon — NEPU activists' rates raised punitively, by reported multiples, until a man could not both pay and remain in the party. The tax Lugard designed in 1906 to compensate the emirs for their lost slave-raiding income was, in the 1950s, an instrument for bankrupting the opposition.

The gaol. In Katsina province alone, by 1958, **over a hundred NEPU members had been imprisoned** on various charges. Abubakar Zukogi was arrested and gaoled by the Etsu Nupe at Bida. Maitama Sule, NEPU's Kano secretary, was beaten in his own house in July 1953 and left the party. In October 1953 Aminu Kano's house was attacked and he and his family were beaten. The NPC's enforcers had a name — '*Yan Mahaukata*, the mad ones.

And the women. **Gambo Sawaba** — born Hajaratu Amarteifio in Zaria in 1933 — joined NEPU's women's wing at seventeen and was its president at nineteen. She was first arrested in 1952 for going into the houses of secluded women to talk politics with them, and she was tried in the **Alkali court**, and the charge was "*drawing out women who were in purdah,*" and she was convicted and given three months. It was the first of **sixteen imprisonments**, more than any other woman in Nigerian political history. Her hair was shaved with broken bottles. She was stripped and flogged in prison.

And when the women of the North asked for the vote, the ruling party told them their franchise would come "*only in God's time.*" It did not come with independence. Women in Northern Nigeria did not vote until the 1970s.

Sixteen years in and out of prison, a party of teachers and peasants, a manifesto, a trade union, a women's wing — and the machinery that broke them was the machinery Frederick Lugard had promised, in the ruins of Sokoto in March 1903, to leave exactly as he found it.

Reading plurality against the framework

All three monopolies, one coalition, and the seam was captured by an act of toleration. Violence: the Frontier Force and the emir's men, one chain of command. Wealth: one tax, one split, one treasury with an account at the Crown Agents. Trusted information: one channel, guaranteed by the state, with the competitors excluded by law and the incumbent's own rivals frozen out by the same guarantee. **This is a fully captured order, and it is worth insisting on that verdict precisely because it was such a *gentle* capture** — no censorship bureau, no political police, no *kipande*, no camps. It did not need any of that, because there was nothing left to check it.

Which yields the module's contribution, and it is the mirror of a finding the framework already holds. The Field

Manual notes that a conqueror who *inherits* the seam by destroying its previous occupant tends to end with a monopoly, because razing the incumbent razes the rival channels that used to crowd it. Northern Nigeria establishes the reverse route to the same destination: **a conqueror who *preserves* an incumbent interpreter class, and guarantees it against competition, captures the seam just as completely — and more durably, because the capture wears the incumbent's own face and cannot be denounced as foreign.** Destruction and preservation are two roads to one monopoly. **Add to the diagnostic: ask not only whether the conqueror destroyed the old channel, but whether he *insured* it.**

And the liberty finding, which is the one to take away. Every honest measure says the *talakawa* of 1930 was safer than the *talakawa* of 1890: the raids had stopped, the walls came down, the roads were open. And every structural measure says he was **less free**, in the only sense this framework recognises, because the number of hands that could remove a bad emir had fallen from five to one, and the one had no interest in whether the emir was bad — only in whether he was orderly and solvent. **Indirect rule is not conservation. It is the removal of every check on an office except the conqueror's own, disguised as respect for tradition.** The emir kept his throne and lost his accountability, and the peasant kept his farm and lost his last court of appeal — which had been, of all things, the Caliph.

Pressure released as neither reform nor rupture — it released as inheritance. The framework warns that a foreclosed order ruptures because the elite fractures, exhausts, is conquered, or overbreeds, not because the excluded finally rise. Northern Nigeria confirms it from an unexpected angle: **the excluded rose, in an organised, articulate, disciplined party with a manifesto and a women's wing — and were beaten in the emir's court, taxed into poverty, and gaoled by the hundred, and it changed nothing.** NEPU never took the North. The NPC did, on the Native Authority machinery, and carried it

into the Federation; and when the order finally broke, in January 1966, it broke because young army officers — insiders, not the crowd — shot the Sardauna of Sokoto in his house. That is Module 10, and it is the framework's rule holding exactly.

One last note, and it belongs here. In 1979 the successors of NEPU took power in Kano State under the People's Redemption Party, and among the first things they did was **abolish the *jangali***, the cattle tax that Frederick Lugard had codified in 1906 — the tax his own Memorandum said was there to compensate the chiefs for the income they had lost from slave-raiding and slave-trading. It took seventy-three years, and the *talakawa* had to win an election to do it, and they did it in the first year they held the pen.

A note on sources.

The Sawaba Declaration is quoted **exactly**, as it is reproduced in the Nigerian public record and in the accounts of the party's founders; the passages given are the paragraph on "*the family compact rule of the so-called Native Administration*" and the Declaration's closing invocation of "*POVERTY… COMFORT, PRIVILEGE… EQUALITY, and political, economic, and social SLAVERY to FREEDOM.*" NEPU was founded in Kano on **8 August 1950**; the Declaration of Principles was issued at the party's first convention, held at Kano on 3–6 April 1951, and an English translation by Aminu Kano of the original Hausa was published by the party in 1953. **The dating of the Declaration is given variously in the sources — some place it at the founding in August 1950, others at the 1951 convention — and both are noted here rather than one chosen.**

Illa Ringim's account of being beaten at the Ringim Alkali Court in 1951 for shouting *Sawaba* is quoted from his autobiography as recorded by Beita Yusuf and reproduced in the Nigerian historical literature; it is a translated recollection, given as such. The imprisonment of over a hundred NEPU members in Katsina

province by 1958, the Native Authorities' use of punitive taxation and corporal punishment against NEPU activists, the assaults on Maitama Sule (July 1953) and on Aminu Kano and his family (October 1953), the gaoling of Abubakar Zukogi by the Etsu Nupe, and the NPC enforcers known as '*Yan Mahaukata* are from the specialist literature on NEPU and Native Authority relations (Iliyasu on Katsina province; Alkasum Abba; Sklar, *Nigerian Political Parties*), **paraphrased and credited, not quoted at length.** The figure of a reported threefold increase in NEPU members' tax assessments is given as reported and should be treated as an illustration rather than an audited statistic.

Gambo Sawaba's first arrest in Kano in 1952, her trial before the Alkali court on a charge of "*drawing out women who were in purdah,*" her three-month sentence, her presidency of NEPU's women's wing at nineteen, her sixteen imprisonments and the punishments recorded of them, and the NPC's answer to northern women's demand for the franchise — that it would come "*only in God's time*" — are as the Nigerian record reports them; the quoted phrases are given as reproduced there. Aminu Kano's defence before the Emir of Kano's council (the Prophet's alliance at Medina, the Christian engineers at the Great Mosque, the emirs' British decorations) is from the biographical literature, paraphrased.

The constitutional passages — the 1922 Legislative Council, the first elections of 20 September 1923, and the statement that the Council "*legislates only for the Colony and the Southern Provinces… and the Governor continues to legislate for the Northern Provinces… The power of taxation in the Northern Provinces is left with the Governor*" — are quoted exactly from *Colonial Reports — Annual, No. 1315: Nigeria, Report for 1925* (HMSO, 1926), paras. 13–14, as in Module 8, together with the native treasury balances of para. 24. Lugard's Sokoto Address of 21 March 1903 is quoted as in Module 1; his report of the "*quite remarkable expression of joy and relief*" at the guarantee of religious freedom is from the Annual Report for 1902, quoted as in

Module 7. The competition of the Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya, the Mahdist currents, and al-Kanemi's challenge to Bello are as in the Landscape and Module 5.

The abolition of the *jangali* by the People's Redemption Party government in Kano State in 1980 is as reported in the Nigerian press and political literature.

And legibility is not pardon. The peace the British brought to Hausaland was real, and the *talakawa* of 1930 lived a safer life than his grandfather. That is set down without qualification, and it is the strongest thing that can be said for this order. It does not touch the finding of this module, which is that the same settlement quietly removed every hand that could have restrained the man who ruled him — and then, when his grandchildren organised a party and a union and a women's wing and said so out loud, beat them in the courts it had promised to preserve. The arithmetic is laid out. The sum is left to the reader.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

PATTERNS OF POWER · BRITISH NORTHERN NIGERIA — MODULE 10

SOMETHING LIKE A PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT

> *Module 10 · Change and Collapse — the floor under Northern Nigeria never cracked. It was written off. Britain kept every soldier she had and lost only the credibility of using them, and then a new Prime Minister asked his Cabinet what each colony was worth, and the answer came back that Nigeria was not worth holding*

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The graveyard of risings, in one country

Begin by counting the times the ruled of Nigeria rose, and what it got them.

Satiru, March 1906. Peasants, fugitive slaves and radical clerics, in the name of God, against the emirs and the Empire together. They destroyed a British column in February and were annihilated in March — upwards of two thousand dead in an afternoon — by five hundred and seventy rifles, a field gun, Maxims, and the Sultan of Sokoto's own cavalry. The ground was cursed. It has never been rebuilt.

The Women's War, November–December 1929. In the south-east, fifteen to twenty-five thousand Igbo and Ibibio women rose against the warrant chiefs and the threat of taxation — sitting on the chiefs, burning Native Courts, closing markets, paralysing the administration for weeks. Troops fired on unarmed women and killed more than fifty of them. And here the record must be exact,

because it is the one entry that pays: the women **won their tax concession**, and the warrant-chief system was reformed in 1933. Their structural demands — women on the Native Courts, a woman as District Officer — were, in the words of the administration, regarded as irrational and ridiculous. They moved the price. They did not move the structure.

Iva Valley, 18 November 1949. Twenty-one striking coal miners and a bystander shot dead by colonial police at the Enugu colliery.

NEPU, 1950–1960. The *talakawa* of the North organised a party, a manifesto, a trade union, a women's wing and a political school, led by a man of real moral stature, arguing in the emirate's own theological idiom. They were beaten in the alkali courts, taxed into ruin by the Native Authorities, and gaoled in the hundreds. Gambo Sawaba went to prison sixteen times. NEPU never took the North.

Four risings. Four defeats. One concession, on a tax.

That is what a rising against an intact floor produces, and it looks the same in Hausaland in 1955 as it did in Swabia in 1525. In Northern Nigeria the *talakawa* faced not one intact floor but two, stacked: the emirate's, a century and a half old and running on the conviction of the governed; and the Empire's, guaranteeing the emirate's with artillery. No quantity of courage, organisation, justice, or enlightenment was going to shift that arrangement, and none did.

So the question this module must answer is the only one worth asking: **what happened to the floor?**

What did not happen

It did not crack.

This has to be said carefully, because the easy version is wrong and the easy version is what the phrase "exhausted by the war" invites. Britain in 1960 was not Russia in 1917. Her army had not been annihilated. Her officer corps had not divided. There was no

mutiny, no collapse of the state, no rival elite in the field. The West African Frontier Force existed. The Royal Navy existed. Had the British government resolved in 1960 to hold Northern Nigeria by force, there was — in the crude sense of men and guns — nothing on the Niger that could have stopped it.

What Britain had lost was not the reach. It was **the credibility of the reach, and then the will to pay for it** — and the framework is precise on this point: the cost column runs on the *credible expectation* of organised violence against a defector, not on the raw capacity for it. A power that everyone knows will not fight has an empty cost column whether or not its magazines are full.

So: not a floor shattered. A floor **written off**. And the writing-off has a date, a room, and a paper trail.

What the war actually did

Britain won the Second World War and was ruined by it — not in her army but in her ledger.

She had borrowed to fight it on a scale no state had attempted: by 1945 she owed something in the order of **£14 billion**, much of it to the Commonwealth itself, in the sterling balances — money the imperial centre owed its own periphery. Lend-Lease was terminated abruptly at the war's end, and Keynes went to Washington to negotiate the Anglo-American Loan Agreement: **$3.75 billion**, on terms including sterling convertibility, a condition that promptly produced a run.

Set one number against another. In **October 1956**, the entire foreign currency reserve of the United Kingdom stood at roughly **$2.2 billion**. The United States alone held **$3.75 billion** of British debt.

The Empire was, before it was anything else, a debtor's estate. And the creditor sat in Washington.

Port Said

On 26 July 1956 Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal. Britain and France, in collusion with Israel, invaded at the end of October to take it back: eighty thousand men, the largest British amphibious operation since 1944, against a state with no serious air force, to recover a waterway Britain had built, owned and garrisoned for seventy years.

Militarily it worked. It was destroyed anyway, in nine days, by money.

Eisenhower did not fire a shot. He did three things. He **blocked the IMF** from extending Britain the $561 million standby credit she was counting on. He **blocked the Export-Import Bank** from a further $600 million. And he let it be understood that the United States Treasury was preparing to **sell its holdings of sterling bonds**.

The Bank of England lost $45 million between 30 October and 2 November. November's projected losses in gold and dollar reserves ran past $200 million. Macmillan — Chancellor of the Exchequer, shortly to be Prime Minister — told the Cabinet that the reserves could not sustain what was coming, and that within weeks Britain would be unable to import sufficient food and fuel.

The Cabinet accepted a ceasefire at midnight on **6–7 November 1956.**

An American memorandum of 26 November recorded the consequence in one sentence, and it is worth having in the government's own words: "*The spectacle of seeing their military success turned into defeat by diplomatic action of the 'superpowers' will further encourage the British to consider themselves a second-rate power.*"

That is the moment the cost column emptied — and note precisely what emptied it. Not a defeat in the field; Britain won in the field. Not a rising in the colonies; the colonies were quiet. **A foreign treasury threatened a currency, and an empire discovered it could not act.** After 6 November 1956 the credible

expectation of organised British violence against a defecting colony was gone — not because Britain lacked soldiers, but because everybody, including Britain, now knew she would not use them without permission, and would not be given permission.

The audit

Anthony Eden resigned on 9 January 1957. Harold Macmillan became Prime Minister.

On 28 January 1957 — nineteen days into his premiership, twelve weeks after the ceasefire — he instructed the Cabinet's Colonial Policy Committee to report on which territories were ripe for independence, which would qualify for Commonwealth membership, and, thirdly, to prepare

> **"*something like a profit and loss account*"** *for each colony, so that ministers would be aware what would be gained or lost by granting independence.*

The Committee produced seventy-six pages. It named the immediate candidates: Malaya, already set; the Caribbean and Central African Federations; and **Nigeria — in 1960 or 1961.**

Nigeria became independent on **1 October 1960.**

Read the sequence once more, slowly, because it is the spine of this module and of the paper standing behind it.

The date of Nigerian independence was fixed in a British Cabinet committee, in a document written in London in 1957, by ministers performing an accounting exercise on the profitability of their possessions — three years before the flag came down, and no Nigerian wrote it, read it, was consulted on it, or knew that it existed.

The talakawa did not free themselves. They were audited, and released.

The control case, and its honest limits

The obvious objection is that the pressure of African nationalism is *in* that ledger — that the risings raised the cost of staying, and so did the work after all, through the accounts rather than the barricade.

The framework grants this in advance, and grants it properly: pressure from below is a genuine cause, operating not by breaking the floor but by raising the standing price of the settlement. It is the weight on the lever. The question is only whether it is ever the hand that moves it.

And this collection holds the control.

Kenya fought. From 1952, a State of Emergency: a forest war, screening, detention camps, executions, a security apparatus, an archive burned before the flag came down, and a toll that begins at the official eleven thousand and runs upward into figures the burning was meant to obscure. It was the most sustained armed challenge to British rule in Africa. Kenya became independent in **December 1963.**

Nigeria did not fight. No Emergency, no forest war, no camps, no insurgency of any kind. Nigeria became independent on **1 October 1960.**

Same empire, same Colonial Office, same decade, same audit — and **the colony that fought a war was released three years after the colony that did not.**

The comparison will not bear every weight one might want to put on it: Kenya had a settler population that had to be bought out and reassured, and that alone would have delayed matters, and it is also the reason the rising happened. So the honest finding is narrower than a slogan and harder than one:

Armed rising did not accelerate the departure. It may well have raised the price. It did not set the date, and the colony where nobody fired a shot went first.

Who actually led

Look at who received the state, because *Elite Chaos* predicts the answer and the record supplies it without a wrinkle.

Not the *talakawa*. NEPU lost, and its leader sat in the Federal House as an opposition member.

The men who took the country from Britain were a counter-elite of insiders, formed by the order they inherited. **Ahmadu Bello**, Sardauna of Sokoto, a descendant of Usman dan Fodio, Katsina College man, Premier of the Northern Region, master of the Native Authority machinery Britain had spent sixty years perfecting. **Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa**, Prime Minister, Katsina College. **Nnamdi Azikiwe**, mission-schooled, American-educated, newspaper proprietor. **Obafemi Awolowo**, lawyer, called to the English bar.

Not a peasant among them. Not a herdsman, not a farmer, not a freed slave. Every one of them a product of exactly the formation Module 4 showed being withheld from the majority — which is precisely why they, and not the majority, were standing there when the flag came down. **The men who could take the state were the men the state had formed, and the state had formed almost nobody.**

The crowd cheered on 1 October 1960. It was present at the opening. It authored nothing.

The second collapse

The order Britain left lasted five years and three months.

At about two in the morning on **15 January 1966**, a group of young army officers — majors, most of them — moved simultaneously in Kaduna, Ibadan and Lagos. In Kaduna, Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu went to the Premier's lodge and killed **Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto**, and one of his wives. In Lagos, the Prime Minister, **Tafawa Balewa**, was taken from his house and shot, and his body left at a roadside. **Samuel Akintola**, Premier of the West, was killed. So was the Finance

Minister, **Festus Okotie-Eboh**. So were the senior officers of the Nigerian Army — Maimalari, Ademulegun, Kur Mohammed, Shodeinde, Largema, Unegbe — shot by their own juniors in a single night.

The ruler of the North, descendant of Usman dan Fodio, the most powerful man in Nigeria, was killed in his house by a major.

This is elite fracture in its purest documented form. The men who did it were not peasants and were not led by peasants. They were the counter-elite in uniform: young, credentialled, formed, and blocked — officers who had been trained to expect the country's future and who believed the political class had sold it. Nzeogwu's broadcast from Radio Kaduna named the enemy as the political profiteers and the swindlers and the men who demanded ten per cent: the vocabulary of a disappointed insider, not of a rising class. About two dozen men with pistols, inside the one institution Britain had built that actually worked.

Then the reload. A counter-coup in July, Northern officers killing the general the January plotters had inadvertently installed. Then the pogroms of autumn 1966, in which Igbo civilians in the North were massacred in numbers given between eight thousand and thirty thousand and higher, and perhaps a million fled east. Then Biafra, and a war of two and a half years, and a famine inside a blockade, and a toll the honest sources give as a range from about half a million to three million — overwhelmingly children, overwhelmingly starvation.

The people were the fuel. They were the crowd in the streets of Kano and the conscripts in the bush at Owerri. They were never the spark.

The metabolic test, applied

The framework asks a hard question here: the mass death a collapse collects is proportional to how much genuine, life-sustaining coordination the order was actually performing — catastrophic where the coordination *was* the subsistence

metabolism, near-bloodless where it was only governance and commerce.

Apply it to the British order in Northern Nigeria, and it returns an answer that indicts nothing and explains everything.

Britain left, and almost nobody died. There was no famine in 1960, no economic collapse, no breakdown of subsistence, no rupture in the countryside at all. The harvest came in. The markets opened. The alkali sat. The emir sat.

And the reason is the whole of this study in a sentence: **Britain's coordination in Northern Nigeria was thin — one political officer per hundred thousand people, governance and commerce and nothing else — and so its removal cost almost nothing.** The subsistence metabolism of the North was the peasant farm and the emirate that taxed and judged it, and Britain had never been that. She had rented it. **A tenant's departure does not bring down the house.**

Which means the cheapness of the hold and the cheapness of the exit are the *same fact*, read at two ends of the order's life. The complexity variable that told Lugard to preserve the apparatus in 1903 is the same variable that told Macmillan the apparatus could be handed back in 1960 without catastrophe — because it had never stopped being somebody else's.

And it sharpens the contrast the corpus already holds. In Kenya, Britain **had** inserted herself into the metabolism, by taking the land — the stock extraction of Module 6, the nine-hundred-and-ninety-nine-year leases. So Kenya's exit required a land settlement, a buyout, a war and an Emergency, because Britain could not simply stand up and leave a table she had taken a seat at. **In Nigeria she had never sat down.**

The deaths of 1967–70 belong to a different account, and it is important not to launder them into this one. They are not the metabolic cost of the British order's collapse. They are the cost of the *federation's* collapse into war, and specifically of a blockade deliberately applied to a region that could not feed itself without trade. The coordination that was severed there was real and it

was subsistence — which is exactly why the toll was what it was. Module 11 will count it.

Reading the collapse against the framework

The crack was exhaustion — but in its colonial form, and the corpus should carry the distinction. *Elite Chaos* gives exhaustion as a floor shattered from outside by great-power war, the army dissolved, the survivors forced to pay the men they armed. Northern Nigeria is not that, and pretending it is would be sloppy. **Britain's floor was never broken; it was priced, and found not worth the money.** The reach survived; the credibility of the reach died at Port Said on 6 November 1956, when a foreign treasury proved it could stop a British army without firing; and the reach itself was then formally written off in a Cabinet committee eleven weeks later. **In the colonial case, exhaustion arrives as an accounting decision, and the ledger is kept on another continent.** That is a distinct sub-mechanism and it deserves a name of its own, because it is how most of the European empires actually ended.

The colonial subject's liberation is a function of a variable he cannot see, cannot influence, and is not consulted about. The cost column holding a Hausa farmer in place in 1955 was underwritten by a force living four thousand miles away, and it emptied because of a canal in Egypt and a bond position in Washington. No case in this collection states *Elite Chaos*'s thesis more brutally, and none documents it better, because this crack has a date, a room, a Prime Minister, and a title: **something like a profit and loss account.**

Reform or reload? Reload, and comprehensively. The rupture of 1966 installed no plurality. The NPC inherited the Native Authority machinery; the army inherited the NPC's state; the emirs stayed. The *talakawa*'s party was dissolved with all the others. The one hand that could check an emir changed from a Resident to a Premier to a Brigadier, and remained one hand.

Northern women did not vote until the 1970s. When the *talakawa* finally reached power in Kano in 1979, under NEPU's successors, one of their first acts was to abolish the *jangali* — Lugard's cattle tax, the one his Memorandum said was there to compensate the chiefs for the income they had lost from slave-raiding. It took seventy-three years and an election.

The Menu classification held, and outlived every order that used it. Module 8 classified this as Co-opt executed by *assuming the chair*. The framework asks whether the classification drifted, and warns that the drift is usually the collapse's mechanism. **Here it never drifted — and that is the finding.** The chair was occupied by the Caliph, then the High Commissioner, then the Premier of the Northern Region. The Sultan of Sokoto is still the Sultan of Sokoto; the Emir of Kano is still the Emir of Kano; the alkali courts still sit. **What broke in January 1966 was the federation — the newest joint in the structure, five years old, with no formation behind it and no naturalisation at all. An order breaks at its youngest joint.** The thing Britain *built* collapsed. The thing Britain *rented* is still standing.

And the filter's verdict, which is not a verdict. The British order in Northern Nigeria met a test it had not been designed for — a fiscal-military test administered from Washington, by a rival elite, at a moment of the rival's choosing — and it did not bear it. That is a finding about structural fit under the pressure this order happened to meet, and it is nothing else. It is not proof the design was foolish; the design was, on its own terms, brilliantly economical, and it held sixty years for the price of a hundred men. Nor is the emirate's survival a verdict in the emirate's favour. It survived because it had already passed its tests — 1804, 1903, 1906, 1966 — and had had a hundred and sixty years of undisturbed formation to compound a single answer into something that now looks like the furniture of reality. **Survival is structural fit, never moral desert.** The filter has no foresight

and no preferences. Read it as more and the directing hand has been smuggled back in.

A note on sources.

Macmillan's instruction to the Cabinet's Colonial Policy Committee of **28 January 1957**, and his call for "*something like a profit and loss account*" for each colony so that ministers would know what would be gained or lost by granting independence, is quoted as it is given in the scholarly literature on British decolonisation (W. D. McIntyre, *British Decolonization, 1946–1997*), which cites the Cabinet papers directly. **The Cabinet document itself has not been read here, and the phrase is given as that literature gives it.** The resulting seventy-six-page report, and its identification of Malaya, Nigeria (in 1960 or 1961), and the Caribbean and Central African Federations as the immediate candidates, is from the same source.

The financial mechanics of Suez are from the specialist literature and the American diplomatic record: British wartime borrowing of roughly £14 billion by 1945, largely in sterling balances owed to Commonwealth members; the 1945 Anglo-American Loan Agreement and the $3.75 billion of British debt held by the United States; British foreign currency reserves of approximately $2.2 billion in October 1956; Eisenhower's blocking of $561 million in IMF standby credit and $600 million from the Export-Import Bank, and the threatened sale of US sterling holdings; the Bank of England's loss of $45 million between 30 October and 2 November 1956; and the ceasefire at midnight on 6–7 November. These are drawn from Boughton's IMF study of the crisis, the US Army War College's analysis of it as financial coercion, and the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series. The judgement that the British would henceforth "*consider themselves a second-rate power*" is quoted from a US State Department memorandum of 26 November 1956 (FRUS 1955–57, vol. XXVII), a public-domain government document. **Macmillan's**

warning to the Cabinet about food and fuel imports is reported in the literature, which also records that Treasury officials had given him less alarming figures than those he presented, and that colleagues suspected him of dramatising the crisis to unseat Eden. That dispute is noted and not resolved; nothing in this module depends on Macmillan's sincerity, only on the Cabinet's decision.

The Women's War of November–December 1929 is given from the standard accounts: fifteen to twenty-five thousand women mobilised across Owerri and Calabar provinces; troops fired on unarmed protesters and killed **more than fifty**; the tax on women was abandoned and the warrant-chief system reformed in 1933; the women's structural demands were refused. **Casualty figures for the Women's War vary in the sources and are given here as reported.** The Iva Valley shootings of 18 November 1949 (twenty-one striking miners and a bystander killed at the Enugu colliery) are as the record has them. Satiru is as in Module 5; NEPU as in Module 9.

The events of 15 January 1966 — the killings of Ahmadu Bello, Tafawa Balewa, Samuel Akintola, Festus Okotie-Eboh, and the senior officers of the Nigerian Army — are as the standard accounts establish them. **Nzeogwu's Radio Kaduna broadcast is paraphrased, not quoted, because a verified text was not obtained here.** The casualty figures for the pogroms of 1966 (given between eight thousand and thirty thousand and higher) and for the civil war of 1967–70 (given between roughly half a million and three million, overwhelmingly from starvation) are **contested and given as ranges**; Module 11 will treat them properly. Ahmadu Bello's descent from Usman dan Fodio is as the standard sources give it; **the precise degree is stated variously and is therefore not specified.**

The Kenya comparison draws on the British Kenya study in this collection and on the standard accounts of the Emergency; that toll is likewise contested and is not adjudicated here. The abolition of the *jangali* by the People's Redemption Party

government in Kano State in 1980 is as reported in the Nigerian political literature.

And legibility is not pardon. To show that Nigerian independence was scheduled in a British ledger takes nothing from the courage of the people who fought for it, or the justice of their case, or the stature of Aminu Kano and Gambo Sawaba and the men who shouted *Sawaba* before the court and were beaten in the street for it. It is to say what actually moved the date — because a study that flatters the people it describes has stopped measuring anything, and the flattery would be the deeper insult. The pressure from below was real. It was the weight on the lever. The lever was worked in Whitehall.

The arithmetic is laid out. The sum is left to the reader.

PATTERNS OF POWER · BRITISH NORTHERN NIGERIA — MODULE 11

WE KILLED MEN AND WOMEN AND SEVENTEEN CHILDREN

> *Module 11 · The Grim Accounting — the only continuous record of slave-raiding in British Northern Nigeria was kept by the raider himself. He was a District Head, confirmed in office by the British, who asked him to stop in December 1920 and reappointed him as tax collector in the same breath, and did not depose him until 1927*

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The ledger, and who kept it

Muhammad Hamman Yaji was the District Head of Madagali, in the far north-east of Nigeria, from 1902 until his arrest in August 1927. He held that office under the Germans and then, from the First World War, under the British. He was confirmed in it, paid through it, and used it to collect the tax.

From September 1912 until the day before his arrest he kept a diary, in Arabic, sometimes almost daily. It is the only document of its kind in the region's history: not a colonial report, not a traveller's account, not a historian's reconstruction, but the private working record of an African ruler under colonial rule, written for himself.

It is, for the most part, a ledger of slave raids.

Over roughly nine years it records **more than a hundred raids** on the non-Muslim hill peoples of the Mandara mountains — the *montagnards* of Sukur and the surrounding massifs — the

taking of some **2,016 captives**, and the killing of at least **two hundred men**, of whom he specifies a hundred and sixty-eight. Livestock by the herd. Women exchanged as gifts, or traded — three, on one occasion, for a horse.

And this entry, which gives the module its title:

> "*I sent Fadhl al Nar with his men to raid Sukur and they captured 80 slaves, of whom I gave away 40. We killed men and women and 17 children.*"

That was written by a man holding a British warrant, in a British Protectorate, some years after the conquest that had been fought — and was still being celebrated in London — to end slavery in exactly this territory.

The British knew. In 1916, before they had even formally assumed responsibility for the region, they were already describing an "*orgy of oppression and confiscation*" in Madagali and Mubi, **where slaves were being sold openly.** And in **December 1920** the District Officer went to Hamman Yaji and prevailed upon him to desist — while, in the same act, **confirming him in his position as District Head with responsibility for collecting taxes.**

He was not deposed until **August 1927**, and the reviewers of his diary note, drily, that when the British finally moved it may have had less to do with the slaving than with his Mahdist sympathies. He died in exile in 1929.

That is the accounting. Everything else in this module is arithmetic around it.

What the founding cost

Set out the conquest first, and set it out with the victors' figures marked as such, because there are no others.

Kano, February 1903: the walls stormed; British casualties fourteen wounded, none killed. Kano's dead are not counted anywhere.

Sokoto, 15 March 1903: Lugard's own report gives the enemy at 1,500 horse and 3,000 foot, and their losses as "*estimated at 70 killed and 200 wounded*" against one British carrier killed. The modern reconstructions put the Caliphate's dead nearer a hundred. Two hours.

Burmi, 27 July 1903: "*about 700 of the enemy*" killed, including Caliph Attahiru I, against Major Marsh and ten men dead and seventy-two wounded.

Satiru, 10 March 1906: upwards of **two thousand men** killed in an afternoon, with some three thousand women and children taken; the village razed, the ground cursed, never rebuilt.

And then the part that is almost never counted, because it was never a war and so never got a name. The Protectorate ran **annual punitive patrols** for a decade and a half into the non-Muslim districts — the very peoples the Caliphate had been raiding, now being "pacified" by the power that had come to protect them. The 1902 Annual Report describes the policy in language that should be quoted rather than summarised, because it is the administration speaking to Parliament about the people it was about to shoot:

> "*…it is unfortunately true that the African savage in his primitive state can, as a rule, understand nothing but force, and regards arguments and verbal lessons as the weapons of the weak.*"

A town captured. Heads of the marauding band arrested. "*A heavy fine was imposed.*" That formula recurs, patrol after patrol, year after year, and behind each instance is a number nobody wrote down.

There is no total. There will never be a total. The dead of the pacification patrols are the largest missing figure in this study.

What the standing order cost

Slavery, for thirty-five more years. The legal status was abolished in 1901; the institution was not abolished until **1936**. Between one and two and a half million people were enslaved at the conquest. **One hundred and two thousand** of them assembled the purchase price of their own bodies and paid it to their owners, through the emirs' courts, under Maliki law. The rest waited, or died waiting, and the plantation slaves — who had no capacity to work on their own account and so could never accumulate the price — mostly could not buy anything at all.

And the raiding did not stop where nobody was watching. Hamman Yaji's 2,016 are the only ones we can count, and we can count them only because he counted them. The victims were, without exception, people who had no emir, no *alkali*, no treasury and no apparatus — the hill peoples, the "pagan tribes," the stateless. The identical population that Module 6 found losing its land to the tin companies on the Jos Plateau, and its smelters to an administrative ban.

This is the study's variable, written in blood: **the peoples who had an apparatus were preserved, and the peoples who had none were handed to them.**

Forced labour. The Baro–Kano railway was built, between 1907 and 1912, on it. The tin fields of the Plateau drew their workforce through cash taxation, the pressure of the market, the weakening of slavery, and the state's use of forced labour, until a migrant workforce assembled itself out of the poorest districts.

The foreclosed lives. Twelve government schools in 1915, with an average of **733 pupils**, in a population of ten million. Twenty-five thousand Qur'anic schools, ineligible for a penny of grant. Literacy in the North under five per cent at mid-century against roughly twenty in the South. Fewer than ten Northerners in the senior ranks of their own region's civil service in the early 1950s. Northern women did not vote until the 1970s. **A formation gap does not appear in a mortality table. It**

appears sixty years later, in a civil service list, and then in a war.

And the mortality the order did not cause but did not prevent. The influenza pandemic of 1918–19 killed, on the standard estimate, **about half a million Nigerians out of a population of eighteen million, in under six months**, with half to four-fifths of the population stricken. It was not a British crime; it was a global catastrophe. But it moved along the railways and the trade routes the British had built, and the scholarship on the Northern Provinces finds the administration's response marked by neglect. The same line that carried the groundnuts carried the virus, and that is a real cost of coordination and belongs in the column without polemic. The scholarship on the famines of the period — Michael Watts's work above all — argues that colonial taxation in cash, and the push into cash-cropping, eroded the buffers that had carried Hausa households through bad years. **I have no verified death toll for the famine of 1913–14 and will not invent one.**

What the order actually delivered

Now the other column, and it must be given at full weight or the module is worthless.

The raids stopped. Not everywhere, as Hamman Yaji proves — but across most of the North, they stopped. The Sokoto Caliphate had raided its neighbours annually, as **state policy**, for a century; whole districts of what became the Middle Belt were harvested for human beings, generation after generation, and villages built walls against it and lost their children to it. After 1903 the great annual raids of the emirates ceased. The tribute in slaves ceased. The trans-Saharan export, which had run in the thousands a year, ended.

That is not a small thing. It is, measured in lives not taken, probably the largest single good the British did in Northern

Nigeria, and a study that cannot say so plainly has stopped being an accounting and become a prosecution.

The peace was real. For sixty years there was no war in Hausaland. A *talakawa* farmer in 1930 lived a materially safer life than his grandfather: no cavalry over the horizon, no wall to man, no children taken. Module 9 said he was less *free* in the structural sense, and that stands. He was also not raided, and that stands too, and both are true at once, and holding both is the whole discipline.

And there were roads, a railway, a currency, courts of appeal against mutilation, and treasuries that did not exist before. The Native Administrations had over a million pounds on their books by 1925. These are not nothing.

The conqueror's syllogism

The syllogism runs: *order is necessary; this order provided order; therefore this order was necessary.* It is the oldest argument in the repertoire and it is false at the join, and the way to refuse it is to be precise about the counterfactual.

The alternative to British rule in 1903 was not chaos. It was **the Sokoto Caliphate**, an administratively sophisticated state that had held Hausaland for a century and would have gone on holding it — a state that raided its neighbours for human beings and was, on the enslaved population's own evidence, one of the largest slave societies in modern history. That is the honest comparison, and it does not flatter anybody. The choice on offer in 1903 was not between a slave empire and freedom; it was between a slave empire run from Sokoto and a slave empire run from Sokoto with a British Resident at the Sultan's elbow, an anti-slavery proclamation in the gazette, and a promise not to interfere with existing domestic relations.

What Britain actually delivered was the end of the *raids* and the survival of the *slavery*. It took the part of the institution that was visible from London — the raiding column, the caravan, the

market — and left the part that was not: the household, the farm, the concubine, the man who could not buy himself.

And here is the structural fact that the whole study has been assembling, and it is the hardest thing in it.

Britain could not have done otherwise *and kept the Menu draw*. One political officer per hundred thousand people cannot abolish slavery across a quarter of a million square miles. He cannot inspect a household. He cannot audit a district head in the Mandara mountains. He has no independent channel of information — the courts are the emirs', the police are the emirs', the tax assessors are the emirs', and the only reports he receives come from the men he is supposed to be watching. **The thinness that made indirect rule so cheap is the identical thinness that made abolition unenforceable.** You cannot rent a machine and also audit it.

So the betrayal in this study is not, in the end, a story about wicked men. Lugard was not a monster and Flora Shaw was not a liar and the Residents were not, mostly, cruel. **It is an arithmetic consequence of the only rational item on the Menu.** The apparatus was complex, so the draw was preservation; preservation meant a hundred Englishmen; a hundred Englishmen cannot enforce an abolition; so the abolition was not enforced, and the robe was refitted around the result, and the men who did the refitting believed every word.

That is legibility. It is not pardon. **The people in Hamman Yaji's diary were not killed by an arithmetic. They were killed by men, one of whom Britain confirmed in office, and paid, and asked politely to stop.**

What the collapse cost

Module 10 established the shape and it needs only its figures here.

The British departure cost almost nothing. No famine, no economic collapse, no rupture in the countryside. The harvest

came in. That is exactly what the metabolic test predicts of an order whose coordination was thin — governance and commerce, never the subsistence metabolism.

The successor's collapse cost everything. The coup of 15 January 1966 and its counter-coup; the pogroms of that autumn, in which Igbo civilians in the North were killed in numbers given between eight thousand and thirty thousand and higher, with perhaps a million fleeing east; and then the war of 1967–70, whose dead are given across the range **half a million to three million**, overwhelmingly from starvation inside a blockade, overwhelmingly children.

These are not the metabolic cost of the British order's collapse and must not be laundered into it. They are the cost of the **federation's** collapse — the youngest joint, the newest institution, the thing with no formation behind it. But the shape of that federation, and the North–South fracture that ran through it, and the education gap that made Southerners the clerks of a Northern region, and the line between where missions could work and where they could not — all of that was drawn in London and Kaduna, and the accounting must say so without pretending the Igbo and the Hausa were not the ones who pulled the triggers.

The record that does not exist

One last entry, and it is a negative one.

Every number in this module was written down by somebody with power. We know 102,000 people bought their freedom because the **courts** recorded the transactions. We know Hamman Yaji took 2,016 captives because **Hamman Yaji** wrote it in his diary. We know the dead at Sokoto and Burmi because **Lugard** estimated them for Parliament. The dead of the pacification patrols we do not know at all, because nobody with a pen was interested.

There is no archive of the enslaved of Northern Nigeria. There are no letters, no memoirs, no petitions in their own hands,

no census of the ones who never bought themselves. The most numerous class in the study left the thinnest record in it — and the thinness is not a measure of their unimportance. It is the filter, operating on the evidence base itself: power leaves paper, and the powerless leave silence, and a method that mines the paper will always be tempted to mistake the silence for absence.

This module records the silence as an entry, because it is one.

Reading the accounting against the framework

The toll is sorted by the same variable as everything else. Extraction is sorted by caste; the framework says so. Northern Nigeria adds that **the body count is sorted by apparatus**. The peoples with a state — the Hausa, the Fulani, the emirates — got peace, preservation, and a Resident who would not interfere. The peoples without one — the montagnards of Madagali, the Berom of the Plateau, the "pagan tribes" of the patrols — got raided, dispossessed, conscripted, and shot, sometimes by the British and sometimes by British-appointed emirs with British warrants in their pockets. **The complexity variable does not merely predict who gets co-opted. It predicts who gets killed.** That is the grimmest finding this collection has produced and the corpus should carry it in exactly those words.

The cheap hold and the unenforceable robe are one fact, not two. This is the study's central structural claim and Module 11 is where it can finally be stated with the evidence behind it. The apparatus was complex; the rational draw was preservation; preservation is cheap precisely because it uses somebody else's men; and an order that uses somebody else's men **has no independent eyes**. Britain's inability to see Hamman Yaji for fifteen years was not negligence — it was the *design working as designed*. **An order that rents its floor cannot police its own promises, because the only people who could police them are the people it rented the floor from.** Every colonial apologia

that cites indirect rule's economy, and every indictment that cites its failures, are describing the same mechanism from two ends.

Refuse the syllogism, and refuse its mirror. *Order is necessary, therefore this order was* — no: the counterfactual was not chaos but the Caliphate, and the Caliphate was itself a slave state, and neither fact rescues the other. And the sentimental mirror — *the price proves only cruelty* — is equally false: the raids really did stop, the trans-Saharan trade really did end, and a great many people who would have been taken were not taken. **Both columns are real. The sum is not a moral verdict and this study does not offer one.**

And the record's thinness is a finding, not a gap. The filter selects for what survives, and what survives is what the powerful wrote. That the best documentation of slave-raiding under British rule is the *raider's own diary* — discovered, as it happens, by a District Officer named Kirk-Greene, the same man whose documentary collection preserved Lugard's Address at Sokoto — is not an irony. It is the mechanism. **The archive of an order is assembled by the order, and a method built on archives must say so out loud, every time, or it will mistake the shape of the evidence for the shape of the past.**

A note on sources.

The Diary of Hamman Yaji is published as *The Diary of Hamman Yaji: Chronicle of a West African Muslim Ruler*, edited by James H. Vaughan and A. H. M. Kirk-Greene (Indiana University Press, 1995). **Important caveats, stated plainly.** The original Arabic manuscript is lost; what survives is the English translation made by Assistant District Officer L. N. Reed immediately after Hamman Yaji's arrest in 1927. Only the entries for 1924–27 were translated in full — which is to say, **not the principal raiding years** — and the earlier material is therefore known in less complete form. The quoted entry ("*…they captured 80 slaves, of whom I gave away 40. We killed men and women and 17 children*") is quoted as it is

reproduced in the published edition and in reviews of it. The aggregate figures — over a hundred raids across roughly nine years, some 2,016 captives, at least two hundred men killed of whom 168 are specified — are as the published scholarship on the diary reports them, and they are **the raider's own count**, which is to say a minimum and not a measure. The British observation of an "*orgy of oppression and confiscation*" in Madagali and Mubi in 1916, with slaves sold openly; the District Officer's visit of December 1920, at which Hamman Yaji was told to desist and simultaneously confirmed as District Head and tax collector; and the arrest of August 1927 are as Vaughan and Kirk-Greene establish them, paraphrased and credited.

Lugard's casualty figures for Kano, Sokoto and Burmi are quoted exactly from *Colonial Reports — Annual, No. 409: Northern Nigeria, Report for 1902* (HMSO, 1903), as in Module 7, and are the victors' estimates. The passage on the "*African savage in his primitive state*" and the imposition of "*a heavy fine*" are quoted from the same public-domain report. The Satiru figures are as in Module 5, and are likewise the victors' arithmetic.

The influenza mortality — approximately 500,000 Nigerian deaths out of a population of about 18 million within six months, with 50–80 per cent of the population stricken — is from the demographic literature on the 1918–19 pandemic in Nigeria (Ohadike, *Social Science & Medicine*), paraphrased and credited; the finding that the colonial response in the Northern Provinces was marked by neglect is from the recent scholarship in the *African Historical Review* and is given as that scholarship's argument. **No death toll is given here for the Northern Nigerian famine of 1913–14, because none was verified; Michael Watts's *Silent Violence* is the standard treatment and its argument — that colonial cash taxation and cash-cropping eroded pre-colonial famine buffers — is reported as his, not asserted as fact.**

The figure of 102,000 self-purchases and the terminal date of 1936 are from Lovejoy and Hogendorn, as in Module 2. The

educational figures are as in Module 4, and are orders of magnitude. The civil war and pogrom tolls are **contested and given as ranges**, as they must be: the pogroms of 1966 at between eight thousand and thirty thousand and higher; the war of 1967–70 at between roughly half a million and three million, with the great majority of deaths from starvation. **These ranges are wide because the underlying counts are genuinely disputed, and narrowing them here would be a fabrication.**

And legibility is not pardon. Hamman Yaji's entry is quoted in full and used as a title because it is the evidence, not because it is a spectacle. Seventeen children were killed in one raid by a man who held a warrant from the empire that had abolished slavery, and he wrote it down, and the empire asked him to stop seven years later and left him in office. That is the accounting. The arithmetic is laid out. The sum is left to the reader.

PATTERNS OF POWER · BRITISH NORTHERN NIGERIA — MODULE 12

THE EIGHTEENTH

> *Module 12 · Convergence and Divergence — Lugard, writing to Parliament in 1903, noted in passing that the dynasty the Fulani overthrew was itself "the seventeenth which had overrun and conquered Hausaland." He counted. He knew what he was. He simply did not think it disqualified him — and on the framework's own terms, it does not*

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The footnote

It is buried in paragraph 25 of the Annual Report for 1902, in a sentence about the Fulani jihad, and it is the most quietly astonishing thing in the document. Describing the Habe dynasty that Usman dan Fodio overthrew in 1804, Lugard notes that it was "*itself said to be the seventeenth which had overrun and conquered Hausaland*."

Seventeen conquests. He counted them, and he wrote the number down, and he put it in a report to the Secretary of State, and then he went on to explain — in the same document — that the Fulani "*held their suzerainty by right of recent conquest*" and that he could "*see no injustice in the transfer of the suzerainty thus acquired to the British Government by the same right of conquest.*"

He was the eighteenth, and he knew it, and he did not think it disqualified him.

The framework agrees with him — not about the justice, which is not the framework's business, but about the structure. **There is no first innocent order anywhere in this study.** What Lugard broke in 1903 was a floor laid in 1804 by a conqueror who had

come, in his turn, to end an oppression, and who was accused at his founding — by al-Kanemi of Bornu, in writing — of committing the exact crime he had come to abolish. What the Fulani broke was the seventeenth. And what came after Lugard was Ahmadu Bello's Northern People's Congress, and after that the generals, and the office in Sokoto is occupied this morning.

This module reads the case against the corpus, states what it confirms and complicates and refutes, makes the revisions, and ends where the discipline requires — on the strongest argument against everything written above, stated fully, and answered without flinching.

What converges, and why it is not a hand

Set the colonial studies of this collection beside one another and the same shapes recur with a regularity that would look like conspiracy if you did not know the mechanism.

Every one of them shows a **floor of force** laid first and a **robe** fitted afterward. Every one shows the robe cut for the metropole and the army, whose belief funds and mans the conquest, and not for the conquered, whose belief the floor does not need. Every one shows extraction **sorted by caste**. Every one shows the seam split by distance. And every one shows a conqueror arriving not at an aboriginal baseline but at a **former conquest**, naturalised long enough to have become the furniture of reality.

No hidden hand arranged that. Nobody in Whitehall wrote to Paris to compare notes on the management of Muslim aristocracies. The convergence is what happens when many men, in structurally identical positions, work the same problem with the same instrument — and the instrument is the same because, as this collection's founding premise insists, the hardware has not changed in fifty thousand years. **Position logic at scale looks exactly like conspiracy from the outside and is nothing of the kind from the inside.**

The corpus, read side by side

But the interesting thing is not the convergence. It is the **divergence** — and the corpus now contains enough cases to say, with some confidence, what drives it.

Northern Nigeria. A caliphate with an assessed tax system, a trained judiciary applying a written law, an appointed provincial aristocracy, a treasury, and twenty-five thousand schools. Britain drew **preservation**, kept the man *and* the institution, ran the country on one political officer per hundred thousand people, built no surveillance apparatus, took a **flow** extraction and left the peasant his land — and left, in 1960, without a shot, on a date set by an accountant. **The emirate is still there.**

Kenya. An acephalous Kikuyu order — no emirs, no alkalis, no treasury, no assessed tax, nothing to inherit. Britain **forged** chiefs who had never existed, imposed a formation that never took, and got the tell exactly where the framework says it should appear: the *kipande* at two million throats, one of Africa's earliest mass fingerprint registers — the physical infrastructure of distrust — and then the Emergency, the Home Guard, the camps, and an archive burned before the flag came down. A **stock** extraction: the land taken on nine-hundred-and-ninety-nine-year leases, and the profitable crop forbidden by law.

Buganda. A kabaka, a katikkiro, a chiefly hierarchy — a complex apparatus. Britain ruled **through the Katikkiro**, exactly as the variable predicts.

French Vietnam. A mandarinate: one of the most complete formation ladders in the pre-modern world. And here the corpus records the variable **holding at one level and failing at the other**, which is precisely the outcome the Field Manual warns to look for. France kept the mandarins and **cut the ladder** — the triennial examinations ended in Tonkin in 1915 and Annam in 1918, the last palace examination at Huế in 1919 — while leaving the village, the family and the ancestor cult standing. The Vietnam

study names it correctly: not neglect but **decapitation**. The docile base preserved, the elite-reproducing apex removed.

French Algeria. An Ottoman regency, a religious establishment, a tribal order — a real apparatus, and France destroyed it anyway. Direct rule, the *sénatus-consulte*, the *Code de l'indigénat*, a settler population, and the most expensive and bloodiest order in the collection.

Saint-Domingue. No native apparatus at all: a substrate erased, a population imported, an economy of pure extraction — and the one case in the corpus, and very nearly in world history, where the enslaved overthrew the order and founded a state.

The variable, and the thing that overrides it

The complexity variable explains most of that table. Where the apparatus was worth keeping — Sokoto, Buganda, and the mandarinate — it was kept. Where there was nothing to keep — Kenya's highlands, Igboland, the Caribbean — chiefs were forged or populations imported.

But Algeria breaks it. Algeria had an apparatus and France smashed it. So the variable is not sovereign, and the corpus can now name the thing that overrides it.

Settlers.

A settler constituency wants the **stock** — the land itself — and the stock cannot be taken without destroying the apparatus that runs on the population sitting on it. Where the metropole has a settler lobby with a claim on the metropole's politics, the settler lobby wins, the extraction turns from flow to stock, the native becomes an obstacle rather than a labour supply, and the complexity of his administration becomes irrelevant because his administration is going to be removed along with him. Algeria and Kenya both had settlers. Northern Nigeria, Buganda and Vietnam, in the main, did not.

And so the corpus arrives, by a long road, at the sentence that decided the whole history of Northern Nigeria, and it is printed in the Annual Report for 1925 without a scrap of ceremony:

"*The country is not suited for European settlement.*"

Malaria. Blackwater fever. The tsetse fly. West Africa was the white man's grave, and the men who might have wanted Hausa land could not live on it, and so there was **no settler lobby, no demand for the stock, no reason to break the emirate, and therefore indirect rule** — with all that followed: the cheap hold, the preserved slavery, the withheld formation, the bloodless exit, and an emir in Kano this morning.

The corpus should sit with that. **The *Anopheles* mosquito is one of the most consequential actors in this study.** In Saint-Domingue the same insect destroyed Napoleon's army of reconquest and bought Haiti the years it needed. In Northern Nigeria it prevented settlement and thereby produced the gentlest and most durable colonial order in the collection. One vector; opposite mechanisms; both decisive. Geography is not background in this method. It is a variable, and sometimes it is *the* variable.

The ladder, and what cutting it manufactures

Now the sharpest thing the corpus yields when Northern Nigeria and Vietnam are laid side by side, because it joins Module 4 to Module 8 to *Elite Chaos* in a single mechanism.

France cut the Confucian ladder. The scholar-gentry who for a thousand years had climbed from village schoolmaster to palace examination to the mandarinate — the men whose ambition the old order had absorbed, credentialled, and seated — suddenly had nowhere to climb. And what France got, within a generation, was a revolutionary counter-elite: the Đông Kinh Nghĩa Thục closed within eight months, Phan Chu Trinh sentenced to death, Phan Bội Châu exiled — and then the men who went to Paris and

Moscow and Canton and came back to run a war that ended at Điện Biên Phủ.

Britain did not cut the ladder in Northern Nigeria. It left the *mallam*, the *alkali*, the Qur'anic school, and the emir's court exactly where they were, funded them out of Native Treasuries, guaranteed them with artillery, and printed the law book in London. **So the ambitious young Hausa of 1930 had somewhere to climb — and the top of the ladder was inside the British system.** Ahmadu Bello went up it: Sokoto Provincial School, Katsina College, Sardauna, Premier. Aminu Kano, the one man in the study who tried to build a rival ladder, was the son of a Chief Alkali and was beaten back down by the courts his father's class administered.

Northern Nigeria produced no revolutionary counter-elite because it never manufactured one. Vietnam manufactured one on purpose, without meaning to, by removing the rungs.

That is a finding the corpus should hold in exactly these terms: **elite overproduction is not only something an order suffers. It is something a conqueror can *induce*.** Cut a formation ladder and you do not merely deprive a people of schooling — you take the men who would have been magistrates and make them insurgents. Leave the ladder standing and the ambitious will climb it into your own administration and become your district heads. The Menu's families — Export, Prevent, Rotate, Divide, Co-opt — are all techniques for *managing* surplus claimants. Cutting a ladder is the technique for *creating* them, and no one who has ever done it has intended to.

Saint-Domingue, and the exception that is not one

The corpus contains what looks like the refutation of everything Module 10 argued: a colony where the enslaved rose, won, and founded a state. If *Elite Chaos* is right that structural change never comes from below, what is Haiti?

It is the thesis's most spectacular confirmation, and the Saint-Domingue study says so.

The floor cracked in Paris first. The French Revolution destroyed the metropolitan elite — the nobility eliminated, the Terror, the Vendée, foreign war, the bankruptcy of the fiscal-military machine that had built the colony in the first place. The whites of Saint-Domingue split three ways. The National Assembly's decrees armed the free men of colour. Spain equipped and trained Toussaint. Yellow fever destroyed Napoleon's army of reconquest, and the Napoleonic Wars gave the new state the years it needed to survive its infancy.

And the control cases are *in the same colony*. Makandal was executed in 1758. Ogé was broken on the wheel in 1790. The enslaved of 1791 were not braver than the enslaved of 1758, and not better organised than the free men of colour of 1790. **What changed was in Paris.**

Now set that beside Northern Nigeria and the pair is exact. In Saint-Domingue the colony was created by the fiscal-military machine and destroyed by the bankruptcy of that same machine. In Northern Nigeria the Royal Niger Company was bought out by a fiscal-military state at a cost of £865,000 — and the colony was released, one hundred and sixty years later, by the bankruptcy of that same state, at Suez, in a Cabinet committee, with a profit and loss account. **Two colonies, two centuries, one thread: the metropole's ledger built the thing and the metropole's ledger dissolved it, and on neither occasion was anybody in the colony asked.**

The difference is only that Haiti's ledger collapsed catastrophically and Britain's collapsed politely.

What the case confirms, complicates, and refutes

Confirms. The complexity variable, at its strongest documented instance, **holding at both levels** — Britain kept the emir *and* the alkali court *and* the Maliki law *and* the mallam's school, and

printed the law book. The recursion, counted aloud by the conqueror himself. The revealed-preference test: twenty million pounds, forty per cent of a year's expenditure, no compulsion, and therefore a real belief. *Elite Chaos*, with a date, a room, and a document. And the surveillance rule, confirmed by its absence — no *kipande*, no register, no Emergency, sixty quiet years.

Complicates. Four things, and each is a refinement rather than a refutation.

The seam is not always a wall. The method assumes concealment — what is hidden from the metropole is what the conquered live. In Northern Nigeria the truth was **published**: by Lady Lugard, at five hundred pages, in 1905; and by Lugard himself, in a Command Paper, in December 1903, including the sentence about the slaves who ran beside his column and were sent back. Nobody moved. **Publication is the tell of a belief that took completely** — where the frame is strong enough, disclosure is not a risk but a routine administrative return. And its corollary: **concealment is the tell of a constituency that would act.** Lugard hid his war from the Colonial Office because the Colonial Office could have stopped it. He printed paragraph 61 because Parliament would not.

Withheld formation is not always brittle. The colonial bend predicts that forming nobody leaves the order expensive and brittle. Northern Nigeria was the cheapest hold in the corpus. Because withholding formation leaves no vacuum **if a prior formation is still running** — and the framework's category of the "native counter-formation" therefore has to split. In Algeria and Kenya the native religious apparatus stood *against* the colonizer and he watched it. In Northern Nigeria it stood *underneath* him and he funded it.

The surveillance rule needs one word added. Its absence measures the presence of a belief — **but not the identity of the thing believed.** Northern Nigeria was quiet not because Britain's robe took, but because dan Fodio's had, and Britain was standing

on it. A conqueror who inherits a self-running order inherits its silence, and may report that silence home as consent to himself.

And preservation captures a seam as completely as destruction. The Field Manual notes that razing an interpreter class razes the rivals that crowded it, which is why revolutions produce more captured seams than they destroy. Northern Nigeria is the other road to the same place: a pledge of religious non-interference, operationalised as a mission ban, **froze the incumbent channel and forbade all competitors** — and the emir who could once be deposed by a Caliph, denounced by the *ulama*, and unseated by a rival or a Mahdi could now be checked by one hand only, and that hand cared about the tax receipts. **Indirect rule did not preserve the emirate. It made it absolute.**

Refutes. Nothing outright — but it **bounds** the complexity variable, which is more useful. The variable predicts the draw *only in the absence of a settler constituency*. Where settlers want the stock, the apparatus dies however sophisticated it is, and Algeria is the proof.

The revisions

Four, stated plainly, for the corpus to take or reject.

One. A sixth item on the Menu: *Assume the chair*. Where the conquered order has already solved its own open problem, and solved it through an **office** rather than a bloodline, a creed, or a marriage-network, the conqueror need not draw from the Menu at all. He occupies the incumbent's seat and runs the incumbent's mechanism unchanged. Lugard could not co-opt by kinship (he had none) or by doctrine (his unbelief was the Caliph's whole objection). He took the Caliph's power to appoint and depose emirs, abolished the intermediary at Gwandu, and exercised it for sixty years. **This is the mechanism underneath the complexity variable: a complex apparatus is one organised into offices, and an office can be entered by a**

stranger. It may be why Persia and China were reoccupied rather than rebuilt.

Two. Assuming the chair carries a liability the other five do not: you inherit the discipline but not the warrant. The Caliph's right to unmake an emir flowed from his duty to ensure the emir waged jihad and upheld the law. Lugard took the right and could not take the duty. The office began hollowing the day he sat in it — and the people who noticed first were not the emirs but the peasants, the fugitive slaves, and the radical clerics who rose at Satiru in 1906 and were cut down by that emir's cavalry.

Three. The extraction fork is downstream of the Menu draw, not parallel to it. You cannot rent a machine and smash the thing it runs on. Where the apparatus is worth keeping, the extraction must be flow and the peasant keeps his land — which is why a Hausa farmer could tell Lancashire what he would plant and a Kikuyu could not.

Four, and the grimmest. The complexity variable does not merely predict who gets co-opted. **It predicts who gets killed.** The peoples with a state — Hausa, Fulani, the emirates — got peace, preservation, and a Resident who would not interfere. The peoples without one — the montagnards of Madagali, the Berom of the Plateau, the "pagan tribes" of the patrols — got raided, dispossessed, conscripted and shot, sometimes by the British and sometimes by British-warranted emirs. Hamman Yaji is that finding in one man's handwriting.

The strongest counter-position

Now state the case against all of it, at full strength, in its own voice, with nothing held back.

You have shown that Britain preserved slavery for thirty-five years after promising to abolish it. Very well. Now say what you would have had them do.

The menu in 1903 had three items. Leave the Caliphate alone — and the annual raids continue, the tribute in slaves continues, the

trans-Saharan caravans continue, indefinitely. Destroy the emirate and rule directly — which the Treasury would not fund, and which, where it was actually tried, produced Kenya: forged chiefs, a fingerprint register, a State of Emergency, detention camps, and a burned archive. Or preserve the apparatus and abolish slowly.

Britain chose the third, and your own Module 11 concedes the result. ***The raids stopped.*** *The annual harvesting of the Middle Belt stopped. The tribute in slaves stopped. The trans-Saharan export stopped. You count Hamman Yaji's 2,016 captives — a real and terrible number, and one you would not know without a British District Officer preserving the diary. You do not count, because you cannot, the hundreds of thousands who were* ***not*** *taken between 1903 and 1936 because the emirates' raiding armies had been disbanded by four Maxim guns.*

And the abolition came. In 1936 — slowly, shamefully slowly — but without a war, without a famine, and without a Mau Mau. Britain left behind a currency, a railway, a civil service, a peace of sixty years, and a state. The catastrophe of 1966 to 1970 was made by Nigerians.

And your own framework proves the point. You demonstrate that the complexity variable made preservation the only rational draw. You demonstrate that the exit was near-bloodless precisely because the hold was thin. Then say what follows: Lugard's design was not a betrayal of the anti-slavery robe. ***It was the only available way of honouring any part of it*** *— the maximum abolition purchasable at a price the metropole would actually pay. A hundred Englishmen ended the slave-raiding of a subcontinent. That is not hypocrisy. That is what success looks like when the budget is real.*

The answer

Concede first, and concede fully, because the argument earns it.

The raids stopped. That is true, it is enormous, and this study has said so in every module that touched it. The counterfactual to

British rule was not freedom but the Caliphate, and the Caliphate was one of the largest slave societies in modern history, and it raided its neighbours annually as a matter of state policy, and no one here has pretended otherwise. A person of good faith can look at that trade — the raids ended, the slavery preserved — and judge it worth making. This study does not tell him he is wrong. It has no instrument for telling him that.

But the defence makes three moves that must be refused, and they are refused on the evidence rather than on the sentiment.

It converts a constraint into a virtue. Britain did not choose the cheapest option *in order to* maximise abolition. It chose the cheapest option because the Treasury would not buy a dearer one — and then, having discovered that the cheap option was incompatible with the promise, it published a book explaining why the incompatibility was progress. "*It is not to the interest of the administration to hasten its operation. On the contrary, it is evidently to be desired in the interests of the country that it should work slowly.*" That is not a man doing the most he can afford. That is a man explaining, to an audience that has already paid, why he will not do more.

It invoices the wrong party. *The maximum abolition purchasable at a price the metropole would pay.* Note the payer. The metropole paid twenty million pounds in 1833 and declined to pay again. So the enslaved of Northern Nigeria bought themselves — one hundred and two thousand of them, at prices their owners set, in their owners' courts, under their owners' law. And their free neighbours paid the emirs' compensation for lost slave-raiding income, in *haraji*, because Lugard's own Memorandum said the tax was for exactly that. **The price the metropole would pay was zero. The price was paid in Kano.** A defence resting on fiscal constraint must say *whose fisc*.

And it asks to be judged on the raids alone. But the accounting is not only mortal. The order foreclosed a formation for sixty years — twelve schools, seven hundred and thirty-three boys, in a population of ten million — and that foreclosure is why

the North had fewer than ten senior civil servants of its own in 1950, and why the line between where missions could preach and where they could not became a line between Christian and Muslim drawn across the middle of a country. **The bill for indirect rule did not stop running in 1960. It has not stopped running.**

And yet — hold the discipline; do not flatten what will not flatten — **the counter-position does not simply lose.** It survives, and it survives in this form, which is true:

There was no available British policy in 1903 that would have both kept the peace and ended the slavery, because the peace was purchased with the very institution the slavery was lodged in. The emirs were the peace. The emirs were also the slaveholders. Britain could have had the raids stopped or the slavery ended and could not, at any price it was willing to pay, have had both.

It chose the raids. And here is the thing that makes this study worth writing rather than merely worth prosecuting: **it lied to nobody about the choice.** It printed the choice. Lady Lugard printed it in 1905 and the High Commissioner printed it in a Command Paper in 1903, and Parliament read it and bought it for one and threepence and moved on to the next item.

So what the study insists on is narrow and it is this: **that it was a trade; that it was chosen; that somebody paid for it; and that the people who paid were not consulted, were not compensated, and were not the people who made the choice.**

Call the trade justified, if you have weighed it and that is your judgement. **Do not call it a liberation.**

Because the only people in Northern Nigeria who ever believed that word were the men and women who climbed over the walls of Sokoto in March 1903 and ran through the fields beside a British column because they had been told an empire had come to set them free — and who were turned out of the line of march, and handed to the horsemen of Gober, and sent back.

They were the only people the Empire had to police. And their case was closed by a sentence, in a public document, that no one in London thought worth a question in the House:

"*I did not enquire too curiously what became of them.*"

Lugard counted seventeen conquests before him. He was the eighteenth. The Northern People's Congress was the nineteenth, and the generals were the twentieth, and the office in Sokoto is occupied this morning by a descendant of the man who took it in 1804.

The arithmetic is laid out. The sum is left to the reader.

A note on sources.

Lugard's observation that the Habe dynasty was "*said to be the seventeenth which had overrun and conquered Hausaland*", and his statements that the Fulani "*held their suzerainty by right of recent conquest*" and that he could "*see no injustice in the transfer of the suzerainty thus acquired to the British Government by the same right of conquest*", are quoted exactly from *Colonial Reports — Annual, No. 409: Northern Nigeria, Report for 1902* (HMSO, 1903), as in Module 7. "*The country is not suited for European settlement*" is quoted from *Colonial Reports — Annual, No. 1315: Nigeria, Report for 1925* (HMSO, 1926), as in Module 8. Flora Shaw's "*it is not to the interest of the administration to hasten its operation*" is quoted from *A Tropical Dependency* (1905), as in Module 3. Paragraph 61 is quoted as in Module 7.

The comparative material is drawn from the other studies in this collection — British Kenya, British Buganda, British Jamaica, French Algeria, French Vietnam, French Saint-Domingue — and from the framework papers, chiefly *Elite Chaos*, *The Machine That Runs Itself*, *The Architect and the Inheritor*, and the Field Manual. **Where this module characterises those studies' findings, it is reporting them, not re-deriving them**: the Vietnamese examination abolitions (Tonkin 1915, Annam 1918, the last palace

examination at Huế in 1919) and the reading of that policy as *decapitation* are the Vietnam study's; the *kipande* figures and the reading of surveillance as the tell of a failed belief are the Kenya study's; the account of Saint-Domingue's collapse as a fracture originating in Paris, with Makandal (1758) and Ogé (1790) as the control cases, is the Saint-Domingue study's.

Hamman Yaji's diary, its editors, its provenance and its **serious evidential limits** — the lost Arabic original, the surviving Reed translation of 1927, and the fact that only the 1924–27 entries were translated in full, which is to say **not the principal raiding years** — are as set out in Module 11, and the reader should carry those caveats into any use of the figures. The 102,000 self-purchases and the 1936 terminal date are Lovejoy and Hogendorn's. The educational figures are orders of magnitude, not audited counts. Macmillan's "*something like a profit and loss account*" is quoted as the decolonisation scholarship gives it, from the Cabinet papers; the Cabinet document has not been read directly.

The settler-override proposition advanced in this module is this study's own and is offered as a hypothesis, not a finding. It fits the six colonial cases the collection presently holds. Six cases is not a test. It should be attacked with the cases that would break it — a settler colony that preserved a complex apparatus, or a settler-free conquest that destroyed one — and if such cases exist the proposition should be discarded without regret.

And legibility is not pardon. The counter-position at the end of this module is stated in its own voice and at its full strength because it deserves to be, and because a study that will only quote its opponents weakly has already stopped being an inquiry. It is answered, and the answer does not dissolve it. Both columns stand. The arithmetic is laid out, and the sum is left to the reader — which is the whole of what this collection has ever claimed to do.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*